International Data Encryption Algorithm - Revision history

Suffusion of Yellow: Reverted 2 edits by Digfuse6 (talk): Rm WP:OR, see Wikipedia:Sockpuppet investigations/Dabadeeda5

2024-04-14T19:07:25Z

Reverted 2 edits by Digfuse6 (talk): Rm WP:OR, see Wikipedia:Sockpuppet investigations/Dabadeeda5

← Previous revision		Revision as of 19:07, 14 April 2024
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	MediaCrypt AG is now offering a successor to IDEA and focuses on its new cipher (official release in May 2005) [[IDEA NXT]], which was previously called FOX.		MediaCrypt AG is now offering a successor to IDEA and focuses on its new cipher (official release in May 2005) [[IDEA NXT]], which was previously called FOX.

	==IDEA-832==
	IDEA uses 128-bit keys. However, the internal keys are much larger.
	IDEA uses the 128-bit key to generate the 52 * 16-bit subkeys, or 832 bits.
	The 128-bit limitation of the key is artificial, so it can be enlarged up to 832 bits.

	After the patent expired in 2012, IDEA-832 <ref>{{cite web \|date=2012 \|title=IDEA-832 for GCC \|url=http://pccipher.free.fr/idea832/idea832.txt \|website=Alexander Pukall Web Page}}</ref> was released. It uses the same principle as IDEA-128 but the 52 subkeys are generated by a one-way hash function.
	The result is an algorithm that works at the same speed as the IDEA-128 but with a 832-bit key.
	Note that weak keys do not exist in IDEA-832 since subkeys are generated by a one-way hash function.

	== Literature ==		== Literature ==
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	* [http://www.informationsuebertragung.ch/indexAlgorithmen.html IDEA Applet]		* [http://www.informationsuebertragung.ch/indexAlgorithmen.html IDEA Applet]
	* [http://www.source-code.biz/idea/java/ Java source code]		* [http://www.source-code.biz/idea/java/ Java source code]
	*
	* [http://pccipher.free.fr/idea832/idea832.txt IDEA-832 source code in C]
	{{Cryptography navbox \| block}}		{{Cryptography navbox \| block}}
	*

	[[Category:Block ciphers]]		[[Category:Block ciphers]]

Digfuse6: /* External links */

2024-03-06T15:15:31Z

External links

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	* [http://www.informationsuebertragung.ch/indexAlgorithmen.html IDEA Applet]		* [http://www.informationsuebertragung.ch/indexAlgorithmen.html IDEA Applet]
	* [http://www.source-code.biz/idea/java/ Java source code]		* [http://www.source-code.biz/idea/java/ Java source code]
			*
			* [http://pccipher.free.fr/idea832/idea832.txt IDEA-832 source code in C]
	{{Cryptography navbox \| block}}		{{Cryptography navbox \| block}}
			*

	[[Category:Block ciphers]]		[[Category:Block ciphers]]

Digfuse6 at 15:08, 6 March 2024

2024-03-06T15:08:07Z

← Previous revision		Revision as of 15:08, 6 March 2024
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	MediaCrypt AG is now offering a successor to IDEA and focuses on its new cipher (official release in May 2005) [[IDEA NXT]], which was previously called FOX.		MediaCrypt AG is now offering a successor to IDEA and focuses on its new cipher (official release in May 2005) [[IDEA NXT]], which was previously called FOX.

			==IDEA-832==
			IDEA uses 128-bit keys. However, the internal keys are much larger.
			IDEA uses the 128-bit key to generate the 52 * 16-bit subkeys, or 832 bits.
			The 128-bit limitation of the key is artificial, so it can be enlarged up to 832 bits.

			After the patent expired in 2012, IDEA-832 <ref>{{cite web \|date=2012 \|title=IDEA-832 for GCC \|url=http://pccipher.free.fr/idea832/idea832.txt \|website=Alexander Pukall Web Page}}</ref> was released. It uses the same principle as IDEA-128 but the 52 subkeys are generated by a one-way hash function.
			The result is an algorithm that works at the same speed as the IDEA-128 but with a 832-bit key.
			Note that weak keys do not exist in IDEA-832 since subkeys are generated by a one-way hash function.

