Secretariat of Intelligence
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| Created: | 1946 |
| Secretary: | Héctor Icazuriaga |
| Subsecretary: | Francisco Larcher |
| Location: | Av 25 de Mayo 11 |
| Phone: | (54)(11)4340-2600 |
Secretaría de Inteligencia (Intelligence Secretariat, S.I) is the main intelligence agency of the Argentine Republic. It is also the head and director of the National Intelligence System. It is chaired by the Secretary of State Intelligence who is a special member of the Cabinet of Ministers.
The S.I (or SIDE) is considered as a technical body with the ability to collect information, make intelligence in internal and foreign areas, and it contributes to work out a national intelligence strategy in order to handle State affairs. It has the job of collecting and producing foreign and domestic intelligence and counterintelligence. The SIDE is the most important agency with delegations within the country as well as outside.
Legally, SIDE is subordinated to the National Presidential Office and is ruled by secret decrees and laws.[1] Note that S.I, as it is officially called today, was called Secretaría de Inteligencia de Estado (Secretariat of State Intelligence, SIDE) until 2001, when it was renamed as the new intelligence system came online.[2] Still, in Argentina, the Secretaría of Inteligencia is still referred simply as SIDE by the press and common people.
History
The Secretaría of Inteligencia was created in 1946, under the name of Coordinación de Informaciones de Estado (State Intelligence Coordination, CIDE), by Juan Perón's first presidency, as a civilian intelligence agency who would be run by civilians and handle the intelligence affairs of the Argentine State. The Secretariat suffered several structural and functional modifications until 1955, under the government of Aramburu when by Executive Decree N° 776 of January 20th, CIDE adopted the name Secretaría de Informaciones de Estado (Secretariat of State Informations).
During the defacto government of Jorge Rafael Videla, on May 13 of 1976, by Executive Decree 416 it adopted the name Secretaría de Inteligencia de Estado. More recently, in December of 2001, the National Intelligence Reform law was approved[3], changing the structure, name and some functions of SIDE to adapt it to the new National Intelligence System[4]. Today, S.I is the head of the intelligence community in Argentina.
Before CIDE (predecessesor to SIDE and S.I) was established, national intelligence was handled by the Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército (Army Intelligence Service, SIE), also known as Batallón 601, which today is a military intelligence organism depending from the Argentine Army.[5]
Organization
SIDE is the head of the Argentine Intelligence System, and also the biggest intelligence organization in Argentina. It depends of the National Presidential Office. Which means that it follows, and reports only to the President of Argentina, which himself or herself is required to set the national intelligence plan and policy[6].
Besides being an intelligence agency that handles foreign and interior intelligence, it also handles nationwide criminal investigations, like the American FBI. It isn't clear if the recently formed Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Criminal (National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence, DNIC) has taken over SIDE's function of handling national criminal intelligence yet[7].
SIDE also has special internal suborganizations, like the Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence School, ENI), which acts as the main intelligence school, training and recruiting agents for SIDE, as well as studying Argentine intelligence doctrine and giving intelligence post-graduate courses to students who do it's courses all over Argentina, including courses given over the internet.
The 2001 Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 made significant changes to SIDE's internal organization, as well as branching out some of it's tasks to other newly created organizations.[8].
The President of Argentina is expected to assign the charges of Secretariat and Subsecretariat of Intelligence, but restrictions apply on the Executive Power's Secretary of Intelligence assigning his or her own contracted personnel to the organism[9].
The current Secretary of Intelligence is Héctor Icazuriaga, the Subsecretary of Intelligence is Francisco Larcher, both appointed by President Nestor Kirchner.
The third position in SIDE is the Director General de Operaciones (General Director of Operations), position currently held by the legendary SIDE agent Horacio Antonio Stiusso. (Alias: Jaime Stiles).
Structure
SIDE's internal organization itself is made up of three Subsecretarías (Subsecretariats): Interior, Exterior, and Apoyo (Support).
- Subsecretaría de Inteligencia Interior (Subsecretariat of Interior Intelligence); responsible for production and dissemination of intelligence in the internal area. For this purpose, it is subdivided into several Direcciones (Directorates) which are in charge of specific political, economic and social factors.
- Dirección de Inteligencia Interior (Directorate of Interior Intelligence); responsible for searching and collecting of information on national affairs, for which task it has technical-operational and management areas.
- Dirección de Reunión Interior (Directorate of Internal Collection); responsible for the production and diffusion of intelligence corresponding to the internal affairs of Argentina. For the achievement of its role, it is subdivide in Deparments that work on specific political, economic and social issues.
