Beslan school siege

Beslan school hostage crisis
Photos of the victims on the walls of the former SNO
Location	Beslan, North Ossetia-Alania (Russia)
Date	1 September 2004 ~9:30am – 3 September 2004 ~5:00pm (UTC+3)
Target	School Number One (SNO)
Attack type	Hostage taking
Deaths	At least 386 (including 31 terrorists)
Injured	Over 700
Perpetrators	Shamil Basayev's Riyadus Salihiin group

The Republic of North Ossetia in Russia

The Beslan school hostage crisis (also referred to as the Beslan school siege or Beslan Massacre) began when a group of armed Chechen separatists and supporters took more than 1,200 schoolchildren and adults hostage on September 1 2004, at School Number One (SNO) in the town of Beslan, North Ossetia-Alania, (an autonomous republic in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation). On the third day of the standoff, a chaotic gunbattle broke out between the hostage-takers and Russian security forces. Three hundred thirty-four (334) civilians were killed, including 186 children and hundreds more were wounded. Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev took responsibility for the hostage taking.

There are many aspects of the crisis still in dispute, including how many militants were involved, whether weapons and ammunition had been hidden in the school prior to the siege, and whether some of the militants had escaped. Questions about the government's management of the crisis have also, persisted, including the nature and content of negotiations with the militants, the responsibility for the bloody outcome, and the use of heavy weapons by the government forces.

Course of the crisis

See also: Timeline of the Beslan school hostage crisis

Day 1

Background

The initial attack took place on September 1, the traditional start of the Russian school year, referred to as "First September" or "Day of Knowledge." On this day, the children, accompanied by their parents and other relatives, attend ceremonies hosted by their school. It is traditional for the first-year students to give flowers to those entering their final year, and to then be taken to class by the older children.

Comintern Street SNO, located next to the district police station, was one of seven schools in Beslan, with 59 teachers and several support staff, and 900 pupils between the ages of six and eighteen. The gymnasium, where most of the estimated 1,200 hostages were to spend 56 hours, was a recent addition. It measured 10 meters wide and 25 meters long.

Because of the older pupils and family members attending the Day of Knowledge festivities, the number of people in the school at the time of the attack was considerably higher than usual for a normal school day.

Hostage-taking

At 09:30 local time, a group of approximately 32 heavily-armed attackers wearing military camouflage uniforms and black ski masks, and in some cases wearing explosive belts, arrived at SNO in a stolen police GAZ van and a GAZ-66 military truck. At first, some mistook the attackers for Russian forces practicing a security drill. However, the attackers resolved this misconception by shooting in the air and forcing everybody into the school. During the initial chaos, up to 50 people managed to flee and alert authorities to the situation.

After an exchange of gunfire with local police and an armed civilian (Ruslan Gapoyev, who was killed in the exchange), in which it was reported one attacker was shot, the attackers seized the school building, taking approximately 1,300 hostages. The attackers herded the hostages into the school's gym, and confiscated all mobile phones; one of the female rebels stated that if she found anyone hiding a phone, she would kill that person and three others. They ordered everyone to speak in Russian and only when spoken to. When a father named Ruslan Betrozov stood to calm people and repeat the rules in the local language, Ossetic, a gunman approached and killed him with a single shot to the head. Another father named Vadim Bolloyev, who refused to kneel, was also shot and then bled to death.

After gathering the hostages in the gym, the attackers took several small groups of the adult male hostages (about 15 to 22 men total), reportedly those perceived by them as the strongest ones, into another room and then shot at them with automatic rifles, killing all but two of them. One man named Aslan Kudzayev survived by jumping out the window and escaping (the authorities briefly detained him as a suspected terrorist). The attackers then forced other hostages to throw the bodies out of the building and to wash the blood off the floor.

ITAR-TASS reported that a local police source had told them that men disguised as repairmen had concealed weapons and explosives in the school in July 2004, but this version of events was later officially refuted. However, some witnesses have since come forward claiming they were made to help their captors remove the hidden weapon caches from the school. There are also claims that they also constructed a sniper's nest in advance on the gymnasium roof.

Beginning of the siege

Overhead map of school showing initial positions of Russian forces

A disorganized security cordon was soon established around the school, consisting of the Militsiya and Russian Army forces; OSNAZ, including the elite Alfa and Vympel units of the FSB; and members of the OMON special forces of the MVD. No fire-fighting equipment was in position and, despite the previous experiences of the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis, there were few ambulances ready. There was not one sapper among the Russian special forces, despite the building being heavily mined. The Russian government initially misreported or downplayed the numbers, repeatedly stating there were only 354 hostages; this reportedly angered the attackers who further mistreated their captives.

Hundreds of hostages packed into the school gym with wired explosives attached to the basketball hoop

The attackers mined the gym and the rest of the building with improvised explosive devices, and surrounded it with tripwires. In a further bid to deter rescue attempts, they threatened to kill 50 hostages for every one of their own members killed by the police, and to kill 20 hostages for every gunman injured. They also threatened to blow up the school if government forces attacked.

Karen Mdinaradze, the Alania football team's cameraman, survived a mysterious explosion in which he lost his eye. Apparently, one of the female bombers accidentally detonated her explosive belt, killing another bomber, one other militant, and several adult hostages. According to another version, the blast was actually triggered by Polkovnik (Russian for Colonel), the group leader, when he set off the bomb by remote control to kill those who openly disagreed about the child hostages and intimidate other possible dissenters.

The Russian government initially said that it would not use force to rescue the hostages, and negotiations towards a peaceful resolution took place on the first and second days, led by Leonid Roshal, a pediatrician whom the hostage takers had reportedly asked for by name; Roshal had helped negotiate the release of children in the 2002 Moscow siege. According to the witness in court, however, Russian negotiators confused him with Vladimir Rushailo, a Russian security official. At Russia's request, a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council was convened on the evening of September 1, at which the council members demanded "the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages of the terrorist attack". U.S. President George W. Bush made a statement offering "support in any form" to Russia.

That night, the hostage takers began exploring the area surrounding the school, preparing for an exit strategy once their demands had been met.