	== Literature ==		== Literature ==

Duckmather: adding short description; ce

2024-02-03T21:31:44Z

adding short description; ce

← Previous revision		Revision as of 21:31, 3 February 2024
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			{{Short description\|Symmetric-key block cipher}}
	{{Infobox block cipher		{{Infobox block cipher
	\| name = IDEA		\| name = IDEA
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	}}		}}

	In [[cryptography]], the '''International Data Encryption Algorithm''' ('''IDEA'''), originally called '''Improved Proposed Encryption Standard''' ('''IPES'''), is a [[Symmetric-key algorithm\|symmetric-key]] [[block cipher]] designed by [[James Massey]] of [[ETH Zurich]] and [[Xuejia Lai]] and was first described in 1991. The algorithm was intended as a replacement for the [[Data Encryption Standard]] (DES). IDEA is a minor revision of an earlier [[cipher]] Proposed Encryption Standard (PES).		In [[cryptography]], the '''International Data Encryption Algorithm''' ('''IDEA'''), originally called '''Improved Proposed Encryption Standard''' ('''IPES'''), is a [[Symmetric-key algorithm\|symmetric-key]] [[block cipher]] designed by [[James Massey]] of [[ETH Zurich]] and [[Xuejia Lai]] and was first described in 1991. The algorithm was intended as a replacement for the [[Data Encryption Standard]] (DES). IDEA is a minor revision of an earlier [[cipher]], the Proposed Encryption Standard (PES).

	The cipher was designed under a research contract with the Hasler Foundation, which became part of Ascom-Tech AG. The cipher was patented in a number of countries but was freely available for non-commercial use. The name "IDEA" is also a [[trademark]]. The last [[patent]]s expired in 2012, and IDEA is now patent-free and thus completely free for all uses.<ref>{{cite web\|url=http://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?locale=de_EP&CC=EP&NR=0482154 \|title=Espacenet - Bibliografische Daten \|language=de \|publisher=Worldwide.espacenet.com \|access-date=2013-06-15}}</ref>		The cipher was designed under a research contract with the Hasler Foundation, which became part of Ascom-Tech AG. The cipher was patented in a number of countries but was freely available for non-commercial use. The name "IDEA" is also a [[trademark]]. The last [[patent]]s expired in 2012, and IDEA is now patent-free and thus completely free for all uses.<ref>{{cite web\|url=http://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?locale=de_EP&CC=EP&NR=0482154 \|title=Espacenet - Bibliografische Daten \|language=de \|publisher=Worldwide.espacenet.com \|access-date=2013-06-15}}</ref>
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	===Key schedule===		===Key schedule===
	Each round uses 6 16-bit sub-keys, while the half-round uses 4, a total of 52 for 8.5 rounds. The first 8 sub-keys are extracted directly from the key, with K1 from the first round being the lower 16 bits; further groups of 8 keys are created by rotating the main key left 25 bits between each group of 8. This means that it is rotated less than once per round, on average, for a total of 6 rotations.		Each round uses 6 16-bit sub-keys, while the half-round uses 4, a total of 52 for 8.5 rounds. The first 8 sub-keys are extracted directly from the key, with K1 from the first round being the lower 16 bits; further groups of 8 keys are created by rotating the main key left 25 bits between each group of 8. This means that it is rotated less than once per round, on average, for a total of 6 rotations.

	===Decryption===		===Decryption===
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	==Security==		==Security==
	The designers analysed IDEA to measure its strength against [[differential cryptanalysis]] and concluded that it is immune under certain assumptions. No successful [[linear cryptanalysis\|linear]] or algebraic weaknesses have been reported. {{As of\|2007}}, the best attack applied to all keys could break IDEA reduced to 6 rounds (the full IDEA cipher uses 8.5 rounds).<ref name="idea-cryptanalysis">		The designers analysed IDEA to measure its strength against [[differential cryptanalysis]] and concluded that it is immune under certain assumptions. No successful [[linear cryptanalysis\|linear]] or algebraic weaknesses have been reported. {{As of\|2007}}, the best attack applied to all keys could break IDEA reduced to 6 rounds (the full IDEA cipher uses 8.5 rounds).<ref name="idea-cryptanalysis">
	{{cite book		{{cite book
	\| author = Biham, E.		\| author = Biham, E.
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	\| title = Proceedings of Fast Software Encryption, 2007, Lecture Notes in Computer Science		\| title = Proceedings of Fast Software Encryption, 2007, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
	\| publisher = [[Springer-Verlag]]		\| publisher = [[Springer-Verlag]]
	}}</ref> Note that a "break" is any attack that requires less than 2<sup>128</sup> operations; the 6-round attack requires 2<sup>64</sup> known plaintexts and 2<sup>126.8</sup> operations.		}}</ref> Note that a "break" is any attack that requires less than 2<sup>128</sup> operations; the 6-round attack requires 2<sup>64</sup> known plaintexts and 2<sup>126.8</sup> operations.

