Ordinary language philosophy

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From England came the idea that philosophy has gotten its knickers in a twist by trying to understand words outside of the context of their use in ordinary language.

For example, what is reality? Philosophers have treated it as a noun denoting something that has certain properties. For thousands of years, they have debated those properties. Ordinary Language philosophy would instead look at how we use the word "reality." (Note: Willful oversimplification follows...) We say, "In reality...", but we don't mean that there is some special dimension of being. What we really mean is, "What I just told you only sounded right. Now I'm about to tell you the truth." That is, "in reality" is a bit like "however." And,"The reality of the matter is ..." serves a similar function in setting the listener's expectations. Further, when we talk about a "real gun", we aren't making a metaphysical statement of Platonic proportions; we are merely opposing this gun to a toy gun, pretend gun, imaginary gun, etc.

Ordinary Language philosophy believes that the meaning of words resides in their ordinary uses, and that's why philosophers trip over words taken in abstraction. The metaphysicians can go home and relax now.

Important names in the Ordinary Language school include: Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle, John Austin and Peter Strawson.