Day 2

On September 2, 2004, negotiations between Roshal and the hostage-takers proved unsuccessful, and they refused to allow food, water, and medicines to be taken in for the hostages, or for the bodies of the dead to be removed from the front of the school.

By day two, the lack of food and water took its toll on the young children, many of whom were forced to stand for long periods in the hot, tightly-packed gym. Many children took off their clothing because of the sweltering heat within the gymnasium, which led to rumors of sexual impropriety, though the hostages later explained it was merely due to the stifling heat and being denied any water. Many children fainted, and parents feared they would die. Occasionally, the militants (many of whom took off their masks) took out some of the unconscious children and poured water on their heads before returning them to the gym. Later in the day, some adults also started to faint from fatigue and thirst. Because of the conditions in the gym, when the explosion and gunbattle began on the third day, many of the surviving children were so fatigued that they were barely able to flee from the carnage.

In the afternoon, the gunmen let the Ingushetia President Ruslan Aushev to enter the school building and released 26 hostages, 11 nursing women and 15 children, personally to him. The rebels gave Aushev a note with demands from their leader Shamil Basayev who was not himself present in Beslan. The existence of the note was kept secret by the Russian authorities. It was falsely announced that the hostage takers made no demands. Basayev demanded recognition of a "formal independence for Chechnya" that "would remain in the ruble zone, and would join the Commonwealth of Independent States". He also said that "although the Chechen rebels had played no part in the 1999 apartment building bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk", they would publicly take responsibility for them.

At around 15:30, two rocket propelled grenade (RPGs) were fired approximately ten minutes apart by the hostage-takers at security forces outside the school, setting a police car ablaze, but the Russian forces did not return fire. As the day and night wore on, the combination of stress and sleep deprivation — and possibly drug withdrawal — made the hostage takers increasingly hysterical and unpredictable. The crying of the children irritated them, and on several occasions crying children and their mothers were threatened with being shot if they would not stop crying. Russian authorities claimed that the hostage-takers had "listened to German hard rock group Rammstein on personal stereos during the siege to keep themselves edgy and fired up."

There were no reported deaths on September 2.

Day 3

Versions of the initial events

Rough plan of school showing removal vehicle and damaged gym

Around 13:04 on September 3, 2004, the hostage-takers agreed to allow Emergency Ministry servicemen to remove bodies from the school grounds. However, when the servicemen approached the school, explosions were heard from the gymnasium and the hostage-takers opened fire. Two of the servicemen were killed, while the rest took cover. Part of the gymnasium wall was demolished by the explosions, allowing a group of about 30 hostages to escape, though a number were killed as a result of crossfire between the hostage-takers and the army.

• Presidential advisor Aslambek Aslakhanov said that the cause of the firing and the subsequent storming of the school had been an accidental explosion. According to an early version, one of the bombs had been insecurely attached with adhesive tape, had fallen, and then exploded.

• Ruslan Aushev, a key negotiator during the siege, told the Novaya Gazeta that an initial explosion was set off by a hostage-taker accidentally tripping over a wire. As a result, armed civilians, some of them apparently fathers of the hostages, started shooting. Reportedly, no security forces or hostage-takers were shooting at this point, but Aushev concluded that the gunfire led the hostage-takers to believe that the school was being stormed.

• According to a third version, a special forces sniper shot a hostage-taker whose foot was on a dead-man detonator, triggering the first blasts.

• A fourth version put forward by Duma member and weapons and explosives expert Yuri Savelyev claims that the exchange of gunfire was not begun by explosions within the school building but by two grenades fired by the Russian forces into the building, and that the home-made explosive devices installed by the rebels did not explode at all. Savelyev, a dissenting Torshin commission member, claims these explosions killed many of the hostages and dozens more died in the resulting fire. Yuri Ivanov, another parliamentary investigator, further contended that the grenades were fired on the direct orders of President Putin.

• In a fifth version, Alexander Torshin of a Russian parliamentary commission said the terrorists had started the battle by intentionally detonating bombs among the hostages, to the surprise of Russian negotiators and commanders. That statement went beyond previous government accounts, which have typically said the bombs exploded in an unexplained accident.

The government asserts that once the shooting started, soldiers had no choice but to storm the building. However, most of the town's residents have refuted that official version of events. According to the official statements, the order to start the operation was given by the republican FSB leader.

Storming by the Russian forces

Russian special forces, fired powerful RPO-A Shmel (Bumblebee) rockets at the school's roof and attic, setting parts of the school ablaze (a total of nine empty disposable tubes were later found on the rooftops of nearby apartment blocks). A chaotic battle broke out as two special forces groups fought to enter the school and militants counterattacked. The assault forces included the assault groups of the FSB OSNAZ, and the associated troops of the Russian Army and the Russian Interior Ministry, supported by several tanks from the Russia's 58th Army, BTR-80 wheeled armoured personnel carriers, and at least one Mil Mi-24 helicopter gunship.

Witnesses and journalists saw two T-72 tanks advance on the school that afternoon, at least one of which fired its main gun several times; the tank unit commander testified the tank fired "one blank shot and six antipersonnel-high explosive shells" on orders from the FSB. The Russian government later defended the use of tanks and other heavy weaponry, arguing that it was used after surviving hostages escaped from the school. However, this contradicts the eyewitness accounts (including Associated Press reporters, photographers and videographers), as many hostages were seriously wounded and could not possibly escape by themselves, and others were kept by the militants as human shields, particularly in the area of the school cafeteria.

Many local civilians also joined in the chaotic battle, having brought along their own weapons. At the same time, regular conscript soldiers reportedly fled the scene as the fighting began. The civilians claimed that the local police also panicked, apparently firing in the wrong direction. At least one of the armed volunteers is known to have been killed.

By 15:00, two hours after the assault began, Russian troops claimed control of most of the school. However, fighting was still continuing on the grounds as evening fell, including a machine-gunner firing from an upper floor, and a group holding out in the basement. During the battle, a group of 13 hostage-takers broke through the military cordon and took refuge nearby (reportedly, the group included two women who tried to pass themselves off as medical personnel, contradicting the version according to which there were only two female militants who died during the standoff). Several hostage-takers were believed to have entered a two-story building nearby. This building was destroyed by tanks and flamethrowers around 21:00, according to the Ossetian committee's report.