	[[Bruce Schneier]] thought highly of IDEA in 1996, writing: "In my opinion, it is the best and most secure block algorithm available to the public at this time." (''Applied Cryptography'', 2nd ed.) However, by 1999 he was no longer recommending IDEA due to the availability of faster algorithms, some progress in its [[cryptanalysis]], and the issue of patents.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://slashdot.org/interviews/99/10/29/0832246.shtml \|title=Slashdot: Crypto Guru Bruce Schneier Answers \|date=29 October 1999 \|publisher=slashdot.org \|access-date=2010-08-15 }}</ref>		[[Bruce Schneier]] thought highly of IDEA in 1996, writing: "In my opinion, it is the best and most secure block algorithm available to the public at this time." (''Applied Cryptography'', 2nd ed.) However, by 1999 he was no longer recommending IDEA due to the availability of faster algorithms, some progress in its [[cryptanalysis]], and the issue of patents.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://slashdot.org/interviews/99/10/29/0832246.shtml \|title=Slashdot: Crypto Guru Bruce Schneier Answers \|date=29 October 1999 \|publisher=slashdot.org \|access-date=2010-08-15 }}</ref>
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	===Weak keys===		===Weak keys===
	The very simple key schedule makes IDEA subject to a class of [[weak key]]s; some keys containing a large number of 0 bits produce [[weak encryption]].<ref name=weak>{{Cite book\|first1=Joan \|last1=Daemen \|author1-link=Joan Daemen \|first2=Rene \|last2=Govaerts \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|title=Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO' 93 \|chapter=Weak Keys for IDEA \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|year=1994 \|volume=773 \|pages=224–231 \|citeseerx = 10.1.1.51.9466\|doi=10.1007/3-540-48329-2_20 \|isbn=978-3-540-57766-9 }}</ref> These are of little concern in practice, being sufficiently rare that they are unnecessary to avoid explicitly when generating keys randomly. A simple fix was proposed: XORing each subkey with a 16-bit constant, such as 0x0DAE.<ref name=weak/><ref>{{Citation \|title=A note on Weak Keys of PES, IDEA and some Extended Variants \|first1=Jorge Jr. \|last1=Nakahara \|first2=Bart \|last2=Preneel \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|year=2002 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.20.1681 }}</ref>		The very simple key schedule makes IDEA subject to a class of [[weak key]]s; some keys containing a large number of 0 bits produce [[weak encryption]].<ref name=weak>{{Cite book\|first1=Joan \|last1=Daemen \|author1-link=Joan Daemen \|first2=Rene \|last2=Govaerts \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|title=Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO' 93 \|chapter=Weak Keys for IDEA \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|year=1994 \|volume=773 \|pages=224–231 \|citeseerx = 10.1.1.51.9466\|doi=10.1007/3-540-48329-2_20 \|isbn=978-3-540-57766-9 }}</ref> These are of little concern in practice, being sufficiently rare that they are unnecessary to avoid explicitly when generating keys randomly. A simple fix was proposed: XORing each subkey with a 16-bit constant, such as 0x0DAE.<ref name=weak/><ref>{{Citation \|title=A note on Weak Keys of PES, IDEA and some Extended Variants \|first1=Jorge Jr. \|last1=Nakahara \|first2=Bart \|last2=Preneel \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|year=2002 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.20.1681 }}</ref>

	Larger classes of weak keys were found in 2002.<ref name=weak2>{{Citation \|url=http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-189.pdf \|title=New Weak-Key Classes of IDEA \|first1=Alex \|last1=Biryukov \|first2=Jorge Jr. \|last2=Nakahara \|first3=Bart \|last3=Preneel \|first4=Joos \|last4=Vandewalle \|journal=Information and Communications Security, 4th International Conference, ICICS 2002 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2513 \|pages=315–326 \|quote=While the zero-one weak keys problem of IDEA can be corrected just by XORing a fixed constant to all the keys (one such constant may be 0DAE<sub>x</sub> as suggested in [4]) the problem with the runs of ones may still remain and will require complete redesign of the IDEA key schedule. }}</ref>		Larger classes of weak keys were found in 2002.<ref name=weak2>{{Citation \|url=http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-189.pdf \|title=New Weak-Key Classes of IDEA \|first1=Alex \|last1=Biryukov \|first2=Jorge Jr. \|last2=Nakahara \|first3=Bart \|last3=Preneel \|first4=Joos \|last4=Vandewalle \|journal=Information and Communications Security, 4th International Conference, ICICS 2002 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2513 \|pages=315–326 \|quote=While the zero-one weak keys problem of IDEA can be corrected just by XORing a fixed constant to all the keys (one such constant may be 0DAE<sub>x</sub> as suggested in [4]) the problem with the runs of ones may still remain and will require complete redesign of the IDEA key schedule. }}</ref>

