Battle of 73 Easting
The battle of 73 Easting was a decisive tank battle fought on February 26th, 1991, during the Gulf War, between armored forces of the United States Army and those of the Iraqi Republican Guard. The battle is named after a "phase line" near which the battle took place. Phase lines are map references occurring every few kilometers used to measure progress of an offensive operation. The battle of 73 Easting was approximately 50 miles east of Al Busayyah, Iraq.
As part of General Norman Schwarzkopf's plan for the war's ground phase against Iraq, called Operation Desert Sabre, VII Corps, racing east from Saudi Arabia into Iraq had two goals: to cut off any Iraqi retreat from Kuwait, and to pin down and destroy five Republican Guard divisions near the Iraq/Kuwait border positioned to respond to the Arab and Marine Corps units liberating Kuwait to the south. This maneuver was dubbed the "Hail Mary." Lead elements in VII Corps' push into Iraq were the American 3rd Armor Division (AD), the British 1st Armored Division (AD), and an organic reconnaissance element, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). With the start of the ground campaign on the night of February 23rd/24th, VII Corps crossed the border into Iraq. Iraqi resistance was light and ineffective and the 2nd ACR did not see significant fighting until the 25th.
On the 26th of February, with adverse weather conditions preventing air support, the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the 3rd Armored Division simultaneously conducted a hasty attack against the 29th and 9th Brigades of the Tawakalna Division. Spearheaded by the division cavalry squadron, the 2nd ACR, and a tank heavy task force, supported by five battalions of cannon artillery and 27 MLRS launchers, the 3rd Armored Division succeeded in destroying numerous Iraqi armored vehicles and tanks in intense fighting. Up to that time, the battle of 73 Easting was the largest tank battle for the United States military since World War II.
Conditions
The battle of 73 Easting was conducted under extremely adverse weather conditions. Weather conditions on the 26th began with heavy ground fog which lifted and gave way to winds gusting from 25-42 knots. Heavy rain then later blowing sand often reduced visibility to less than 100 meters and the ceiling was generally too low for Army aviation or Air Force ground support aircraft to fly for the opening rounds of the battle.
Plan
The 2nd ACR was to advance east, locate and engage the enemy at a distance, and allow the heavy armor units of the 1st and 3rd ADs to pass through to finish destroying the Iraqis. The limit of advance was to be 70 Easting.
Iraqi forces were the heavily armored Tawakalna Division, and occupied well-constructed defensive emplacements. They had also prepared alternate positions which enabled them to reorient to the west to face the VII Corps attack. Even after extensive aerial and artillery bombardment, most elements of the Tawakalna Division remained combat effective prior to the advance of the 2nd ACR.
67 Easting
At 13:00 one of 2nd ACR cavalry troops, G (Ghost) Troop, 2nd ACR killed several more personnel carriers and at approximately 15:30, three enemy tanks.
By 16:10, to the south at phase line 00 Northing, another of 2nd ACR cavalry troops, E (Eagle) Troop, received fire from an Iraqi dismounted outpost, a dug-in Iraqi ZU-23 and several occupied buildings in an Iraqi village. The American scouts returned fire with their tanks and Bradleys, silenced the Iraqi guns, took prisoners, and continued east. Advancing three more kilometers to the 70 Easting line more enemy fire came in and was immediately returned.
73 Easting
Reaching 70 Easting at 16:22 Eagle Troop knocked out a screen of eight Iraqi T-72 tanks. Beyond this they could see Iraqi T-72 tanks in prepared positions at 73 Easting. This was the Iraqi Brigade Assembly Area. Captain McMaster of Eagle Troop, 2nd ACR, fearing the loss of surprise, decided not to wait for the heavier units to come forward, pass through his lines and engage the Iraqis, but instead ordered Eagle Troop to advance and engage the Iraqi tanks. Using surprise and its thermal imaging equipment advantage, Eagle Troop, consisting of 10 M1 Abrams tanks, 13 M3 Bradleys, two M106 mortar carriers, one M577 command track and a M981 FIST-V charged and destroyed the Iraqi tanks at 73 Easting at close range. Unlike previous engagements, this time the destruction of the first Iraqi tanks did not result in the wholesale surrender of Iraqi soldiers. The Iraqis stood their ground while their tanks and armored personnel carriers of the Tawakalna Division attempted to maneuver and fight. By 17:15, Eagle Troop had destroyed 30 tanks and 24 armored personnel carriers, as well as numerous other vehicles and bunkers, and taken 1,300 prisoners with no losses to themselves. In twenty minutes Eagle Troop had advanced in constant heavy contact with Iraqi armor from the 67 Easting line to its halt at the 74 Easting line.