Firefighters, who were called two hours after the fire started, were not prepared to battle the blaze that consumed the gymnasium; one old fire truck arrived two hours after the start of the fire, reportedly without water. Few ambulances were available to transport the hundreds of injured victims, who were driven in private cars. One suspected terrorist was lynched on the scene by a mob of civilians, an event filmed by the Sky News crew, while an unarmed militant was captured alive by the OMON troops while trying to hide under their truck (later identified as Nur-Pashi Kulayev).

Sporadic explosions and gunfire continued at night despite reports that all resistance by militants has been suppressed. These did not end until 12 hours after the first explosions.

Aftermath

Russia's deputy Prosecutor General Alexander Fridinsky said that 31 of the 32 hostage-takers had been confirmed dead and one had been captured alive. During the operation, at least 11 soldiers of the OSNAZ special forces groups Alfa and Vympel were killed, among them the commander of Alfa, while more than 30 suffered wounds of varying severity. It was the highest official number of casualties in a single engagement in the history of these units.

Many survivors remained in severe shock, and some of the injured died in hospitals. At least one surviving female hostage committed suicide after returning home. The Russian government has been heavily criticized by many of the local people who, days after the end of the siege, did not know whether their children were alive or dead. Some human remains were even found by a local man in the nearby garbage dump several months after the crisis, which prompted further outrage.

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a two-day period of national mourning for September 6 and September 7, 2004. On the second day of mourning, 135,000 people joined a government-organised rally against terrorism on the Red Square in Moscow. Putin cancelled planned meetings with German chancellor Gerhard Schröder in Hamburg and in the German federal state of Schleswig-Holstein.

Casualties

Further information: [[:List of victims of the Beslan school massacre]]

Official fatalities
Hostages	334
Police and civilians	8
Emergency workers	2
Special forces	11+
Hostage-takers	31
Total	386+
-
Estimated wounded
Special forces	30+
Other	700
Total	730+

At least 396 people, mostly hostages, were killed during the crisis. The first of the many funerals were conducted on September 4, the day after the final assault, with more the following Sunday, and mass burials of 120 people on Monday. The local cemetery was too small and had to be expanded to an adjacent plot of land to accommodate the dead.

The exact number of people that received ambulatory assistance immediately after the crisis is not known, but is estimated to be around 700. Moscow-based military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer in a September 7 2004 Moscow Times column concluded that 90% of the hostages had sustained injuries. After their release, 437 people, including 221 children, were hospitalized. 197 children were taken to the Children’s Republican Clinical Hospital in the North Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz, and thirty were in resuscitation units in critical condition. Another 150 people were transferred to the Vladikavkaz Emergency Hospital. Sixty-two people, including twelve children, were treated in two local hospitals in Beslan. Six children with heavy wounds were flown to Moscow for specialist treatment. The majority of the children were treated for burns, gunshot and shrapnel wounds, and mutilation caused by mines and bombs. Some had to have amputations and eyes removed. Many children were permanently disabled by injuries sustained during their captivity. The sudden influx of large numbers of injured placed a severe strain on the local health service. There was an inadequate supply of hospital beds, medication, and neurosurgery equipment. One month after the attack, 240 people (160 of them children) were still being treated in hospitals in Vladikavkaz and in Beslan. Surviving children and parents have received psychological treatment at Vladikavkaz Rehabilitation Centre.

Later, it was reported that an unknown number of survivors may have died as a result of a government-ordered countermeasure, called Naloxone, meant to counter the effects of Fentanyl-based drugs in the case of the Moscow-type scenario of the storming. The latest fatality is 33-year-old librarian Yelena Avdonina, who on December 8 2006 succumbed to wounds sustained during the siege.

It is not known how many members of Russia's elite special forces died in the fighting, as official figures range from 11 to more than 20 killed. The number on the memorial in Beslan is only 10. These killed included all three commanders of the assault group: Colonel Oleg Ilyin and Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Ratzumovsky of Vympel, and Major Alexander Petrov of Alfa.

Responsibility and motives

Responsibility

Chechen separatists

Initially, the identity and origin of the attackers was not clear. It was widely assumed from day two that they were separatists from nearby Chechnya, but the Russian presidential aide Aslambek Aslakhanov denied it: "They were not Chechens. When I started talking with them in Chechen, they had answered: 'We do not understand, speak Russian'." However, freed hostages confirmed that many of the hostage-takers did speak Chechen amongst themselves and only spoke Russian with heavy accents.

On September 17, 2004, Basayev issued a statement claiming responsibility for the Beslan school siege, saying his Riyadus-Salikhin "martyr battalion" had carried out this attack. Newspaper reports have also linked his Ingush deputy, Magomet Yevloyev, to the school attack. The Beslan crisis was strikingly similar to the 1995 Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis and the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis, in which hundreds of civilians were held hostage by Chechen militants also led by or answering to Shamil Basayev.

The Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov immediately denied that his forces were involved in the siege. He condemned the action and all attacks against civilians via a statement issued by his envoy Akhmed Zakayev in London, and blamed it on what he called a radical local group. He called on western governments to initiate peace talks between Russia and Chechnya and added: "I categorically refute all accusations by the Russian government that President Maskhadov had any involvement in the Beslan event."

In May 2005, after Maskhadov's death, North Ossetian government official Izrail Totoonti said that both Maskhadov and Zakayev declared they "were ready to fly to Beslan, to any North Ossetian airport, to negotiate with the militants," adding that Maskhadov's sole demand was his unhindered passage to the school and "the hostage release operation began an hour later." Zakayev confirmed this account.

Arab and alleged al-Qaeda involvement

Shortly after September 3, 2004, official Russian sources stated that the attackers were part of an international group led by Shamil Basayev that included a number of Arabs with connections to al-Qaeda, and said they picked up phone calls in Arabic from the Beslan school to Saudi Arabia and another undisclosed Middle Eastern country.