	This is still of negligible probability to be a concern to a randomly chosen key, and some of the problems are fixed by the constant XOR proposed earlier, but the paper is not certain if all of them are. A more comprehensive redesign of the IDEA key schedule may be desirable.<ref name=weak2/>		This is still of negligible probability to be a concern to a randomly chosen key, and some of the problems are fixed by the constant XOR proposed earlier, but the paper is not certain if all of them are. A more comprehensive redesign of the IDEA key schedule may be desirable.<ref name=weak2/>

	==Availability==		==Availability==

Kku: link cryptanalysis

2024-01-26T15:07:16Z

link cryptanalysis

← Previous revision		Revision as of 15:07, 26 January 2024
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	}}</ref> Note that a "break" is any attack that requires less than 2<sup>128</sup> operations; the 6-round attack requires 2<sup>64</sup> known plaintexts and 2<sup>126.8</sup> operations.		}}</ref> Note that a "break" is any attack that requires less than 2<sup>128</sup> operations; the 6-round attack requires 2<sup>64</sup> known plaintexts and 2<sup>126.8</sup> operations.

	[[Bruce Schneier]] thought highly of IDEA in 1996, writing: "In my opinion, it is the best and most secure block algorithm available to the public at this time." (''Applied Cryptography'', 2nd ed.) However, by 1999 he was no longer recommending IDEA due to the availability of faster algorithms, some progress in its cryptanalysis, and the issue of patents.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://slashdot.org/interviews/99/10/29/0832246.shtml \|title=Slashdot: Crypto Guru Bruce Schneier Answers \|date=29 October 1999 \|publisher=slashdot.org \|access-date=2010-08-15 }}</ref>		[[Bruce Schneier]] thought highly of IDEA in 1996, writing: "In my opinion, it is the best and most secure block algorithm available to the public at this time." (''Applied Cryptography'', 2nd ed.) However, by 1999 he was no longer recommending IDEA due to the availability of faster algorithms, some progress in its [[cryptanalysis]], and the issue of patents.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://slashdot.org/interviews/99/10/29/0832246.shtml \|title=Slashdot: Crypto Guru Bruce Schneier Answers \|date=29 October 1999 \|publisher=slashdot.org \|access-date=2010-08-15 }}</ref>

	In 2011 full 8.5-round IDEA was broken using a meet-in-the-middle attack.<ref>{{cite journal \|last1=Biham \|first1=Eli \|last2=Dunkelman \|first2=Orr \|last3=Keller \|first3=Nathan \|last4=Shamir \|first4=Adi \|author-link1=Eli Biham \|author-link4=Adi Shamir \|title=New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds \|journal=Journal of Cryptology \|date=2011-08-22 \|volume=28 \|issue=2 \|pages=209–239 \|doi=10.1007/s00145-013-9162-9 \|doi-access=free \|language=en \|issn=0933-2790}}</ref> Independently in 2012, full 8.5-round IDEA was broken using a narrow-[[biclique attack\|bicliques attack]], with a reduction of cryptographic strength of about 2 bits, similar to the effect of the previous bicliques attack on [[Advanced Encryption Standard\|AES]]; however, this attack does not threaten the security of IDEA in practice.<ref name="idea-narrow-bicliques">{{cite book \|last1=Khovratovich \|first1=Dmitry \|last2=Leurent \|first2=Gaëtan \|last3=Rechberger \|first3=Christian \|title=Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012 \|chapter=Narrow-Bicliques: Cryptanalysis of Full IDEA \|volume=7237 \|date=2012 \|pages=392–410 \|doi=10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_24 \|doi-access=free \|language=en\|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|isbn=978-3-642-29010-7 }}</ref>		In 2011 full 8.5-round IDEA was broken using a meet-in-the-middle attack.<ref>{{cite journal \|last1=Biham \|first1=Eli \|last2=Dunkelman \|first2=Orr \|last3=Keller \|first3=Nathan \|last4=Shamir \|first4=Adi \|author-link1=Eli Biham \|author-link4=Adi Shamir \|title=New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds \|journal=Journal of Cryptology \|date=2011-08-22 \|volume=28 \|issue=2 \|pages=209–239 \|doi=10.1007/s00145-013-9162-9 \|doi-access=free \|language=en \|issn=0933-2790}}</ref> Independently in 2012, full 8.5-round IDEA was broken using a narrow-[[biclique attack\|bicliques attack]], with a reduction of cryptographic strength of about 2 bits, similar to the effect of the previous bicliques attack on [[Advanced Encryption Standard\|AES]]; however, this attack does not threaten the security of IDEA in practice.<ref name="idea-narrow-bicliques">{{cite book \|last1=Khovratovich \|first1=Dmitry \|last2=Leurent \|first2=Gaëtan \|last3=Rechberger \|first3=Christian \|title=Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012 \|chapter=Narrow-Bicliques: Cryptanalysis of Full IDEA \|volume=7237 \|date=2012 \|pages=392–410 \|doi=10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_24 \|doi-access=free \|language=en\|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|isbn=978-3-642-29010-7 }}</ref>

