Talk:Science

The divorce of science from philosophy is completely unjustified. --Daniel C. Boyer

Because?...B

Because it is a set of theories or a method of inquiry about how the world is, it is fundamentally an aspect of philosophy, and the divorce exists for no other reason than to enable science to get away without ever having to defend the a priori assumptions on which it bases its method. Why are these assumptions beyond challenge? --Daniel C. Boyer

Daniel, I agree with the gist of your reply. My "Because?..." was questioning what I misunderstood to be a comment about the historically divergent paths of these disciplines. Generally, scientists are not adequately familiar with the philosophical presumptions upon which science rests, and they have become dogmatic and overly-confident in these presumptions. For example, how many scientists have studied formal logic, epistemology or acknowledge the problem of induction. Yet they bandy about such words as "logical", "true", "knowledge and "fact" as if they knew what these concepts mean! Not all of the rules of logic have been sorted out and there is still not a sufficiently developed theory of truth or theory of knowledge in philosophy, yet scientists act as if this has already been done. —B 21:14, Nov 4, 2003 (UTC)

Was there ever a parting of philosophy and science? Even very recent philosophers have been influential (for better or for worse). A few names that spring to mind are Wittgenstein, Popper, Victor Kraft, Lacatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend. NielsBohr seems to have been a relativist [1]. Einstein, who wrote philosophical papers of his own, was inspired by ErnstMach. Einstein and Bohr, of course did challenge a priori assumptions about our ability to be objective. --ChrisSteinbach

Chris, in a sense, yes, there was a parting, and this parting is the problem described in different ways by both Daniel and me above. Namely, that in order to do science well, scientists need to have a better background in certain philosophical subjects, but this has become more difficult since science became a discipline separate from philosophy with their own unique subjects of study. Some scientists have made contributions to the philosophy of science, but generally they go on with their research without adequately grasping the philosophical limitations of science. —B 21:14, Nov 4, 2003 (UTC)

The leading assertion of the second paragraph in the current article is false:

"Certain fundamental assumptions are needed for science. The first assumption is that of realism."

Realism as defined in the article or scientific realism is not necessary to science. Science is no less compatible with instrumentalism than it is with realism. Science does not require that unobservable theoretical entities, such as electrons, are "real"; science only requires that unobservables help explain and predict sense-data. Besides the leading sentence, the rest of the paragraph has another sophmoric problem. In particular, equating "facts" and "physical objects and events" with the same ontological status: "facts are real"; "physical objects and events are facts". (Whatever that is supposed to mean...although that terminology may be popular or conventional, it's meaning is far from clear. Hmm, sounds like an analytic philosophy critique.) The third paragraph about consistency fails to even mention or explain science's (or rather scientific theories' or laws') dependence on the much more relevant principal of induction. (Nevermind the problem of induction.) B 17:03 Jan 8, 2003 (UTC)

I removed this: "Some scientists in the hard sciences consider all scientific-like fields of study outside of the hard sciences (including the soft sciences) not to be true science, or even relegate them to the realm of pseudoscience."

The way this is phrased, that's just not true. In fact, this entire article was laced with unfounded anti-science remarks that were just egregiously POV. It started to look like a leftist Derrida-inspired deconstructionist tract to deligitimize science. RK 13:53 7 Jun 2003 (UTC)

I looked at the "anti-realism" paragraphs you removed, maybe it should be put in its own article, like Scientific realism and rewritten as NPOV? (I don't understand much about the philosophy of science, so maybe I'm misled here) -- Rotem Dan 14:00 7 Jun 2003 (UTC)

Ought there not be some sort of criticism of Science

ChrisG 17:39, 4 Nov 2003 (UTC)

I have some trouble with the first paragraph on the main Science page:

"According to the philosophy of science, science (from scientia, Latin for "knowledge") refers to the body of knowledge, which humans have accumulated; as well as to the method of studying this data. Scientific knowledge is said to encompass "the natural universe". Scientists, who study scientific knowledge, practice the scientific method (a process of observation and experimentation)."