At least two English/Algerians are among the identified terrorists who actively participated in the attack: Osman Larussi and Yacine Benalia. A UK citizen named Kamel Rabat Bouralha, arrested while trying to leave Russia immediately following the attack, is suspected to be a key organizer. All three were linked to the Finsbury Park Mosque of north London. Russia also claimed that alleged al-Qaeda agent Abu Omar al-Saif was responsible for financing the attack.

Motives

Nationalism

Russian negotiators say the attackers never explicitly stated their demands, although they did have notes handwritten by one of the hostages on a school notebook, in which they spelled out demands of full troop withdrawal from Chechnya and recognition of Chechen independence (see below Demands).

The moderate wing of the anti-Russian resistance condemned the hostage taking. Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov denounced the school siege, categorically denying his government's involvement in the terrorist act.

Islamic fundamentalism

Shamil Basayev stated that the attackers' goals were not limited to merely Chechen nationalism and independence, as he also had objectives relating to establishing an Islamic Emirate across the whole of the North Caucasus (including predominantly Russian Orthodox Christian North Ossetia) stretching from the Black Sea to Caspian Sea. The only surviving attacker, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, claimed that attacking a school and targeting mothers and young children was not merely coincidental, but was deliberately designed for maximum outrage with the purpose of igniting a wider war in the Caucasus.

According to this theory, the attackers hoped that the mostly Orthodox Christian Ossetians would attack their mostly Muslim Ingush and Chechen neighbours to seek revenge, encouraging ethnic and religious hatred and strife throughout the North Caucasus. North Ossetia and Ingushetia had previously been involved in a brief, but bloody conflict in 1992 over disputed land in the North Ossetian Prigorodny District, leaving an estimated 600 dead and 50,000 displaced.

The expected backlash against neighbouring nations failed to materialise on a massive scale. In July 2007, however, the office of the presidential envoy for the Southern Federal District announced that a North Ossetian armed group engaged in abductions as retaliation for the Beslan school hostage taking. FSB Lieutenant Colonel Alikhan Kalimatov, who was sent from Moscow to investigate these cases, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen on September 18 2007.

Demands

The hostage-takers in Beslan were reported to have made the following demands:

• Withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and independence for Chechnya.
• Presence of the following people in the school:
  • Aleksander Dzasokhov, president of North Ossetia,
  • Murat Ziazikov, president of Ingushetia,
  • Ruslan Aushev, former president of Ingushetia,
  • Leonid Roshal, a renowned pediatrician.

Alternatively, instead of Roshal and Aushev, the hostage takers named Vladimir Rushailo and Alu Alkhanov, pro-Moscow President of Chechnya. Dzasokhov and Ziazikov refused to come, while Aushev entered the school and negotiated the release of a number of hostages.

The 1 September 11:00-11:30 letter sent along with a hostage ER doctor

(The case papers of the Nur-Pashi Kulayev's criminal trial. File pages 196-198, the vetting protocol. Cited at the trial session January 19, 2006.)

8-928-738-33-374

We request the republic's president Dzasokhov, the president of Ingushetia Ziazikov, the children's doctor Rashailo for negotiations. If anyone of us is killed, we'll shoot 50 people. If anyone of us is wounded, we'll kill 20 people. If 5 of us are killed, we'll blow up everything. If the light, communication are cut off for a minute, we'll shoot 10 people.

The telephone number according to pravdabeslana.ru; the federal committee reported 8-928-728-33-74. The hostage who was made to write the note misspelled doctor Roshal's name.

The 1 September 16:00-16:30 letter brought by the same female hostage

According to the federal committee report this note contained a corrected phone number (ending with 47) and addition of Aushev to the list of requested persons.

The 2 September 16:45 letter sent along with Ruslan Aushev

(A note hand-written on a quad ruling notebook sheet sized 32 by 20 cm. Source: ibidem. Pages 189-192, the vetting protocol. Pages 193-194, a photocopy of this note.)

From Allah's servant Shamil Basayev to President Putin.

Vladimir Putin, it wasn't you who started this war. But you can finish it if you have enough courage and determination of de Gaulle. We offer you a sensible peace based on mutual benefit by the principle—independence in exchange for security. In case of troops withdrawal and acknowledgement of independence of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, we are obliged not to make any political, military, or economic treaties with anyone against Russia, not to accommodate foreign military bases on our territory even temporarily, not to support and not to finance groups or organizations carrying out a military struggle against RF, to be present in the united ruble zone, to enter CIS. Besides, we can sign a treaty even though a neutral state status is more acceptable to us. We can also guarantee a renunciation of armed struggle against RF by all Muslims of Russia for at least 10 to 15 years under condition of freedom of faith. We are not related to the apartment bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk, but we can take responsibility for this in an acceptable way.

The Chechen people is leading a nation-liberating struggle for its freedom and independence, for its self-protection rather than for destruction or humiliation of Russia. We offer you peace, but the choice is yours.

Allahu Akbar

Signature

30 August

Identities

Masked hostage-taker during the crisis

According to official version, 32 attackers participated directly, two of whom were women, and one of whom was taken alive while the rest were killed. The number and identity of attackers remains a controversial topic, fueled by the often contradictory government statements and official documents.

Many of the surviving hostages and eyewitnesses claim there were many more attackers, some of whom may have escaped. Unofficial numbers go as high as 52 attackers, with four women amongst them. It was alleged that three militants were captured alive, including the leader Vladimir Khodov and a female.

On September 6 2004, the name and identity of seven of the assailants became known, after forensic work over the weekend and interviews with surviving hostages and a captured assailant. In November 2004, Russian officials announced that 27 of the 32 attackers had been identified (27 was also the number of the militants' bodies found as reported just after the storming). However on September 12, 2005, the lead prosecutor against captured terrorist Nur-Pashi Kulayev stated that only 22 of the 32 bodies had been identified, leading to further confusion over which identities have been confirmed.

The forensic tests also established that 21 of the terrorists took heroin as well as morphine in a normally fatal amount. The official investigation cited the use of these "new drugs" as a reason for the militants’ ability to continue fighting despite being badly wounded and presumably in great pain.