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	}}</ref> Note that a "break" is any attack that requires less than 2<sup>128</sup> operations; the 6-round attack requires 2<sup>64</sup> known plaintexts and 2<sup>126.8</sup> operations.		}}</ref> Note that a "break" is any attack that requires less than 2<sup>128</sup> operations; the 6-round attack requires 2<sup>64</sup> known plaintexts and 2<sup>126.8</sup> operations.

	[[Bruce Schneier]] thought highly of IDEA in 1996, writing: "In my opinion, it is the best and most secure block algorithm available to the public at this time." (''Applied Cryptography'', 2nd ed.) However, by 1999 he was no longer recommending IDEA due to the availability of faster algorithms, some progress in its cryptanalysis, and the issue of patents.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://slashdot.org/interviews/99/10/29/0832246.shtml \|title=Slashdot: Crypto Guru Bruce Schneier Answers \|publisher=slashdot.org \|access-date=2010-08-15 }}</ref>		[[Bruce Schneier]] thought highly of IDEA in 1996, writing: "In my opinion, it is the best and most secure block algorithm available to the public at this time." (''Applied Cryptography'', 2nd ed.) However, by 1999 he was no longer recommending IDEA due to the availability of faster algorithms, some progress in its cryptanalysis, and the issue of patents.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://slashdot.org/interviews/99/10/29/0832246.shtml \|title=Slashdot: Crypto Guru Bruce Schneier Answers \|date=29 October 1999 \|publisher=slashdot.org \|access-date=2010-08-15 }}</ref>

	In 2011 full 8.5-round IDEA was broken using a meet-in-the-middle attack.<ref>{{cite journal \|last1=Biham \|first1=Eli \|last2=Dunkelman \|first2=Orr \|last3=Keller \|first3=Nathan \|last4=Shamir \|first4=Adi \|author-link1=Eli Biham \|author-link4=Adi Shamir \|title=New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds \|journal=Journal of Cryptology \|date=2011-08-22 \|volume=28 \|issue=2 \|pages=209–239 \|doi=10.1007/s00145-013-9162-9 \|doi-access=free \|language=en \|issn=0933-2790}}</ref> Independently in 2012, full 8.5-round IDEA was broken using a narrow-[[biclique attack\|bicliques attack]], with a reduction of cryptographic strength of about 2 bits, similar to the effect of the previous bicliques attack on [[Advanced Encryption Standard\|AES]]; however, this attack does not threaten the security of IDEA in practice.<ref name="idea-narrow-bicliques">{{cite book \|last1=Khovratovich \|first1=Dmitry \|last2=Leurent \|first2=Gaëtan \|last3=Rechberger \|first3=Christian \|title=Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012 \|chapter=Narrow-Bicliques: Cryptanalysis of Full IDEA \|volume=7237 \|date=2012 \|pages=392–410 \|doi=10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_24 \|doi-access=free \|language=en\|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|isbn=978-3-642-29010-7 }}</ref>		In 2011 full 8.5-round IDEA was broken using a meet-in-the-middle attack.<ref>{{cite journal \|last1=Biham \|first1=Eli \|last2=Dunkelman \|first2=Orr \|last3=Keller \|first3=Nathan \|last4=Shamir \|first4=Adi \|author-link1=Eli Biham \|author-link4=Adi Shamir \|title=New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds \|journal=Journal of Cryptology \|date=2011-08-22 \|volume=28 \|issue=2 \|pages=209–239 \|doi=10.1007/s00145-013-9162-9 \|doi-access=free \|language=en \|issn=0933-2790}}</ref> Independently in 2012, full 8.5-round IDEA was broken using a narrow-[[biclique attack\|bicliques attack]], with a reduction of cryptographic strength of about 2 bits, similar to the effect of the previous bicliques attack on [[Advanced Encryption Standard\|AES]]; however, this attack does not threaten the security of IDEA in practice.<ref name="idea-narrow-bicliques">{{cite book \|last1=Khovratovich \|first1=Dmitry \|last2=Leurent \|first2=Gaëtan \|last3=Rechberger \|first3=Christian \|title=Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012 \|chapter=Narrow-Bicliques: Cryptanalysis of Full IDEA \|volume=7237 \|date=2012 \|pages=392–410 \|doi=10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_24 \|doi-access=free \|language=en\|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|isbn=978-3-642-29010-7 }}</ref>