'Stripped down', it says:

"Science refers to the body of knowledge which humans have accumulated, as well as to the method of studying this data. Science is said to encompass "the natural universe".

The phrasing leaves room for improvement, but rather than change it directly myself , I thought it more 'in the spirit of Wiki' to merely point out the issues.

Issue (1):

Science, as a term denoting 'a body of knowledge', is not 'the body of knowledge which humans have accumulated", there being knowledge other than science in this all encompassing body.

Issue (2):

Whilst the claim that 'science is said to encompass the natural universe' is perfectly reasonable, it does not address the difficulties raised by issue (1) unless is is modified so that it says:

"science is exclusively concerned with the natural universe"

We can perhaps address both issues by a new phrasing of the definition:

"The term science, when used to denote a body of knowledge, refers to a body of knowledge exclusively concerned with and derived from the study of the natural universe".

This adjustment does not make any attempt to address where the boundaries between natural and metaphysical knowledge might occur and is not intended to do so, it is merely to address some inherent ambiguities in the existing phrasing of the definition.

Ericross

Is it not the case that early 17th century scientists such as Galileo, Descartes and others, in their theory of primary and secondary qualities, demolished naive realism. Naive realism is the belief that, for example, the colour red is an inherent (or primary) property of a body, rather than a secondary quality; i.e. only a sensation produced in the mind of an observer, albeit in some way caused by the object. Leighxucl 04:00, Jan 12, 2004 (UTC)

theories, laws, and hypothesises

Latest comment: 21 years ago5 comments2 people in discussion

As to Lord Kenny's statement that "theories do not turn into laws". That is false ... the article is inaccurate due to his edits. A theory is different from a physical law in that the former is a model of reality whereas the latter is a statement of what has been observed, BUT there is a exceedingly remote chance that the accepted "laws" are wrong (and evidence is needed to regeneralize the the "so-called" laws). This was has occured (eg. Newton vs Einstien).

A hypothesis is a proposed explanation for a phenomenon ... this in turn develops into a "theory" to model the phenomenon ... and, ultimately, evolves into a "Law" (when scientific generalization occur based on empirical observations) ... they are refered to as "laws", but they are, in reality, just theories (that haven't been disproven) ... many scientific theories (such as ones concerning gravity) do turn into laws. Sincerely, JDR

I have to agree with the statement that "theories do not turn into laws." Laws and theories are two separate things, each of which might have been previously verified, and each of which might be disproven. A hypothesis might develop into either a law or a theory. The difference is that laws are simpler correlations of observable data, while theories typically try to build a theoretical framework which may help to explain physical laws or other theories. Newton's law of gravity, for instance, explains nothing. It only gives the observed correlation between the measured values of a gravatational force between two objects, the mass of the two objects, and the distance between thier gravitational centers. Einstien's theories attempted to give a deeper understanding of how gravity worked, from some sort of theoretical basis. millerc 06:27, 17 May 2004 (UTC)Reply

This has been removed from the philosophy section:

Implicit in classical science's devotion to acquiring knowledge about the universe is an assumption that atoms, animals, gravity, stars, wind, microbes, etc. all exist independently of our observations of them. This essentially metaphysical view is termed realism. The opposed view of modern science parallels a metaphysical position, that of idealism which in varying forms denies the existence of matter independent of mind. The two views are metaphysical because although both are consistent with our experience there appears to be no way to get outside of that experience in order to see which (if either) is true.

I don't know why. It explains the difference between realism and idealism, and then points out that both are metaphysical and that science isn't really affected by the "truth" of either one. I don't understand why this should be removed, or why it supposedly conflicts with other paragraphs. I think the first sentence just needs to be rephrased and everyone can be happy with it. - Omegatron 20:14, May 18, 2004 (UTC)

These terms are not subject-specific. They are barely related to science but as a subnote. (realism is not necessary to science).
I am adamant about the process of explaining jargon.

