Talk:Existentialism
I think the current version has a big problem in that it does not recognize christian-existentialist like Jaspers and Marcel. It seems too Sartre-centric too me. (Tomos, Dec15)
Prior contents moved to Talk Old.
I changed the main page, because I think it will be a valuable exercise to re-write this article with more emphasis on defining existentialism, cataloging it's proponents, and explaining what they have in common. The information on the Old version of this page could be useful on various pages about Sartre, but it doesn't apply to all of the existentialists, and some of it covered peripheral issues, which are interesting and perhaps important, but should not receive the prominent billing they did on the prior version of this page.
I want to be clear: I don't mean to say that the old page isn't good or valuable, I just think we can do better.MRC
I agree... --LMS
This is the old page, previously at /Old:
Existentialism is a philosophical movement primarily interested in examination of the human being from an emotional standpoint. In the aftermath of the first world war, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus and others were distressed by the progressive dehumanization that they saw as a direct result of the rational and scientific thought which impelled the Industrial Revolution.
Introduction
Existentialism does away with Rene Descartes' famous argument, summarized as I think, therefore I am. On the face of it, an existentialist would argue, Descartes' argument is erroneous: thoughts are distinct from us. We may have thoughts, but others may also have them, or they may exist independently of us. Thought is not a good argument for existence. You exist because of what you feel; it is your emotions that are undeniably you.
The existential philosophers make all of their arguments as emotional rather than logical imperatives. Existentialists are more concerned with the nature of happiness than with things.
Some of the better known existential arguments include:
- Hell is other people
- Pain is conciousness
Pain is conciousness
Existentialism divides the world into two categories. One category are called en-soi, things that can be analyzed rationally, like a rock. The second category are pour-soi, things that emote; beings. A thing cannot feel unhappy about being a thing, it has no emotions; a rock is perfectly satisfied being a rock. A being must always therefore compare itself with the thing, and be envious of its ability to just be.
Hell is other people
In order to fill that void, the emptiness of knowing that as beings we must do more than just exist, we fill our minds with other things.
One path is that of avarice, a being can collect things around himself to distract him from the pain of his conciousness. Things don't fit well into the gap though, as they continually remind us of the difference between being, and thing; a being who follows avarice must continually renew the set of things that distract him from the pain.
The second path is that of love, a being may find another pour-soi to distract her from her conciousness. The match between pour-soi and pour-soi is better; the being doesn't continually notice that the thing that she is concious of is not herself by its nature. But pour-soi resist being used in this way -- the person she loves is not willing to invest himself solely in filling her conciousness, he must assert himself, and his own emotions.
This paradox, that the only thing that can save you from the pain of conciousness is another being, but that being will rebel at being used solely in that way, is what the existentialists mean when they say 'Hell is other people.'
Expansion
The above is of course an over simplification. The key to Sartre's theory is that the "existential I" is not a "transcendental I". The problem with the Cogito is not that it assumes or infers existence from thought, but that that it goes farther than it should by affirming the existence of an I, which is a "thinking thing." To put it in more clear english: A thought I experience proves its own existence, but it does not prove my existence as the "one who has the thought". Though earlier philosophers postulated a "transcendental ego" as thing which thinks, Sartre argues that the transcendental ego is not necessary since thought needs no "pole" to hang on, since as Husserl says, consciousness is always consciousness -- of something else -- and that something else can explain thought's existence without postulating an unperceived transcendental ego. However, it is right to point out that attraction and repulsion are understood by Sartre as objects of consciousness, and therefore are one poles on which consciousness hangs.
Now, on to the use of "emotional" -- certainly the existentialists were concerned that philosophy not lose touch with the basic passions of human existence. Human beings do not just think about the world around them, they become passionately involved in all kinds of relationships. Emotional is not the right word to use, passion is. But even then passion is not opposed to reason (usually) it is simply admitted that Blasé Pascal was correct to say "the heart has reasons know not of." And though this takes Pascal's statement out of context it is very illustrative of the existential position that the world cannot be understood by reason alone. Passionate involvement is necessary if you wish to "really" understand the world around you.
I added Peter Wessel Zapffe (1899-1990) to existentialistic philosophers. Allthough nihilistic from my point of view, I read this description of him on the cover of a book summing up his life. Sigg3.net 14:48 3 Jul 2003 (UTC)
I am very surprised by the mention of Henri Bergson and Emmanuel Lévinas as existentialists. Blaise Pascal has indeed been mentioned as a precursor, although this is too me far from obvious. I cannot say anything about Berdyaev, Stirner and Zapffe. Marc Girod 16:58, 29 Nov 2003 (UTC)
- Just a question: Are there clear criterias for being an existentialist which could rule out (or in) people? I mean, what is the definition of existentialist? A person with existentialistic views? It's a circledefinition. - Sigg3.net 21:26, 29 Nov 2003 (UTC)
- I think so. Existentialism is a sort of dialectical synthesis on top of (thesis) the idealism of Plato, and (antithesis) the realism of Aristotle. There exists something, but it is meaningless, as all meaning comes from discrimination and is free --can be placed anywhere, is subjective, or negociated (inter-subjective), and thus engages our responsibility. I think this excludes Lévinas and probably Bergson (I am less sure) as idealists. Pascal sees the necessity of freedom --since he doesn't publish his wager; that's why he is a precursor. Marc Girod 14:53, 1 Dec 2003 (UTC)
- If I'm not mistaken, today's existentialism is based on the words of Jean-Paul Sartre and Søren Kierkegaard. At least on ethics, allthough they are quite different on this matter - Kierkegaard with emphasis on the Religious Level while Sartre clearly states that God is not. But you're right on the radical freedom. Angst is a definite keyword in this -ism. Sigg3.net 22:35, 1 Dec 2003 (UTC)
- What Sartre and Kierkegaard have in common is the freedom and the responsibility of choice (leap of faith for Kierkegaard). I still wait for a justification of the mention of Bergson as existentalist. I think Bergson is not easily classified (and I read this also from von Wright). Marc Girod 15:18, 20 Dec 2003 (UTC)
Does this sentence mean anything: A person can only defined by his actions? I changed it to ..be defined. - Sigg3.net 17:59, 10 Dec 2003 (UTC)
This was a great article, and the last thing I would want to do is critisize it. I thought it was very well structured and well delivered. I think that a little more could be mentioned about Nietzsche, considering he was quite an influential figure of Existentialism. How about it? ~apokryphos