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	== Literature ==		== Literature ==
			* {{cite book \|doi=10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_9 \|chapter=A New Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on the IDEA Block Cipher \|title=Selected Areas in Cryptography \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|year=2004 \|last1=Demirci \|first1=Hüseyin \|last2=Selçuk \|first2=Ali Aydin \|last3=Türe \|first3=Erkan \|volume=3006 \|pages=117–129 \|isbn=978-3-540-21370-3 }}
	* Hüseyin Demirci, Erkan Türe, Ali Aydin Selçuk, A New Meet in the Middle Attack on The IDEA Block Cipher, 10th Annual Workshop on [[Selected Areas in Cryptography]], 2004.
	* ~~Xuejia~~ ~~Lai and James~~ L. ~~Massey, [http:/~~/citeseerx~~.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi~~=10.1.1.14.3451 A Proposal for a New Block Encryption Standard], [[EUROCRYPT]] ~~1990,~~ pp.~~ 389–404~~		* {{cite book \|doi=10.1007/3-540-46877-3_35 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.14.3451 \|chapter=A Proposal for a New Block Encryption Standard \|title=Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT '90 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|year=1991 \|last1=Lai \|first1=Xuejia \|last2=Massey \|first2=James L. \|volume=473 \|pages=389–404 \|isbn=978-3-540-53587-4 }}
			* {{cite book \|doi=10.1007/3-540-46416-6_2 \|chapter=Markov Ciphers and Differential Cryptanalysis \|title=Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT '91 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|year=1991 \|last1=Lai \|first1=Xuejia \|last2=Massey \|first2=James L. \|last3=Murphy \|first3=Sean \|volume=547 \|pages=17–38 \|isbn=978-3-540-54620-7 }}
	* Xuejia Lai and James L. Massey and S. Murphy, Markov ciphers and differential cryptanalysis, ''Advances in Cryptology — Eurocrypt '91'', Springer-Verlag (1992), pp. 17–38.

	==References==		==References==

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← Previous revision		Revision as of 03:22, 7 July 2023
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	===Weak keys===		===Weak keys===
	The very simple key schedule makes IDEA subject to a class of [[weak key]]s; some keys containing a large number of 0 bits produce [[weak encryption]].<ref name=weak>{{Cite book\|first1=Joan \|last1=Daemen \|author1-link=Joan Daemen \|first2=Rene \|last2=Govaerts \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|title=Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO' 93 \|chapter=Weak Keys for IDEA \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|year=1994 \|volume=773 ~~\|journal=Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 93 Proceedings~~ \|pages=224–231 \|citeseerx = 10.1.1.51.9466\|doi=10.1007/3-540-48329-2_20 \|isbn=978-3-540-57766-9 }}</ref> These are of little concern in practice, being sufficiently rare that they are unnecessary to avoid explicitly when generating keys randomly. A simple fix was proposed: XORing each subkey with a 16-bit constant, such as 0x0DAE.<ref name=weak/><ref>{{Citation \|title=A note on Weak Keys of PES, IDEA and some Extended Variants \|first1=Jorge Jr. \|last1=Nakahara \|first2=Bart \|last2=Preneel \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|year=2002 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.20.1681 }}</ref>		The very simple key schedule makes IDEA subject to a class of [[weak key]]s; some keys containing a large number of 0 bits produce [[weak encryption]].<ref name=weak>{{Cite book\|first1=Joan \|last1=Daemen \|author1-link=Joan Daemen \|first2=Rene \|last2=Govaerts \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|title=Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO' 93 \|chapter=Weak Keys for IDEA \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|year=1994 \|volume=773 \|pages=224–231 \|citeseerx = 10.1.1.51.9466\|doi=10.1007/3-540-48329-2_20 \|isbn=978-3-540-57766-9 }}</ref> These are of little concern in practice, being sufficiently rare that they are unnecessary to avoid explicitly when generating keys randomly. A simple fix was proposed: XORing each subkey with a 16-bit constant, such as 0x0DAE.<ref name=weak/><ref>{{Citation \|title=A note on Weak Keys of PES, IDEA and some Extended Variants \|first1=Jorge Jr. \|last1=Nakahara \|first2=Bart \|last2=Preneel \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|year=2002 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.20.1681 }}</ref>