In November 2004, 28-year-old Akhmed Merzhoyev and 16-year-old Marina Korigova of Sagopshi, Ingushetia, were arrested by the Russian authorities: Merzhoyev was charged with providing food and equipment to the hostage-takers, and Korigova with having possession of a phone that Tsechoyev had phoned multiple times (Korigova was released when her defence attorney Sharip Tepsoyev showed that she was given the phone by an acquaintance after the crisis).

In August 2005 the Russian forces in Igushetia killed a man identified as Iznaur Kodzoyev, who they said was one of the 32 hostage takers at the Beslan school. This report directly contradicted the official version according to which none of the terrorists has escaped and Kodzoyev's body was identified among these killed. He was also previously announced dead by the Russians months before the Beslan crisis.

Alleged planners and financiers

• Shamil Basayev - Chechen national, took ultimate responsibility for the attack, died in Ingushetia in 2006
• Kamel Rabat Bouralha - foreign national detained in Chechnya in 2004, suspected of organizing the attack
• Abu Omar al-Saif - Saudi national and accused financer, died in Dagestan in 2005
• Magas Akhmed/Magomet Yevloyev - Ingush-Chechen warlord close to Basayev, initially placed at the school and even among the identified bodies
• Abu Zaid - Saudi national and accused organizer, died in Ingushetia in 2005

Hostage takers

Some of the hostage-takers, who numbered at least 32 and included a shahidka women, are tentatively identified as:

Alleged leaders

• Polkovnik Ruslan Khuchbarov - reputed group leader (disputed identity), possibly escaped and at large
• Abdullah Vladimir Khodov - an ethnic Ukrainian from nearby Elkhotovo, where he was wanted for a bomb attack (though Basayev has since said he was an FSB double agent sent to infliltrate the rebel movement), former pupil of the Beslan SNO
• Fantomas - an unidentified bald Slav (he took off his mask) thought to have been a bodyguard to Shamil Basayev, nationality unknown but possibly an ethnic Russian
• Ali Taziyev - former Ingush policeman-turned-rebel who had allegedly led the negotiations on behalf of the hostage takers, some allege an alias/stolen identity of Polkovnik or Magas (Yevloyev), with the conflicting further official documents alleging he was an organizer but not present at the school.

Identified male militants

• Magomed Aushev - a native of Ingushetia
• Yacine Benalia - a British-Algerian who had already been reported killed earlier

• Sultan Kamurzayev - a Chechen from Kazakhstan
• Magomet Khochubarov - a native of Chechnya
• Han-Pashi Kulayev - one-armed older brother of Nur-Pashi, a former bodyguard of Basayev, released from the Russian prison before the attack
• Nur-Pashi Kulayev - a 24-year-old Chechen recruited to help his brother Han-Pashi, the sole known surviving hostage-taker who was sentenced to life in prison
• Adam Kushtov - a 17-year-old Ingush who had fledthe 1992 ethnic cleansing in North Ossetia to Ingushetia
• Abdul-Azim Labazanov - a 31-year-old Chechen, born in Kazakhstan, initially fought on the federal side in the First Chechen War in the group led by Ruslan Labazanov
• Osman Larussi - a British-Algerian, who had already been reported killed earlier
• Arsen Merzhoyev - a 25-year-old native of Engenoi, Chechnya
• Mayrbek Shaybekhanov - a Chechen militant from Engenoi, arrested in Ingushetia and then released shortly before the school attack
• Issa Torshkhoyev - a 26-year-old Chechen refugee in Ingushetia, wanted since the shootout in 2003 when his home was raided by the police.
• Bei-Alla Tsechoyev (also spelled Bay or Ala) - a 31-year-old Ingush, brother of Musa, had a prior conviction for possessing illegal firearms
• Musa Tsechoyev - a 35-year-old native of Sagopshi in Ingushetia, owned the GAZ-66 truck that drove the hostage-takers to the school

Identified female militants

In April 2005, the identity of the two female suicide bombers was revealed.

• Roza Nagayeva - a Chechen woman from the village of Kirov-Yurt in Chechnya's Vedensky District, sister of Amnat Nagayeva, who is suspected of being the suicide bomber having blown up one of the two Russian airliners brought down on August 24, 2004; Roza Nagayeva has previously mistakenly been named as having carried out the bombing of Moscow's Rizhskaya metro station on August 31, 2004
• Mairam Taburova - a Chechen woman from the village of Mair-Tub in Chechnya's Shalinsky District

Official investigations and trials

Kulayev interrogation and trial

Main article: Nur-Pashi Kulayev

The captured militant, 24-year-old Nur-Pashi Kulayev, born in Chechnya, was identified by former hostages. The state-controlled Channel One showed fragments of his interrogation. Kulayev said the group was led by a Chechnya-born militant nicknamed Polkovnik (Colonel) and by the North Ossetia native Vladimir Khodov. According to Kulayev, Polkovnik shot another militant and detonated two female suicide bombers because they objected to capturing children.

Kulayev recognized the body of a short and well-built man as Polkovnik. The official investigators identified Polkovnik as Ruslan Tagirovich Khochubarov. The authorities linked a third body to Magomet Yevloyev nicknamed Magas, an Ingush from the Chechen capital Grozny (Yevloyev however is still alive as of 2007). Kulayev recognized the body of a bald-headed man dressed in a vest and black uniform trousers as belonging to a militant nicknamed Fantomas.

In May 2005 Kulayev was a defendant in a Russian court in the republic of North Ossetia. He was charged with murder, terrorism, kidnapping, and other crimes and pleaded guilty on seven of the counts. Ten days later, on May 26 2006, Nur-Pashi Kulayev was sentenced to life in prison; no appeal was filed by either the defendant or prosecutor. Kulayev later disappeared in the Russian prison system and it is unclear if he's still alive.