- Dirección de Contrainteligencia (Directorate of Counterintelligence) (85); responsible for counterintelligence and counterespionage activities. It has intelligence and technical-operational areas which have specific duties.
- Dirección de Observaciones Judiciales (Directorate of Judicial Surveillance) (84); responsible for carrying out the telephone controls set up by a Judge.
- Dirección de Comunicación Social (Directorate of Social Communication); responsible for the collection of public information (taken from the mass media).
- Subsecretaría de Inteligencia Exterior (Subsecretariat of Foreign Intelligence) (32); is in charge of the collection of information and production of intelligence on foreign affairs. It has the following directorates:
- Dirección de Reunión Exterior (Directorate of Foreign Collection); responsible for the collection of information on facts and/or processes pertaining to foreign affairs. It comprises different areas with strictly technical and operational targets. It is responsible for the liaison with Foreign Services.
- Dirección de Inteligencia Exterior (Directorate of Foreign Intelligence); responsible for the production of State Intelligence and Information on the external area. For this purpose, it has specific areas analysing different issues and the continental and global frame by country/country by country/in each country:
- International Political, Economical and Social Processes.
- International Terrorism and Organised Crime.
- Processes of the Proliferation of Weapons of Massive Destruction.
- Subsecretaría de Apoyo de Inteligencia (Subsecretariat of Support Intelligence); is in charge of the staff, logistic support, communications and data-processing center of the Secretariat. In order to achieve this, it has several directorates in charge of these specific areas.
Recent unofficial reports (since SIDE does not declare the number of agents it has) state that about 2.500 to 3.000 personnel are currently working inside and outside of Argentina. Of which, 80% works in the Interior Subsecretariat, and the remaining on the Exterior Subsecretariat.
According to the agent's rank, they get paid from 1.800 to 2.678 Argentine Pesos a month. Directors, reach $3.000 AR. Only the Secretary, and Subsecretary of intelligence are public functionaries, the rest of SIDE personnel must act and work "in the shadows", as stated by the Argentine Intelligence law 25.520[10].
Facilities
SIDE's main building is located in Avenida 25 de Mayo 11, at the heart of Downtown Buenos Aires, near to the Presidential Palace and Plaza de Mayo. It should be noted that SIDE does not have a central facility as the CIA's Langley headquarters, instead, many buildings, known as bases or operation centers are spread throughout the city of Buenos Aires.
Even though SIDE's virtual headquarter is located in the Capital of Argentina, SIDE is a nation wide intelligence organization, and has delegations and bases in all provinces of Argentina, as well as diplomatic representations in most important countries. Unofficial reports state that SIDE has more than 25 operation bases around the world.
Also, many bases, divisions, or operation centers are spread out in the city of Buenos Aires. The following is a incomplete list, and may be outdated list or unreliable since it is based on press reports.
- Buildings next to it's main one: Ave. 25 de Mayo 33/35.
- Offices in the 8th floor of the Pasaje Barolo: Ave. de Mayo 1366/70/80.
- Billinghurst Base (Division 22): Ave. Billinghurst 2484.
- Transnational Crime and International Counterterrorism [11] (Division 34): Ave. Coronel Díaz 2079.
- Directorate of Judicial Surveillance (Division 84): Ave. de los Incas 3800.
- Directorate of Counterintelligence (Division 85): Ave. Estados Unidos 3057.
Subjects of interest
The following list of SIDE's interests was obtained from the old defunct SIDE website, and may possibly be outdated.
- International terrorism.
- Religious fundamentalism.
- Organized crime (mafias, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, falsification of documents).
- Terrorist attack against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.
- Terrorist attack against the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA).
- Evolution of integration developments (NAFTA, MERCOSUR, etc.)
- History and development of Indians of Western Hemisphere.
- Proliferation of massive destruction weapons.
- Ecological problems that can be considered risks for national security.
- Migrations.
Recent changes
On February of 2001, because of budget cuts during the Fernando de la Rúa administration, SIDE cut back 1.000 agents and personnel, with the reason of removing staff from the secretariat who had been involved in human rights violations in the 70's. Officially the restructuration of SIDE included: removing of jobs from all personnel past their retiring, which in effect has removed from SIDE most personnel from pre-democratic time, furthermore, all retired military personnel, staff that had another job in the Public Administration, and personnel contracted and designed in the last year of the preceeding administration (the Menem administration).
On October of 2003, more than 160 staff and agents in SIDE were laid off by the Kirchner government, given the reason of a organizational cleaning and reestructuration.
Counterterrorism
After the 1992 Israeli Embassy attack in Buenos Aires, SIDE started focusing on Triple border terrorism activities, and any Middle Eastern terrorist organizations which might attack on Argentine soil.