Bensaccount 20:24, 18 May 2004 (UTC)Reply

They are important terms relating to the question "What is science?" and the relationship between science, philosophy, metaphysics, empiricism, perception, etc. Philosophy is hardly a footnote to science. They both descended from the same thing, and are still intertwined, even if the applied sciences and technologies no longer refer to any philosophical concepts directly. Neither idealism or realism are necessary for science, but they ARE necessary to include while discussing the nature of science...
Then why are you removing the explanation?

- Omegatron 20:40, May 18, 2004 (UTC)

They do not answer what is science. Science is merely a process, and the results of that process.
By the process of explaining jargon I meant by using hyperlinks.

Bensaccount 20:43, 18 May 2004 (UTC)Reply

A process of what? Making observations? Observations of what? This is not an article on the scientific method, but an article on the nature of science itself.
I don't understand what you mean. Did I remove some wikilinks by accident?

- Omegatron 20:49, May 18, 2004 (UTC)

Science is both a process of gaining knowledge, and the knowledge gained by this process. (Science).
I mean just hyperlink realism instead of explaining it on this page.

Bensaccount 20:52, 18 May 2004 (UTC)Reply

PS. I think that the philosophy here may fit better on the nature article, which is harder to define. (What is nature?)

Nature is the natural world, especially in its essential form, untainted by human influence. This definition makes the assumption that atoms, animals, gravity, stars, wind, microbes, etc. all exist independently of our observations of them. This essentially metaphysical view is termed realism. The opposed view of realism is the metaphysical position, idealism which in varying forms denies the existence of matter independent of mind. The two views are metaphysical because although both are consistent with our experience there appears to be no way to get outside of that experience in order to see which (if either) is true.

Bensaccount 23:12, 18 May 2004 (UTC)Reply

Philosophy of science

Why have two sections addressing philosophical issues? Philosophical foundations of the scientific method, rather curiously, did not discuss the philosophical foundations of the scientific method. Philosophy was a rather idiosyncratic chat about Kant – not exactly a renowned philosopher of science. Rather than attempt a halting account in this article, why not link to the main philosophy of science articles? Banno 11:30, Jun 8, 2004 (UTC)

Theories of various quality

I rather object to this sentence: "Thus, when scientists refer to the theories of biological evolution, electromagnetism, and relativity, they are referring to ideas that have survived considerable experimental testing." While there no doubt is a great deal of circumstantial evidence supporting the theory of evolution, it does not exactly lend itself to experimental testing. So you might observe that certain bacteria adapt to their environment, or might even create new types of vegetable by cross-breeding, but has anyone ever observed the development of a completely new species, let alone created a new species using the mechanisms that allegedly drive evolution? I think not.

Note that I am not criticizing the theory of evolution itself. I would merely argue that, as a theory, it is far weaker than the theory of relativity, for example. In my opinion, it should rather be compared to something like continental drift.

I believe there are several examples of completely new species. I'm no expert. Try looking here: Observed Instances of Speciation - Omegatron 13:31, Jun 17, 2004 (UTC)

Locations of science

The "locations of science" section seems to imply that academia is the standard by which all science is "truly" done, and that researchers in private institutions only occasionally brush with scientific exactitude. But since the mid 20th century the line between academic and industrial science has become so blurred (UC Berkeley's entire Int. Bio. dept is paid for by Monsanto, if I recall), and the rise of private financing of basic research (Genentech comes to mind) makes its current formulation overly idealistic and quite a bit naive, I think. Am I the only one who thinks this? --Fastfission 01:13, 10 Jul 2004 (UTC)

Or you can do science in your bedroom by yourself. Or to determine which route is the fastest way to get to work. I don't know why it has this concept of science in a place... - Omegatron 05:07, Jul 10, 2004 (UTC)