Other 2nd ACR Troops, I (Iron), K (Killer), and G (Ghost), had joined the fighting at 73 Easting as well. By 16:40 Ghost Troop had assumed a fixed position on a ridge overlooking a wadi at, and parallel to, the 73 Easting phase line, north of Eagle Troop's battle. During the fight the Republican Guards' Tawakalna Divsion's 18th Brigade had gotten tangled up with the 12th Iraqi AD, and both enemy units were trying to retreat through the same narrow piece of terrain, a shallow valley between two ridgelines, leading straight into Ghost Troop. At 18:30 the first of several waves of Iraqi T-72 and T-55 tanks adavanced into the wadi in their bid to escape, directly into Ghost Troop. The fighting in these waves waves was fierce. The other troops and tank companies were fighting largely against dug-in soldiers and stationary tanks, not the waves of armored charges faced by Ghost Troop that night. The fighting was so intense that more than once, only the calling in of artillery and helicopters saved Ghost Troop. By 21:00 Ghost Troop was desperately short on ammunition and a tank company, Hawk, was sent in to relieve them. Ghost Troop lost one M3 Bradley to Iraqi tank fire and one soldier, Sgt. Nels A. Moller, the gunner of the Bradley, was killed.
By 22:30, the 2nd ACR's front was quiet as the 1st Infantry Division began its forward passage of lines. The 1st Infantry Division completed its passing through the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's line and continued to advance on Objective Norfolk, an area encompassing the intersection of the IPSA Pipeline Road, several desert trails, and a large Iraqi supply depot. Now, instead of three armored cavalry squadrons, the Iraqi 18th and 37th Armored Brigades faced six heavy battalions of American tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and another six battalions of 155mm field artillery. Again, the Iraqis did not run or surrender but manned their vehicles and weapons to face the advancing Americans. In the ensuing battle many American units advanced past Iraqi tanks and crews, who were in shelters or had not yet turned on their engines and so did not appear to be threats in the American crew's thermal sights. Some confusion ensued, with enemy tanks and anti-tank infantry crews now operating in the rear of the American lead units, and several friendly fire incidents occurred. The brigade commander, Colonel David Weisman, decided to pull the battalions back, consolidate, and use his artillery to destroy the aggressive Iraqi infantry.
The Iraqis had halted the 1st Infantry Division's initial push into their sector only temporarily. By 00:30, 27 February, the two attacking brigades of the 1st Infantry Division were positioned along the 75 Easting, 2,000 meters east of 73 Easting. They crossed remaining ten kilometers of their objective, Objective Norfolk, over the next three hours. By dawn the 1st ID had taken Objective Norfolk and the fight shifted away from the 73 Easting area to 1st Armored Division's attack to the north, started at 20:00 on 26 February, and the 3rd Armored Division attack just to the south of the 1st Division.
The 2nd ACR had advanced between two Iraqi divisions, the 12th Armored Division and the Tawakalna Division, becoming the only American unit so outnumbered and out-gunned during the ground campaign. The 2nd ACR destroyed approximately 85 tanks, 40 personnel carriers and more than 30 wheeled vehicles, along with several anti-aircraft artillery systems during the battle. The equivalent of an Iraqi brigade was destroyed at 73 Easting; it was the first ground defeat of the Republican Guards. Within 24 hours, most of the others were gone.
Analysis
Armored battles in the open desert are generally decided very quickly. The 2nd ACR was able to surprise the enemy and penetrate the Iraqi positions so quickly that they were unable to recover. Also, superior American night vision equipment along with the poor weather combined to give the American tank crews a first-shot advantage.
The combined attack of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's three squadrons and the 1 Infantry Division's two leading brigades had destroyed two Iraqi brigades (18th Mechanized Brigade and 37th Armored Brigade) of the Tawakalna Division.
Casualties
Iraqi
- 85 Tanks (mostly T-72s with some (T-55)s)
- 40 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (mainly BMPs, MTLBs and BRDMs )
- 39 trucks
- 1 ZU-23
- 1,300 prisoners
- unknown KIA and wounded
US
- 1 M1 tank
- 4 M3 Bradleys
- 7 KIA, most due to friendly fire
- 30 wounded, again, most due to friendly fire)
Reference
- "Ghost Troop, Battle at 73 Easting."
Crowley, Vince Armor, May-June 1991, VOL C, #3.
- "The 2nd ACR at the Battle of 73 Easting."
Davis, 1LT Daniel L. Field Artillery Journal, PB 6-92-2, Apr 92, Pg 48.
- "A Swift Kick, 2nd ACR's Taming of the Guard."
Army Times, Aug 5, 1991.
- "Dragon's Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting."
Armor, May-June 1992, VOL CI, #3.
- Draft Report The Battle of 73 Easting, 26 February 1991, a historical introduction to a simulation.
Krause, Col Michael US Army Center of Military History 2 May 1991.
See also
External links
- [http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/2ACR/storm/history.html Desert Storm, a day by day history of the
Second Armored Cavalry Regiment]
- Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict, by Stephen Biddle. From International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996)
- The FReeper Foxhole Revisits The Battle of 73 EASTING - 1991 -Jan. 22, 2005 at the Free Republic website.
- An account of Ghost Troop's fight], by Stars and Stripes
- Correcting Myths About The Persian Gulf War: The Last Stand of the Tawakalna by Stephen A. Bourque, from The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997