International intelligence agencies cooperated with SIDE in training it's personel on international terrorism subjects. Experts of all the world were contracted to teach classes on the subject in the National Intelligence School. SIDE also started offering Farsi lessons to it's agents.
Even more focus on international terrorism and Triple border activity was given after the 1994 AMIA Bombing. SIDE, along with the Brazilian ABIN, was one of the first agencies to point out the activities of suspected Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, in the Triple border area.
Recruitment
SIDE is rumored to be a "very closed family", one which nobody enters without a recommendation. Interviews with agents who agreed to give an insight into SIDE's culture and modus operandi, state that "the first rule is to forget your name", and that new agents are baptized with a fake identity that conserves the initials of his real name.
Before becoming spies, recruits must train in the National Intelligence School.
Culture
The Secretary and Subsecretary of Intelligence are traditionally referred as "Señor 5" ("Mr. Five") and "Señor 8" ("Mr. Eight") respectively, because of the location of their offices, fifth and eight floor of the 25 de Mayo buildings. Other aliases include "Señor 3" ("Mr. Three") for the Subsecretary of Exterior Intelligence.
Agents working for SIDE call the Secretariat simply as "La Casa", Spanish for "The House".
SIDE personnel reffer to the Dirección de Observaciones Judiciales (Directorate of Judicial Surveillance, DOJ) as "Ojota", loosely translated to English "Sandal". Furthermore "Ojota" implies "Ojo", (Eye) as a big watching eye.
Foreign agents whose function is to act as a link between their agency and SIDE are referred as "COI". Also, agents are sometimes referred as "The Service" (in English).
Public media
SIDE is an organization of which not many Argentines know about. Argentine television shows and movies have mostly neglected the fact of SIDE's existance. Nevertheless, Argentine political shows and documentaries have extensively talked about SIDE during recent year's involvement in public cases.
Oficially, every three months, SIDE publishes a magazine through the National Intelligence School.
As a side note, in the American CBS TV show Alias, Nadia Santos (Mía Maestro) is an ex-SIDE agent who now works for the CIA.
Books
The only book entirely dedicated to SIDE's history and scandals is "Los sospechosos de siempre: Historia del espionaje en la Argentina", by Jorge Boimvaser. The book was to be published in 1995, but then Secretary of Intelligence, allegedly made a monetary deal with its author and Editorial Planeta to hold off on the book's publication. The book was finally published in 2001, and is one of the most complete sources of information about SIDE.
Contact
The following is an official list of phone/fax numbers to contact SIDE. The code to call Argentina, Buenos Aires, is 54 11.
- Secretariat of Intelligence: 4340-2600
- National Intelligence School: 4811-1041/44930
- Subsecretary of Intelligence: 4331-5878/5944
Historical operations and scandals
The SIDE has been publicly and secretly involved in many national scandals and investigations in Argentina. Most notoriously, the AMIA Bombing case, and the Israeli Embassy Bombing case. Nevertheless, SIDE's reputation in Argentina is not a good one, it has been accused of being a money laundering organization who does operation on behalf of the current government's political goals rather than national security and intelligence gathering. SIDE has also been blamed because it's staff used to contain many ex-military servicemen that were believed to have right-wing ideologies, the press, and judicial investigations, point out that, they might or might not have had a significant role in the investigations of the Jewish bombings. Nevertheless, most of these lost their jobs during the 2001 personnel cleanup.
AMIA investigation
Many press reports and common Argentines believe that SIDE played a very big role in the AMIA Bombing investigation. In 2003, President Néstor Kirchner signed a decree that allowed the ex-Secretary of Intelligence, Hugo Anzorreguy, and many intelligence directors, agents and analysts who where involved in the case, to be available to declare in the investigation about Judge Galeano's mishandling during his job as official judge of the case[12].
Kirchner's decree also opened all of SIDE's files (about 15.000) on the bombing. Family of the victims, and judicial sources stated that most of them contained no sustancial/relevant new information.
Judicial reports during the investigation have displayed sufficient evidence of SIDE's involvement in the AMIA case. Furthermore, in the investigation of irregularities during the investigation (see Operación Cabildo) Hugo Anzorreguy then Secretary of Intelligence during the Menem administration has been charged with ilegally deviating clues during the investigation.
Several critics of SIDE and press report blame SIDE for faling to stall the attack on the AMIA as the warnings of an impeding attack on Argentine soil were received. Judicial evidence presented during the AMIA investigation show that the Argentine Embassador in Beirut, the Brazilian Intelligence Service, and the Argentine Consulate in Milan warned SIDE about the attack on the Jewish organization.