	Larger classes of weak keys were found in 2002.<ref name=weak2>{{Citation \|url=http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-189.pdf \|title=New Weak-Key Classes of IDEA \|first1=Alex \|last1=Biryukov \|first2=Jorge Jr. \|last2=Nakahara \|first3=Bart \|last3=Preneel \|first4=Joos \|last4=Vandewalle \|journal=Information and Communications Security, 4th International Conference, ICICS 2002 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2513 \|pages=315–326 \|quote=While the zero-one weak keys problem of IDEA can be corrected just by XORing a fixed constant to all the keys (one such constant may be 0DAE<sub>x</sub> as suggested in [4]) the problem with the runs of ones may still remain and will require complete redesign of the IDEA key schedule. }}</ref>		Larger classes of weak keys were found in 2002.<ref name=weak2>{{Citation \|url=http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-189.pdf \|title=New Weak-Key Classes of IDEA \|first1=Alex \|last1=Biryukov \|first2=Jorge Jr. \|last2=Nakahara \|first3=Bart \|last3=Preneel \|first4=Joos \|last4=Vandewalle \|journal=Information and Communications Security, 4th International Conference, ICICS 2002 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2513 \|pages=315–326 \|quote=While the zero-one weak keys problem of IDEA can be corrected just by XORing a fixed constant to all the keys (one such constant may be 0DAE<sub>x</sub> as suggested in [4]) the problem with the runs of ones may still remain and will require complete redesign of the IDEA key schedule. }}</ref>

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2023-07-07T03:13:33Z

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← Previous revision		Revision as of 03:13, 7 July 2023
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	===Weak keys===		===Weak keys===
	The very simple key schedule makes IDEA subject to a class of [[weak key]]s; some keys containing a large number of 0 bits produce [[weak encryption]].<ref name=weak>{{~~Citation \|title=Weak Keys for IDEA~~ \|first1=Joan \|last1=Daemen \|author1-link=Joan Daemen \|first2=Rene \|last2=Govaerts \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|~~journal~~=Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 93 ~~Proceedings~~ \|year=~~1993~~ \|pages=224–231 \|citeseerx = 10.1.1.51.9466\|doi=10.1007/3-540-48329-2_20 }}</ref> These are of little concern in practice, being sufficiently rare that they are unnecessary to avoid explicitly when generating keys randomly. A simple fix was proposed: XORing each subkey with a 16-bit constant, such as 0x0DAE.<ref name=weak/><ref>{{Citation \|title=A note on Weak Keys of PES, IDEA and some Extended Variants \|first1=Jorge Jr. \|last1=Nakahara \|first2=Bart \|last2=Preneel \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|year=2002 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.20.1681 }}</ref>		The very simple key schedule makes IDEA subject to a class of [[weak key]]s; some keys containing a large number of 0 bits produce [[weak encryption]].<ref name=weak>{{Cite book\|first1=Joan \|last1=Daemen \|author1-link=Joan Daemen \|first2=Rene \|last2=Govaerts \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|title=Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO' 93 \|chapter=Weak Keys for IDEA \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|year=1994 \|volume=773 \|journal=Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 93 Proceedings \|pages=224–231 \|citeseerx = 10.1.1.51.9466\|doi=10.1007/3-540-48329-2_20 \|isbn=978-3-540-57766-9 }}</ref> These are of little concern in practice, being sufficiently rare that they are unnecessary to avoid explicitly when generating keys randomly. A simple fix was proposed: XORing each subkey with a 16-bit constant, such as 0x0DAE.<ref name=weak/><ref>{{Citation \|title=A note on Weak Keys of PES, IDEA and some Extended Variants \|first1=Jorge Jr. \|last1=Nakahara \|first2=Bart \|last2=Preneel \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|year=2002 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.20.1681 }}</ref>