Torshin commission

At a press conference with foreign journalists on September 6, 2004, Vladimir Putin rejected the prospect of an open public inquiry, but cautiously agreed with an idea of a parliamentary investigation led by the Duma. He warned, though, that the latter might turn into a "political show". On November 27, 2004, the Interfax news agency reported Alexander Torshin, head of the parliamentary commission, as saying that there was evidence of involvement by "a foreign intelligence agency." He declined to say which, but said "when we gather enough convincing evidence, we won't hide it".

On December 26, 2005, Russian prosecutors investigating the siege on the school claimed that authorities had made no mistakes. Family members of the victims of the attacks have claimed the security forces of incompetence, and have demanded that authorities be held accountable. On August 28, 2006, Yuri Savelyev, an MP and member of the official parliamentary inquiry panel, publicized his report proving that Russian forces deliberately stormed the school on 4 September 2004 using maximum force. According to Savelyev, a weapons and explosives expert, special forces fired rocket-propelled grenades without warning as a prelude to an armed assault, ignoring apparently ongoing negotiations.

On December 22, 2006, a Russian parliamentary commission ended their investigation into the incident. They concluded that the number of gunmen who stormed the school was 32 and laid much blame on the North Ossetian police, stating that there was a severe shortcoming in security measures. In addition, the commission said the attack on the school was premeditated by Chechen rebel leadership including Aslan Maskhadov. In a controversial move, the commission claimed that the shoot-out that ended the siege was instigated by the hostage takers, not security forces.

Ella Kesayeva, who leads the Voice of Beslan support group, suggested that the report was meant as a signal that Putin and his circle were no longer interested in having a discussion about crisis, saying that they "personally didn't expect anything different from Torshin." In February 2007, two members of the commission broke their silence to denounce the investigation as a cover-up, and the Kremlin's official version of events as fabricated, saying they refused to sign off on the report because of their doubts.

Trial of the local policemen

Three local policemen of the Pravoberezhny District ROVD (district militsiya unit) accused of failing to stop gunmen seizing the school were the only officials put on trial over the massacre. On May 30, 2007, Pravoberezhny Court's judge Vitalii Besolov granted an amnesty to them. In response, a group of dozens local women then ransacked the courtroom, smashed windows, overturned furniture and tore down a Russian flag. Victims' groups said the trial had been a whitewash designed to protect their superiors from blame.

The victims of the Beslan terror act said they are going to appeal against the court judgement.

Allegations against the Russian government

Allegations of incompetence

Beslan mother at the cemetery

The handling of the siege by Vladimir Putin's administration was criticized by a number of observers and grassroots organisations, amongst them the Mothers of Beslan and Voice of Beslan. Initially, the European Union also criticized the response.

Criticism, including by the survivors and the relatives of the victims, centered on the allegations that the storming of the school was ruthless, citing the use of heavy weapons, RPO flamethrowers, and tank guns. There were accusations that officials had not earnestly tried to negotiate with the attackers and deliberately provided incorrect and inconsistent reports of the situation to the media. The local provincial leaders were criticized for having allowed the attack to take place. Some critics also charged that the authorities failed to keep the battleground secure from entry by civilians or exit by the militants.

In general, the criticism was denied by the Russian government. General Nikolai Shepel, acting as deputy prosecutor at the trial of Kulayev, found no fault with the security forces in handling the hostage crisis. "According to the conclusions of the investigation, the expert commission did not find any violations that could be responsible for the harmful consequences," Shepel said.

However, Vladimir Putin admitted to a certain lack of professionalism and understanding in handling the crisis. Alexander Dzasokhov, the head of North Ossetia, resigned his post in May 31, 2005, after pressure from Mothers of Beslan on Putin to have him dismissed. North Ossetian Interior Minister Kazbek Dzantiev also resigned shortly after the crisis. At the same time Putin fired the head of the Ossetia's FSB branch, Valery Andreyev, who testified that he had personally given the order to overrun the school during the siege.

To address lingering doubts, the Russian government launched a parliamentary investigation led by Alexander Torshin, resulting in the December 2005 report which put blame on local authorities, for "a whole number of blunders and shortcomings". Another separate public inquiry headed by Stanislav Kesayev concluded on November 29, 2005, that government officials and military leaders handled the situation poorly.

In August 2007 the Truth of Beslan web site alleged the government forces knew of the planned attack well in advance, citing police communications.

Censorship

Russian state-controlled television only reported official information about the number of hostages. The number of 354 people was persistently given, as initially stated by Lev Dzugayev, the press secretary of the President of North Ossetia and Valery Andreyev, the chief of the republican FSB. This deliberately false figure had grave consequences for the treatment of the hostages, and also sparked the incidents of violence by the local residents against the members of Russian and foreign media.[1]

According to media reports, after the bloody conclusion relatives were not allowed to visit hospitals where the wounded were treated, and doctors were not allowed to use their mobile phones.[2]

On September 8, 2004, several leading Russian and international human rights organizations – including Amnesty International (AI), International Helsinki Federation (IHF), Moscow Helsinki Group, Memorial, and Human Rights Watch – issued a joint statement in which they pointed out the responsibility that Russian authorities bore in disseminating false information:[3]

We are also seriously concerned with the fact that authorities concealed the true scale of the crisis by, inter alia, misinforming Russian society about the number of hostages. We call on Russian authorities to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the circumstances of the Beslan events which should include an examination of how authorities informed the whole society and the families of the hostages. We call on making the results of such an investigation public.