Embassy of Iran and Cuba bugging
During the investigation of the AMIA case, then counterintelligence operations director Horacio Antonio Stiusso, was asked about why SIDE had been tapping the phone lines and setting bugs in the embassies of Iran and Cuba in Buenos Aires. Stiusso alleged that those tasks were simply counterintelligence operations and had no relationship with the AMIA case. Nevertheless, in 1998, Argentina fired many Iranian diplomats on the basis of "phone taps" that provided evidence Iran was involved in the AMIA bombing.
Sofía Fijman incident
For information on the death of Sofía Fijman in the National Intelligence School, see the article on the ENI's incidents.
The capture of Gorriarán Merlo
In October 28 of 1995, Enrique Gorriarán Merlo, Argentina's most wanted terrorist, was captured in the little town of Tepoztlán, 60 miles away Mexico City, and flown back to Argentina in a plane rented by SIDE. Merlo had been involved in numerous criminal, activities during the 70's and 80's, most notably the assssination of Anastasio Somoza Debayle on September 17 in Paraguay, and for orchestrating the attack on the La Tablada military barracks by the MTD group, in Argentina on 1989.
Merlo, who claims it was a kidnapping orchestrated by SIDE[13], had traveled to Mexico to meet with Mexican politicians of the PRD, who were cooperating in an international push to free the guerrillas responsible for the La Tablada attack who were, and still are, serving prison term in Argentine jails. Merlo arrived in the Mexican capital with a fake Uruguayan passport, where he soon realized that the Mexican security forces were following him. He thought they were just doing basic surveillance on him to see if he was doing any ilegal activity in Mexican territory.
On Saturday, October 28th, he spotted three Argentine looking men in Tepotzltán square (plaza), "one of which-he said- looked like he was from the Argentine intelligence service or the police". Merlo was driving a friend's truck, after spotting the Argentines, he tried to loose his entourage of followers by driving into the town of Cuatula. A few minutes later, Merlo claims he was stopped, sorrounded, and shot several times until he put his hands out the truck's destroyed window.
Merlo goes on to claim that the Mexican security services handcuffed him, and made him face the Argentine, who nodded silently (affirming that he was who they were looking for).
Merlo was taken into the Mexican Migrations Department, where he claims was interrogated three times by SIDE agents. The last time they interrogated him, they asked if he was Gorriarán Merlo, he answered back "Yes", and simultaneuously asked for asylum. (Mexico has a tradition for giving asylum to politically prosecuted persons in other Latin American countries). One of the Mexican police man told them that there was "receptiveness" about his request, but at five in the morning, Mexican authorities took him to the airport and put in him in SIDE's plane, where the same SIDE agent from Tepoztlán and the interrogation was present.
The operation was allegedly carried out by the Sala Patria [14] group of SIDE.
Gorrarián Merlo served prison time in Argentina for his crimes, and was later indulted in 2003 by President Eduardo Duhalde.
Operation Ciprés
In the late nineties, Nasrim Mokhtari, an Iranian prostitue/hairdresser, who was believed to be involved with an Iranian support group that helped carry out the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in 92, and the AMIA Building in 94, was tricked into coming back to Argentina from Europe. The information on her involvement came from Willson Dos Santos, another suspect in the AMIA case. Wilson Dos Santos was a Brazilian taxi boy and thief who did a significant amount of smuggling in the Triple Frontier. Dos Santos had a romantic relationship with Mokhtari in Buenos Aires, and claims he knew about the plot to bomb the AMIA Building through her connection in the Buenos Aires Islamic community. Furthermore, a few weeks before the bombings, Dos Santos entered the Argentina, Israeli, and Brazilian consulates in Milán, Italy, to warn about the upcoming attacks. There was no trace of him until he was captured in Switzerland years later, holding 8 passports, and extradited to Argentina on charges of false testimony. He currently is serving prison time in Argentina.
When Wilson Dos Santos was declaring about the bombings, even though there were weak points in his statements, he named Nasrim Mokhtari, an Iranian hairdresser in Buenos Aires, who he said, knew about the bombing. (He later testified that he warned the consulates on information he got from her). It is suspected that Dos Santos worked, or works for the ABIN, or the Brazilian Police.
The Argentine Justice System, needing new leads because of all the pressure that was coming to them to solve the case, ordered SIDE to find her, and bring her back to Argentina for interrogation at any costs. A huge plan codenamed Operation Ciprés was mounted to locate the woman, who was then living in Europe, and bring her back to Argentina. Ms. Mokhtari was, located and tricked into coming back to Argentina by SIDE agents, who posed as meat businessmen who needed a translator to do business with Iran.
