Soviet–Afghan War

Timeline of the Invasion

The Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan is difficult to date exactly. Depending on what specific event you care to name, the actual invasion starts anywhere from the beginning of 1978 with the Communist regime taking power in Kabul, to December 1979 when the Soviet Union moves troops to Bagram air base, or directly into Kabul. This is one timeline of events leading to the invasion.

Spring 1978 – The Afghan Communist Party with Taraki as their leader takes power in Kabul. Traditional tribal resistance (insurgency) begins.

Spring 1978 – Soviets begin discussions with Amin about possible removal of Taraki if necessary.

February 15, 1979 – [U.S.] Ambassador Adolph Dubs is abducted by insurgents and killed during a rescue effort. The U.S. accuses the Soviet Union of initiating the gunfight that leads to his death.

May 1979 – Soviet advisors begin taking over operations at Bagram air base from Afghan government technicians.

September 16, 1979 – Amin assumes Taraki’s offices in the government and the Afghan Communist Party.

October 1979 – Soviet Union begins mobilization of Category 2 divisions in southern Soviet Union SSR’s.

October 10, 1979 – Kabul Times reports on the death of Taraki. Various reports indicate different forms of his death (illness, shootout, strangulation, execution), none can be proven.

December 1, 1979 – Lt. General Viktor Paputin, the Soviet Union’s deputy minister of interior, is reported to have arrived in Kabul on November 28. Many sources speculate he is the top KGB official responsible for coordinating the invasion.

December 1979 – Several Tashkent based Soviet airborne battalions with heavy weapons air-deploy to Bagram air base.

December 17, 1979 – The head of the Afghan intelligence service, Assadullah Amin – Amin’s nephew, is seriously wounded in an assassination attempt and leaves the country to receive medical aid in Tashkent.

December 18, 1979 – Airborne units stationed in Bagram move to cover the Salang Pass. This move supports the upcoming border crossing of the 357th Motorized Rifle Division, based in Tashkent.

December 21, 1979 – A reinforced Soviet airborne regiment is airlifted to Bagram.

December 22, 1979 – Soviet advisors to the Afghan Armed Forces, advise the Afghan’s to undergo maintenance cycles for tanks and other crucial equipment. Telecommunications links to areas outside of Kabul are severed, isolating the capital. Amin moves the offices of the president to the Dar-ul-aman Palace, believing this location to be more defensible during the coming invasion, which only now he realizes is underway.

December 24, 1979 – Soviet units take control of all airfields in and around Kabul. Spetnaz commandos seize control of the telecommunications complex in Kabul, controlling all intra-city communication.

December 26, 1979 – Additional Soviet regiment and division sized units move southward toward the Afghan border.

December 27, 1979 – Soviet interior advisors host a party for Afghan government officials at the Intercontinental Hotel, after its conclusion everyone is arrested. Meanwhile, Soviet military advisers host a party for their Afghan counterparts as well, after its conclusion everyone is imprisoned in the building. 3 Soviet battalions attack the palace where Amin is located, the palace is taken with heavy Soviet causalities and no Afghan survivors.

December 28 – A total of 3 additional Soviet motorized rifle divisions cross the Afghan border, supported by an additional 4 divisions that stay as a reserve in the Southern Soviet Union, just across the border.

Political and Military Motivations and Goals

Some sources believe the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was motivated to prevent constituent SSR's in the southern Soviet Union from breaking away and joining what was becoming an area of wide upheaval. At the time of the invasion, Iran had very recently staged an Islamic revolution against its United States supported government. The newly instituted government was no more friendly to the Soviet Union than to the United States. This signified a third major axis in Eurasian politics (the Chinese, and NATO being the others), much to the Soviets dismay.

Iran possessed a population of approximately 65 million at the time, was armed with modern American weapons, and had ample religious, political, and economic motivations to expand the revolution northward into the Soviet Union. This could easily be compared with a similar situation developing in Afghanistan, with possible (from the Soviet POV) disastrous results. An invasion of an impoverished, technologically unsophisticated Afghanistan that also supplied an eastern flank to Iran would be considered by most Soviet (and other) political and military leaders to be a preferable solution to the developing crisis.

However, unlike Western countries where control of the cities provides effective political control, Afghanistan is primarily rural and agrarian. The political form of government at the time could most closely be compared to feudalism, with strong tribal ties replacing Nobel oaths as in Medieval Europe. The Soviet Union had 2 major options for control (with the unstated option of failure and withdraw being taken as a given):

Drive the resistance (mujahadeen) into Pakistan or Iran, depopulating the rural areas and providing control of the cities to the Soviet-backed government.

Use the shock power of mechanized combat to break the will of the resistance, and cause so much destruction and dislocation that the civilian population could no longer resist. When carried to an extreme (as some commentators have called this case) this is referred to as genocide.

What was Wagered and What was Accomplished

See also: [Other sources]

According to some commentators, Soviet tactics utilized the following military and economic efforts.

The deployment of the 40th Soviet Army (over 100,000 ground troops). With air support, logistics, MVD troops, and other miscellaneous troops, the total number is estimated by some observers at approximately 175,000 troops total. This represented almost 20% of the category 1 (front-line) divisions possessed by the Soviet Union at the time.

Many observers reported wide-spread rear-area use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union. Such use would be in line with common wartime practice for Soviet military units, as reported by Soviet military journals.

The Soviets dropped more than 20 million anti-personnel mines to respond to an enemy that marched on its feet and hooves. Some of these anti-personnel mines were shaped like pens, or dolls, or other shiny trinkets, known as ‘dolly bombs’. These were for children to pick up and play with. The long-term tactic was to maim enough children in enemy areas to seriously impact mujahadeen operations in the future.

Russian costs (in 1986 dollars) were approximately $20 Billion USD / yr, or 10% of their entire military industrial complex.

These tactics accomplished the following effects:

Approximately 90,000 Afghans killed (mujahadeen and government), and 90,000 wounded. Including civilian casualities, estimates are that 10% of the total population was killed, 13.5% of the male population was killed, or 1.5 million were killed overall.

Approximately 22,000 Soviets killed, and 75,000 wounded.

Approximately 6 million refugees (driven into Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, etc.).

$50 Billion USD in damage to Afghanistan, or 1/3 to 1/2 the net worth of the country.

Agricultural production reduced by 50%, livestock losses of 50%.

70% of paved roads were destroyed.

Of 15,000 villages in the country, 5,000 were destroyed (rendered uninhabitable, or economically unsupportable by destruction of all economic value, i.e. fields, wells, roads, etc.)

Resistance

The primary group to resist were the Pushtuns, the largest tribal group, and the one that comprises the current Taliban movement. This major group combined with other smaller differing ethnic tribes in alliances of convenience, to drive the Soviets out. This combined movement was known as the mujahadeen. This plunged the Soviet Union (known to the mujahadeen as the “little Satan”), into a large-scale guerilla war from the outset of their invasion.

Most Soviet and Afghan fighters felt that Pakistan was the key to successful resistance. Pakistan acted as the logistical base of the mujahadeen. The Soviets were placed in a position of having to close this border. Most observers feel the border is unsealable without a massive military invasion of the entire mountainous border region. This is analogous to the problems the U.S. faces in Operation Enduring Freedom, in their hunt for Al-Queda operatives and Osama Bin Laden.

Obviously more needs to be written. Especially to wrap up the piece.