	Larger classes of weak keys were found in 2002.<ref name=weak2>{{Citation \|url=http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-189.pdf \|title=New Weak-Key Classes of IDEA \|first1=Alex \|last1=Biryukov \|first2=Jorge Jr. \|last2=Nakahara \|first3=Bart \|last3=Preneel \|first4=Joos \|last4=Vandewalle \|journal=Information and Communications Security, 4th International Conference, ICICS 2002 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2513 \|pages=315–326 \|quote=While the zero-one weak keys problem of IDEA can be corrected just by XORing a fixed constant to all the keys (one such constant may be 0DAE<sub>x</sub> as suggested in [4]) the problem with the runs of ones may still remain and will require complete redesign of the IDEA key schedule. }}</ref>		Larger classes of weak keys were found in 2002.<ref name=weak2>{{Citation \|url=http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-189.pdf \|title=New Weak-Key Classes of IDEA \|first1=Alex \|last1=Biryukov \|first2=Jorge Jr. \|last2=Nakahara \|first3=Bart \|last3=Preneel \|first4=Joos \|last4=Vandewalle \|journal=Information and Communications Security, 4th International Conference, ICICS 2002 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2513 \|pages=315–326 \|quote=While the zero-one weak keys problem of IDEA can be corrected just by XORing a fixed constant to all the keys (one such constant may be 0DAE<sub>x</sub> as suggested in [4]) the problem with the runs of ones may still remain and will require complete redesign of the IDEA key schedule. }}</ref>

AManWithNoPlan: add doi

2023-07-07T03:12:27Z

add doi

← Previous revision		Revision as of 03:12, 7 July 2023
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	===Weak keys===		===Weak keys===
	The very simple key schedule makes IDEA subject to a class of [[weak key]]s; some keys containing a large number of 0 bits produce [[weak encryption]].<ref name=weak>{{Citation \|title=Weak Keys for IDEA \|first1=Joan \|last1=Daemen \|author1-link=Joan Daemen \|first2=Rene \|last2=Govaerts \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|journal=Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 93 Proceedings \|year=1993 \|pages=224–231 \|citeseerx = 10.1.1.51.9466}}</ref> These are of little concern in practice, being sufficiently rare that they are unnecessary to avoid explicitly when generating keys randomly. A simple fix was proposed: XORing each subkey with a 16-bit constant, such as 0x0DAE.<ref name=weak/><ref>{{Citation \|title=A note on Weak Keys of PES, IDEA and some Extended Variants \|first1=Jorge Jr. \|last1=Nakahara \|first2=Bart \|last2=Preneel \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|year=2002 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.20.1681 }}</ref>		The very simple key schedule makes IDEA subject to a class of [[weak key]]s; some keys containing a large number of 0 bits produce [[weak encryption]].<ref name=weak>{{Citation \|title=Weak Keys for IDEA \|first1=Joan \|last1=Daemen \|author1-link=Joan Daemen \|first2=Rene \|last2=Govaerts \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|journal=Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 93 Proceedings \|year=1993 \|pages=224–231 \|citeseerx = 10.1.1.51.9466\|doi=10.1007/3-540-48329-2_20 }}</ref> These are of little concern in practice, being sufficiently rare that they are unnecessary to avoid explicitly when generating keys randomly. A simple fix was proposed: XORing each subkey with a 16-bit constant, such as 0x0DAE.<ref name=weak/><ref>{{Citation \|title=A note on Weak Keys of PES, IDEA and some Extended Variants \|first1=Jorge Jr. \|last1=Nakahara \|first2=Bart \|last2=Preneel \|first3=Joos \|last3=Vandewalle \|year=2002 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.20.1681 }}</ref>

	Larger classes of weak keys were found in 2002.<ref name=weak2>{{Citation \|url=http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-189.pdf \|title=New Weak-Key Classes of IDEA \|first1=Alex \|last1=Biryukov \|first2=Jorge Jr. \|last2=Nakahara \|first3=Bart \|last3=Preneel \|first4=Joos \|last4=Vandewalle \|journal=Information and Communications Security, 4th International Conference, ICICS 2002 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2513 \|pages=315–326 \|quote=While the zero-one weak keys problem of IDEA can be corrected just by XORing a fixed constant to all the keys (one such constant may be 0DAE<sub>x</sub> as suggested in [4]) the problem with the runs of ones may still remain and will require complete redesign of the IDEA key schedule. }}</ref>		Larger classes of weak keys were found in 2002.<ref name=weak2>{{Citation \|url=http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-189.pdf \|title=New Weak-Key Classes of IDEA \|first1=Alex \|last1=Biryukov \|first2=Jorge Jr. \|last2=Nakahara \|first3=Bart \|last3=Preneel \|first4=Joos \|last4=Vandewalle \|journal=Information and Communications Security, 4th International Conference, ICICS 2002 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2513 \|pages=315–326 \|quote=While the zero-one weak keys problem of IDEA can be corrected just by XORing a fixed constant to all the keys (one such constant may be 0DAE<sub>x</sub> as suggested in [4]) the problem with the runs of ones may still remain and will require complete redesign of the IDEA key schedule. }}</ref>