Wired Equivalent Privacy
Wired Equivalent Privacy or Wireless Encryption Protocol (WEP) is a scheme to secure IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. It is part of the IEEE 802.11 wireless networking standard. Wireless networks broadcast messages using radio, so are more susceptible to eavesdropping than wired networks.
WEP was intended to provide confidentiality comparable to that of a traditional wired network. Several serious weaknesses were identified by cryptanalysts; a WEP connection can be cracked with readily available software within minutes. WEP was superseded by Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) in 2003, followed by the full IEEE 802.11i standard (also known as WPA2) in 2004. Despite its weaknesses, WEP provides a level of security that may deter casual snooping.
Encryption Details
WEP is part of the IEEE 802.11 standard ratified in September 1999. WEP uses the stream cipher RC4 for confidentiality and the CRC-32 checksum for integrity.

Standard 64-bit WEP uses a 40 bit key, which is concatenated with a 24-bit initialization vector (IV) to form the RC4 traffic key. At the time that the original WEP standard was being drafted, U.S. Government export restrictions on cryptographic technology limited the key size. Once the restrictions were lifted, all of the major manufacturers eventually implemented an extended 128-bit WEP protocol using a 104-bit key size.
A 128-bit WEP key is almost always entered by users as a string of 26 Hexadecimal (Hex) characters (0-9 and A-F). Each character represents 4 bits of the key. 4 × 26 = 104 bits; adding the 24-bit IV brings us what we call a "128-bit WEP key". A 256-bit WEP system is available from some vendors, and as with the above-mentioned system, 24 bits of that is for the I.V., leaving 232 actual bits for protection. This is typically entered as 58 Hexadecimal characters. (58 × 4 = 232 bits) + 24 I.V. bits = 256 bits of WEP protection.
Key size is not the only major security limitation in WEP. Cracking a longer key requires interception of more packets, but there are active attacks that stimulate the necessary traffic. There are other weaknesses in WEP, including the possibility of IV collisions and altered packets, that are not helped at all by a longer key. See stream cipher attack.
Authentication
Two methods of authentication can be used with WEP: Open System authentication and Shared Key authentication.
For the sake of clarity, we discuss WEP authentication in the Infrastructure mode (ie, between a WLAN client and an Access Point), but the discussion applies to the Ad-Hoc mode too.
In Open System authentication, the WLAN client need not provide its credentials to the Access Point during authentication. Thus, any client, regardless of its WEP keys, can authenticate itself with the Access Point and then attempt to associate. In effect, no authentication (in the true sense of the term) occurs. After the authentication and association, WEP can be used for encrypting the data frames. At this point, the client needs to have the right keys.
In Shared Key authentication, WEP is used for authentication. A four-way challenge-response handshake is used:
I) The client station sends an authentication request to the Access Point.
II) The Access Point sends back a clear-text challenge.
III) The client has to encrypt the challenge text using the configured WEP key, and send it back in another authentication request.
IV) The Access Point decrypts the material, and compares it with the clear-text it had sent. Depending on the success of this comparison, the Access Point sends back a positive or negative response. After the authentication and association, WEP can be used for encrypting the data frames.
At first glance, it might seem as though Shared Key authentication is more secure than Open System authentication, since the latter offers no real authentication. However, it is quite the reverse. It is possible to derive the static WEP key by capturing the four handshake frames in Shared Key authentication. Hence, it is advisable to use Open System authentication for WEP authentication. (Note that both authentication mechanisms are weak).
Remedies
Use of encrypted tunneling protocols (e.g. IPSec, Secure Shell) can provide secure data transmission over an insecure network. However, replacements for WEP have been developed with the goal of restoring security to the wireless network itself.
WEP2
A stopgap enhancement to WEP, implementable on some (not all) hardware not able to handle WPA or WPA2, based on:
- Enlarged IV value
- Enforced 128-bit encryption
WEPplus
Also known as WEP+. A proprietary enhancement to WEP by Agere Systems (formerly a subsidiary of Lucent Technologies) that enhances WEP security by avoiding "weak IVs". It is only completely effective when WEPplus is used at both ends of the wireless connection. As this cannot easily be enforced, it remains a serious limitation. It is possible that successful attacks against WEPplus will eventually be found. It also does not necessarily prevent replay attacks.
Dynamic WEP
Change WEP keys dynamically. Vendor-specific feature provided by several vendors such as 3Com.
WPA and WPA2
The most widely recommended solution to WEP security problems is to switch to WPA or WPA2. Either is much more secure than WEP. To add support for WPA or WPA2, some old Wi-Fi access points might need to be replaced or have their firmware upgraded.
References
- Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, David Wagner (2001). "Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11" (PDF). Retrieved 2006-09-12.
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(help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Nancy Cam-Winget, Russell Housley, David Wagner, Jesse Walker: Security flaws in 802.11 data link protocols. Communications of the ACM 46(5): 35-39 (2003)
- Scott R. Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, Adi Shamir, "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4". Selected Areas in Cryptography 2001: pp1–24.
- Andrea Bittau, Mark Handley, Joshua Lackey, "The Final Nail in WEP's Coffin", IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland) 2006.
- 802.11b Update: Stepping Up Your WLAN Security
- Wireless LAN Deployment and Security Basics
- An Inductive Chosen Plaintext Attack against WEP/WEP2
- It Came Out of the Sky -- WEP2, Credibility Zero
- Agere Systems press release
- Wireless Network Security (Proxim Wireless white paper)
- Weak IVs
- Replay Attack
- CNN article "Off-the-shelf hack breaks wireless encryption"
External links
- BBC News Oct 19 2007 - Wi-fi security system is 'broken'
- Break WEP Faster with Statistical Analysis Rafik Chaabouni, June 2006.
- (In)Security of the WEP algorithm
- Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4
- List of security problems with WEP
- WEP: Dead Again, Part 1 (Dec. 14, 2004)
- WEP: Dead Again, Part 2 (Mar. 8, 2005)
- Howto crack WEP key with Packet Injection Attack Extended Guide
- The Feds can own your WLAN too : SmallNetBuilder
- Guide on howto crack a WEP encrypted wireless network
- SmallNetBuilder - WEP Cracking... Reloaded, Kevin Herring and Tim Higgins WEP Cracking... Reloaded, August 1, 2007
- SmallNetBuilder - How to Crack WEP, Humphrey Cheung part one, part two, part three May/June 2005. Superseded by the previous article.
- WEP Key Generator Perl source code
- Several software tools are available to compute and recover WEP keys by passively monitoring transmissions.