According to a poll by Levada-Center conducted a week after Beslan crisis, 83% of polled Russians believed that the government was hiding at least a part of the truth about the Beslan events from them. According to the poll by Ekho Moskvy radio station, 92% of the people polled said that Russian TV channels concealed parts of information.[4]

Incidents involving journalists

In several incidents reporters critical of the Russian government could not get to Beslan during the crisis. They included Andrey Babitsky, a Russian journalist with the Radio Free Europe, who was indicted on hooliganism after a brawl with two man who picked a fight with him in the Moscow Vnukovo Airport and sentenced to a 15-day arrest. The late Novaya Gazeta journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who had negotiated during the 2002 Moscow siege, was twice prevented by the authorities from boarding a flight. When she eventually succeeded, she fell into a coma after being poisoned abroad an airplane bound to Rostov-on-Don.[5]

According to the report by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), several correspondents were detained in Beslan (including Russians Anna Gorbatova and Oksana Semyonova from Novye Izvestia, Madina Shavlokhova from Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Elena Milashina from Novaya Gazeta, and Simon Ostrovskiy from The Moscow Times). Several foreign journalists were also briefly detained, including a group of foreign journalists from Gazeta Wyborcza, Libération and The Guardian. The chief of the Moscow bureau of the Arab TV channel al-Jazeera was framed into the possession of a round of ammunition at the airfield in Mineralnye Vody.[6]

Many foreign journalists were exposed to pressure from the security forces and the materials were confiscated from TV crews from ZDF and ARD (Germany), APTN (USA), and Rustavi-2 (Georgia). The crew of Rustavi-2 was arrested; the Georgian Minister of Health said that the correspondent Nana Lezhava, who had been kept for fives days in the Russian pre-trial detention centers, had been poisoned with dangerous psychotropic drugs (like Politkovskaya, Lezhava passed out after being given a cup of tea). The crew from another Georgian TV channel Mze was expelled from Beslan.[7]

Raf Shakirov, chief editor of the Izvestia newspaper, was forced to resign after criticism by the major shareholders of both style and content of the September 4, 2004 issue. In contrast to the less emotional coverage by other Russian newspapers, Izvestia had featured large pictures of dead or injured hostages. It also expressed doubts about the government's version of events.

See also: Russian government censorship of Chechnya coverage

Secret footage

In July 2007 the Mothers of Beslan asked the FSB to declassify video and audio archives on Beslan, saying there should be no secrets in the investigation. They didn't receive any answer to this request.

Same month, the Mothers organization have disclosed a video tape they received anonymously, that they say proves Russian security forces started the massacre by firing rocket grenades on the besieged building. The film, apparently showing the prosecutors and military experts discussing the militant bombs and structural damage in the school in Beslan, had been kept secret by the authorities for nearly three years, and was officially released by the Mothers on September 4, 2007.

European Court complaint

On June 26, 2007, 89 relatives of victims have lodged a joint complaint against Russia with the European Court of Human Rights. The applicants say their rights were violated both during the hostage-taking and the trials that followed.

Domestic repercussions

Security measures

Increased security measures were introduced to Russian cities. More than 10,000 people without proper documents were detained by Moscow police in "terrorist hunt"(at least one high-profile incident of racist police brutality was recorded, as Colonel Magomet Tolboev, a Hero of Russia, was beaten in the street in Moscow because of his Chechen-sounding name).

The Russian public appeared to be generally supportive of increased security measures. A September 16, 2004, Levada-Center poll found 58% of Russians supporting stricter counter-terrorism laws and the death penalty for terrorism, while 33% would support banning all Chechens from entering Russian cities.

Increased government control over Russian society

In the wake of Beslan, President Putin assumed personal control of appointing the governors of Russia's oblasts, which before were directly elected, saying it would boost the security. The election system for Russian Duma was also repeatedly amended, while the Kremlin allegedly consolidated its control over the Russian media and increasingly attacked the non-governmental organizations (especially these foreign-founded). Critics allege that Putin's circle of the Siloviki was using the Beslan crisis as an excuse to increase their grip on Russia.

Other controversies

In September 2005 the self-proclaimed healer and miracle-maker Grigory Grabovoy had promised he could resurrect the killed children for a large sum of money. Grabovoy was arrested and indicted of fraud in April 2006, amidst the accusations that he was being used by the government as a tool to discredit the Mothers of Beslan.

Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alexius II's plans to build only an Orthodox temple as part of the Beslan monument have caused a serious conflict between the Orthodox Church and the state-approved leadership of the Russian Muslims (the latter claiming that 70% of those killed in Beslan were Muslims). Beslan victims organizations also spoke against the project. (Many in Beslan want the ruins of the school to be preserved, opposing the government plan of its demolition to begin with.)

International response

Condemnation

The attack at Beslan was met with international abhorrence and universal condemnation.

• The UN Security Council, in a Presidential Statement on September 1 2004, condemned the attack in the strongest terms and urged states to cooperate actively with Russian authorities to bring the perpetrators to justice.

• The President of the European Commission Romano Prodi on behalf of the European Commission, on September 3 2004, responded by calling the "killing of these innocent people" "an evil, despicable act of barbarism."

• Nelson Mandela of South Africa called the attack an "inhumane and barbaric act of terrorism," saying that "in no way can the victimisation and killing of innocent children be justified in any circumstances, and especially not for political reasons."

• At the Vatican, Pope John Paul II condemned the attack as a "vile and ruthless aggression on defenceless children and families."

• The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, on September 7 2004, condemned it as a "brutal and senseless slaughter of children" and "terrorism, pure and simple."

• President George W. Bush of the United States, in a September 2004 speech to the UN General Assembly, said of the terrorists at Beslan that they "measure their success [...] in the death of the innocent, and in the pain of grieving families." In 2005, he called the attack "the terrorist massacre of schoolchildren in Beslan."

• The British Prime Minister Tony Blair described the terrorist attack as "a barbaric act."

• A group of international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, condemned it as an "abhorrent action" which "display[ed] callous disregard for civilian life." They stated that it was "an attack on the most fundamental right - the right to life; our organizations denounce this act unreservedly."

Charity efforts

Countries and charities around the world donated to funds set up to assist the families and children that were involved in the Beslan crisis.

