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Iraq Survey Group

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The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was a fact finding mission sent by the coalition to find Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs developed by Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. It consisted of a 1,400-member team organized by the Pentagon and CIA to hunt for Saddam's suspected stockpiles of WMD, such as chemical and biological agents. However, the search failed to find such stockpiles, which were the main stated reason for President Bush ordering the invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam. [1]

Formation

The ISG was made up of 1,200 members of British and American experts. David Kay, a prominent U.S. scientist who searched for WMD after the first Gulf War, was chosen to head the group.

The Iraq Survey Group continued the work of UN inspectors, led by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, who were mandated by the UN Security Council to search for illegal weapons before the conflict. (See Iraq disarmament crisis.) The replacement of UNMOVIC/IAEA with British and American scientists was consistent with general trends in the country, which saw the influence of United Nations wane in favour of the occupying military forces.

After the capture of Saddam Hussein, Hans Blix played down suggestions that the former dictator would reveal the wherabouts of any illegal weapons stockpiles: "I doubt that he will reveal any WMD, because I think both we UN inspectors and the American inspectors have been looking around and come to the conclusion that there aren't any," Mr Blix said. "He might be able to reveal when they were done away with. I am inclined to think it was early in 1991 or 1992."

Interim Progress Report

After six months searching for WMD, the ISG issued an 'Interim Progress Report' on October 3, 2003. The team has found evidence of "WMD-related program activities" but no actual chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. In addition to details of dormant WMD programs, the October 2003 report also includes discoveries of non-WMD programs banned by the United Nations and concealed during the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspections that began in 2002. The discoveries made by the ISG include a "clandestine network of laboratories . . . that contained equipment . . . suitable for continuing chemical biological weapons research" and vials of "live C botulinum Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced". [2]. Lines of enquiry adopted by the ISG include the examination of sites across Iraq, as well as interviewing scientists, truck drivers and other workers with possible knowledge of WMD. The failure to find any stockpiles of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons has proved a problem for Washington and London, who used intelligence indicating that Iraq did possess WMD as one of the primary justifications for the invasion of Iraq. The British government, in particular, placed very heavy emphasis on this intelligence.

David Kay resigns

On January 23, 2004, the head of the ISG, David Kay, resigned his position, stating that he believed WMD would not be found in Iraq. "I don't think they existed," commented Dr. Kay. "What everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end of the last Gulf War and I don't think there was a large-scale production programme in the 90s." Kay criticised the intelligence that led to the war in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying "we were all wrong and that is most disturbing". Kay's successor, named by CIA director George Tenet, is the former UN weapons inspector Charles Duelfer. Duelfer has stated that the chances of finding any WMD in Iraq are "close to nil".

Kay told the Senate Armed Services Committee during his oral report the following though: "Based on the intelligence that existed, I think it was reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Now that you know reality on the ground as opposed to what you estimated before, you may reach a different conclusion — although I must say I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place, potentially, than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war."

Dr. Kay's team has established that the Iraqi regime had the production capacity and know-how to produce a great deal more chemical and biological weaponry when international economic sanctions were lifted, a policy change which was actively being sought by France, Germany and Russia. Kay also believes that a large but undetermined amount of the former Iraqi regime's WMD program had been moved to Syria shortly before the 2003 invasion. [3]

On February 1, 2004, senior US administration officials announced that President Bush is to convene an independent enquiry into the intelligence used to justify the Iraq war and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction. This was shortly followed by the convention of a similar enquiry in the UK, which has been boycotted by the two main opposition parties due to disagreements on its scope and independence [4]. The US-sponsored search for WMD has so far cost $300 million, with the final bill expected to top $1 billion.

In January 2005 the group announced the conclusion of its search. They stated that they had failed to find evidence of banned weapons that were used as a justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 2005, political consequences in the USA as a result of the (non-)findings by the ISG appear unlikely.

Duelfer Report

On 30 September 2004, the ISG released the Duelfer Report, its final report on Iraq's WMD programs. The main points of the report are as follows:

  • Iraq's WMD programs had decayed significantly since the end of the first Gulf War
  • Iraq had no deployable WMD of any kind as of March 2003 and had no production since 1991. Iraq destroyed its CW stocks in 1995.
  • Iraq hoped to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped, a prospect that the Iraqi government saw coming soon.
  • Smuggling was used by Iraq to rebuild as much of its WMD program as could be hidden from UN weapons inspectors.
  • Until March 2003, Saddam Hussein convinced his top military commanders that Iraq did indeed possess WMD's that could be used against any US invasion force, in order to prevent a coup over the prospects of fighting the US-led Coalition without these weapons.
  • Iraq used procurement contracts allowed under the Oil for Food program to buy influence amongst UN Security Council member states including France, China, and Russia, as well as dozens of prominent journalists and anti-sanctions activists.

Political implications

President Bush's primary rationale for invading Iraq was the allegation that Saddam Hussein was actively developing WMD and had stockpiles. The Administration's allegation of cooperation between terrorist groups (like Al Qaeda) would mean that Saddam would be able to transport those weapons to U.S. or European urban centers and detonate them, with significant casualties.

In the 2004 presidential election, one of the main topics of debate surround the WMD allegations that Bush made. John Kerry and Democrats assert that Bush may have lied or misled the people about WMD, and may have exaggerated the claims, dragging America into a war it cannot win easily. Bush originally defended his argument that WMD existed in Iraq. Subsequently however, he claimed that Saddam was a threat, regardless of whether he possessed WMD, and that Saddam had the ability to create WMD if the Western World allowed him to do so. As a result, the pre-emptive attack was justified.

The "key finding" about influence peddling is based on over 15,000 documents taken from the former state-owned Iraqi oil corporation by associates of Ahmed Chalabi. These documents were examined by Duelfer’s team and their authenticity verified. The Volcker commission, established by the United Nations, is also investigating them.

See also

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