USS Liberty incident

The USS Liberty (AGTR-5) was an American intelligence ship, which was attacked on June 8, 1967, the fourth day of the Six-Day War, while the ship was steaming on the boundary of international and coastal waters approximately 13 miles off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula near El-Arish without receiving warning by the combined forces of the Israeli Air Force and Navy. 34 Americans were killed and 172 were wounded.

The course of the attack

Orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the USS Liberty must stay 100 miles from the coasts of Israel, Egypt and Syria. This message was not received by USS Liberty, and it operated rather than that basing on an earlier set of orders that set the minimal approach range to Israel to 15 miles, respectively.

On the evening before the attack and on the attack day's morning, the ship observed several Israeli propeller aircraft, some of which flew over it, obviously detecting the ship's type. However, as Israel claims, at noon the HQ watch changed and the status board was reset, making all previous observations irrelevant.

A while before the attack, the ship was flown by by a pair of jet aircraft (Dassault Mysteres) which never approached it nearer than 3 miles, and so were probably unable to classify it. At about 2 p.m. of June the 8th, the ship was attacked by a pair of aircraft similar to the one that was sighted in the morning. They used napalm munitions and with machine gun fire (both inefficient means for attacking a ship). During the attack, the ship became obscured with smoke, and its ensign was shot off, making indetification more difficult afterwards. The attack took several minutes, after which the aircraft turned back to Israel. Within 20 minutes, the ship's ensign was raised again.

At about that time, the ship was approached by a pair of torpedo boats bearing an Israeli flag and making visual signals from afar, which were obscured by the smoke and unresponded to. Two of the ship's machine guns opened fire at them without order, which was stopped quickly. A short time later, a torpedo was launched and hit the ship. Immediately after the hit, the torpedo boats signalled to the ship in English and offered their help. They were given a negative answer and departed half an hour later. About 5 hours after the attack, an American representative approached the ship in an Israeli helicopter, but he was neither able to land nor to establish communications.

Subsequent inquiry

Subsequent ten American commissions of inquiry and three Israeli ones have all concluded that the attack was conducted because of USS Liberty being confused with an Egyptian vessel, and failures of communications between Israel and the US. Those commissions are:

Those reports are:

US Navy Court of Inquiry (1967)
CIA Report (1967)
JCS Fact Finding Team (Russ Report) (1967)
Clifford Report (1967)
Senate Armed Services Committee (1968)
House Appropriations Committee (1968)
House Armed Services Committee Investigation (1971)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1979/1981)
NSA/CSS (1981)
House Armed Services Committee (1991/1992)
Ram Ron Investigation
Israeli Examining Judges Investigation
IDF History Department Investigation

On December 17, 1987, the issue was officially closed by the exchange of diplomatical notes between the US and Israel. Israel has also paid nearly US $13 million in compensations to the families of the victims.

Controversy

Survivors of the attack often make the claim that none of these reports was made as a result of a complete and comprehensive investigation of the attack on the USS Liberty so any opinions about the incident included in these reports is without foundation. They claim that some of these reports simply mention the Liberty incident in passing, and that the attack on the USS Liberty holds a unique position in United States maritime history, as it is the only attack of its kind not to be the subject of a complete and comprehensive public Congressional investigation.

There are several points of controversy that are unresolved due to the lack of objective evidence beyond the two parties' reports (e.g. third-party reports of radio jamming)

The Americans claimed that the Israeli aircraft were unmarked, while Israel denies any markings have been stripped. Israel further points out that it is under the conditions of the attack, sighting marks on aircraft would be problematic, and that no photographs have been presented that display the lack of markings on Israeli aircraft.
The Americans claimed that the Israelis jammed the Liberty's radios on both US Navy tactical and international maritime distress frequencies; again, Israel denies this allegation, and claims that USS Liberty's communications were cut solely by equipment failure originating in the attack.
The Americans claimed that the Israeli torpedo boat personnel deliberately machine gunned life rafts Liberty's crewmen had dropped over the side in anticipation of abandoning ship (denying survivors a chance for survival in the event the ship had sunk) and fired from close range at Liberty crewmen who ventured topside to help their wounded shipmates. Israel denies that life rafts or crewmen were targeted specifically, and points out that machine guns are not as precise as to allow hitting some specific positions at or near the ship and not any others.
Americans claim that the Israeli attackers refused to offer assistance immediately upon their ceasing hostilities. Testimony at the Navy Court of Inquiry, however, indicates that the boats offered their help which was then declined.
Israelis claim that the USS Liberty refused to identify itself over radio, while Americans deny that any request for identification was received.

Survivors deny that the USS Liberty refused to identify itself on the radio. Joe Meadors, then the signalman on bridge, states that:

Immediately prior to the torpedo attack I was on the Signal Bridge repeatedly sending "USS Liberty US Navy Ship" by flashing light to the torpedo boats.

Israeli forces do admit that three crucial errors have been made, the first being the refreshing of the status board (nullifying the ship's classification as American), the second being the erroneous identification of the ship as an Egyptian vessel, and the third being the Israeli HQ not receiving advice from the returning aircraft regarding Latin markins on the hull (as opposed to the Arabic of an Egyptian vessels). As the general root of these problems, Israel sees the combined senses of alarm and tiredness experienced by the Israeli troops at that point of the war.

Israel denies any accusations that the attack was deliberate due to the following arguments:

The attacking aircraft used napalm and machine guns - a rather inconvenient armament for attacking a ship.
USS Liberty opened fire at the gunboats before they had.
Due to the aircraft attack, USS Liberty was covered with smoke and was unable to conduct visual communications in any way.
No adequate cause has been pointed out that would make Israel want to attack an American ship in spite of all the forthcoming complications that must have followed.

Several books were written on the subject that try to prove that USS Liberty was attacked on purpose. Critics claim that many of them include incorrect assumptions and a fuzzy system of conslusion making. As examples, they bring the claim that the ship was attacked to prevent the U.S. from knowing about the forthcoming attack in the Golan Heights (information already dispatched to the Americans), and applying a quote describing the execution of 5 Palestinian guerillas wearing Egyptian uniforms (an act allowed under [rules of war]?) to "prove" the mass murder of 150 Egyptians.

The survivors of the USS Liberty nevertheless believe that the attack was premeditated, and actively try to assert their claim. They are joined in this position by many representatives of the US intelligence community. They claim in particular that a conspiracy has taken place between the Jewish Lobby in the USA and the government in order to explain the American courts' opposite conclusions.

USS Liberty incident

Contents

The course of the attack

Subsequent inquiry

Controversy

See also