Main article: Beslan charity efforts

Media

Books

• Beslan: The Tragedy of School Number 1 by Timothy Phillips (London: Granta Books, 2007) (ISBN 1862079277)
• Terror at Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America's Schools (ISBN 0-9767753-0-1) (Review)
• The 2002 Dubrovka and 2004 Beslan Hostage Crises: A Critique of Russian Counter-Terrorism (ISBN 3-89821-608-X)
• Black Widow. Fictional crime story by Sandy McCutcheon. (ISBN 1-920769-74-9) (McCutcheon's personal blog on the book)

Films

• Children of Beslan (2005). Produced and directed by Ewa Ewart and Leslie Woodhead. HBO Documentary Films and BBC co-production. Nominated in three different categories under the 2006 Emmy Award festival and awarded the Royal Television Society prize in the category: Best Single Documentary.
• Three Days in September (2006). Directed by Joe Halderman, narrated by Julia Roberts. Full Credits Trailer
• The Beslan Siege (2005). TV-documentary by October Films. Director: Richard Alwyn, producer: Liana Pomeranzev. Won the Prix Italia Documentary Award for 2006. IMDB
• Return to Beslan (Terug naa Beslan) (2005). A Dutch documentary produced by Netherlands Public Broadcasting. Won an Emmy Award in 2005 for the best entry in the category "Best Continuing News Coverage".
  • Template:Nl icon Terug naa Beslan (The documentary)
• Beslan (2009). Feature film produced by Firefly Films. Producer: Matthew Hobbs'. Currently in development.

Music

• "Black Widow's Eyes" by The Who (Commentary by Pete Townshend)
• "Children of Beslan" by Steven Cravis (Video by Christian Abicht, available on Cravis' German-language site)
• "Muhammad" by Sami Yusuf is dedicated to "the innocent children of Beslan".
• "Nichya" (No One's) by t.A.T.u. was dedicated to the children and families of Beslan, and was performed at the Beslan memorial by t. A.T.u.
• "Beslan" by Tactical Sekt is inspired by the crisis.

See also

• Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis (June 1995)
• Kizlyar raid (January 1996)
• Moscow theater hostage crisis (October 2002)
• List of hostage crises
• School massacre

External links

News articles and features

• "The School." Feature by C.J. Chivers. Esquire, June 2006, Volume 145, Issue 6. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• "Killers Set Terms, a Mother Chooses." A 2005 Pulitzer Prize winner by Kim Murphy, Los Angeles Times. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• "Beslan's unanswered questions" International Herald Tribune. Last accessed January 30, 2007.
• "One little boy was shouting: 'Mama.' She couldn't hear him. She was dead." The Telegraph. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• "Beslan Children Testify". By Yana Voitova, St. Petersburg Times. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• "School siege timeline" BBC News, September 4, 2004. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
  • "Attackers storm Russian school BBC News, 1 September 2004. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
  • "Force ruled out in Russian siege", September 1 2004 BBC News. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
  • "Group released from siege school", September 2 2004 BBC News. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
  • "Bloody end to Russia school siege", September 3 2004 BBC News. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
  • "Siege school yields more bodies", September 4 2004 BBC News. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
  • "Graphical timeline and basic overview", September 4 2004 BBC News. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• "Eyewitness accounts" BBC News. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• "Hostages murder detailed report", September 2 2004, Caucasus Times. Preserved by Internet Archive. Last accessed July 17 2006.
• "Kazbek Torchinov saw bodies thrown out early morning September 2", Novaya Gazeta. Machine-translated by www.online-translator.com. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "Where could the missing persons have gone", Izvestia, September 6, 2004. Machine-translated by www.online-translator.com. Preserved by Internet Archive. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "On the Moscow Vnukovo airport conflict", Radio Free Europe, September 3, 2004. Machine-translated by www.online-translator.com. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "on Anna Politkovskaya falling into a coma", Novaya Gazeta, September 4, 2004. Anonymous translation. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "On medical workers having phones removed, Gazeta.ru, September 4, 2004. Machine-translated by www.online-translator.com. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "On the investigation", Lenta.ru, September 7, 2004. Machine-translated by www.online-translator.com. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "Report on Ruslan Aushev's September 28, 2004 press conference in Interfax", newsru, September 28, 2004. Machine-translated by www.online-translator.com. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "Russian press review. English overview of Russian press reaction", The Guardian, September 6, 2004. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "Global press review examining how Putin should respond", The Guardian, September 6, 2004. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "Angry Putin rejects public Beslan inquiry", The Guardian, September 7 2004. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "Missing hostage photos", Novye Izvestia. Machine-translated by www.online-translator.com. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "Beslan: The Sick Sense", Analysis of the logic behind choosing Beslan as a target. By Gary Brecher, The eXile alternative newspaper. Last accessed July 17, 2006.
• "Beslan - Two Years After", Russian Analytical Digest, No. 5, July 29, 2006.
• "Pravda Beslana", public investigation of Beslan events site (Beslan's Truth, Template:Lang-ru). Last accessed March 27, 2007.
• "Voice of Beslan". Last accessed March 27, 2007 English translation

Memoirs, tributes and obituaries

• Hope for Beslan. Last accessed 4 October 2007
• Template:Ru icon Web site made by hostages. Some sections in English. By archive.org. Last accessed 4 October 2007.
• Template:Ru icon "Beslans stemme". Last accessed 4 October 2007.

Photos and videos

• Beslan school siege (09/01/2004) (Very Graphic!)
• Photo report by the German journalist Christian Kautz, visiting Beslan school at 2005
• Terror in Russia. An interactive feature, New York Times. Last accessed July 24, 2006
• "In pictures. The Beslan School Siege", September 2004, The Guardian. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• Photo reports huh7, huh6, huh5
• "Russian TV broadcasts siege video" BBC News, September 7, 2004. Last accessed July 17, 2006
• List of screen shots from BBC News & CNN. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• "Beslan. To remember school siege victims", BBC News. Last accessed July 17 2006
• Dispatches Beslan, Documentary with interviews of people directly involved and affected by the siege.
• Life after Beslan. Kevin Sites photo essay (15 images). Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• Crowd Video Footage From Terrorist Siege in Beslan, Russia. Last accessed October 4, 2007.
• Pictures of children, teachers and parents who were killed during the event
• Killed hostages. Last accessed October 4, 2007.

Official reports and communication

• Miklós Haraszti (2004-09-16). "Report on Russian media coverage of the Beslan tragedy: Access to information and journalists' working conditions" (PDF). Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

Investigation and trial

• Day-by-day transcriptions from criminal trial Template:Ru icon, Template:En icon. machine translation. Last accessed July 17, 2006.

Charity

• Fund for victims of Beslan attack (www.MoscowHelp.org). Last accessed July 17, 2006.