It has been said that the operation costed SIDE about half a million dollars, which included locating her, paying costs, agents and buying information in Cyprus, France, Belgium and Switzerland. It also has been rumored that the French intelligence service helped SIDE locate Mokhtari in Paris, France.
Ms. Mokthari was on an Air France flight to Montevideo, Uruguay, that made a connection Buenos Aires. When she got off to change planes, she was arrested by a special counterterrorist squad of the Argentine Federal Police. Even though it was requested by the Argentine Judicial System itself for SIDE to bring her back to Argentina for questioning, there were no sufficient proofs to incriminate her in anything, or even being involved in the so called "Iranian support group" that carried out the AMIA Bombing. Mokhtari was left free, not able to leave the country. That restriction was later lifted, but Nasrim Mokhtari had already lost her contacts in Paris, and Iran did not want her in it's territory because of the sufficient international problems she brought to them with Iran being blamed in participating in the AMIA Bombing.
The operation was carried out by the Sala Patria [15] group. As a side note, when the press found out about such a huge operation to capture the suspected international terrorist, who was just nothing more than a prostitute who worked in cabarets throughout France and Switzerland, the Argentine State, the Argentine Justice System, and SIDE declined to provide sufficient accommodations for Mokhtari to stay in Argentina.
The breakdown of CIA and SIDE relations
In January of 2001, the Página/12 newspaper published an article on SIDE's friction with the American CIA, and published a photo with personal details of Ross Newland, then CIA Station Chief in Buenos Aires, which was expected to become head of the Latin American division in the [[CIA]. Official reports say that the CIA wanted SIDE to investigate the operations of the Russian Mafia and the ex-KGB agents who had just arrived in Argentina. The reasons were that the Russian Mafia was using Argentina as a in-the-middle country for smuggling ilegal aliens to the U.S, because at that time, Argentines required no VISA for tourist stay in the United States, and getting an Argentine citizenship is relatively easy.
The other reason to investigate the just arrived ex-KGB and the Russian Mafia agents was that many ex-CIA and ex-FBI personnel had, and still have private security businesses in Argentina and many other Latin American countries. The arrival of the ex-KGB personnel to Argentina, put at risk their businesses. (Many sources affirm that private security industry in Argentine moves about 40 million dollars each year. Circa 2001). A few months before, the CIA Station Chief, Ross Newland, a 50 year old, who loved living in Buenos Aires (See [[16]]) , accused SIDE of following him and fellow CIA operatives in Argentina, as well as doing surveillance with microphones on them. Press reports stated that, Patricio Finnen and Alejandro Brousson, two old, high staff members of SIDE, were doing the operation from the Billingshurst base (Also known as "Base 22", or the Buenos Aires operation center, one of the many facilities of SIDE in the city). Not only where they doing surveillance on the CIA agents in Argentine soil, but on other service's personnel too, most notably the Israeli Mossad and the German BND.
American reports state that SIDE never helped the CIA on it's requests, instead, it has been said that SIDE helped the "new comers" insert themselves in the market, by selling them information. The CIA became furious since they had approved funds for SIDE to do their operations. They expected SIDE to collaborate, and make the matter an Argentine-State issue, therefore making it hard for the Russians to insert themselves in the Argentine market. The head of SIDE's Counterintelligence Directorate, known as "85" inside SIDE, Retired Mayor Alejandro Broussoun (Alias: Alejandro Bousquet), an ex military servicemen from the Argentine Army Corps of Engineers, and an ex-follower of the ultra nationalist right wing Carapintada movement in the 80's and 90's, was blamed by the CIA for the scandal. As a side note, Brousson also played a significant role in the AMIA investigation, and at one point he blamed the Carapintadas for helping carry out the bombings. A theory that was supported by an FBI report on 1998. During some time, Broussoun had led/formed part of the famous 'Sala Patria'[17].
The United States investigation into the "frictions" with SIDE, revealed that the picture and information of Ross Newland was given to the newspaper by SIDE. Meanwhile, SIDE tried to repair relations by explaining the scandal through another theory.
At the end of the scandal, with Ross Newland's identity uncovered, and the episode becoming a major embarrasement for the U.S in the worldwide intelligence community, the CIA removed its Station Chief from Argentina, and said they were going to move their offices to Montevideo, Uruguay because of their problems working along with SIDE. Also, as a result of this, the head of the 85 (Counterintelligence) Directorate in SIDE, (R) Mayor Alejandro Brousson lost his job because of the American diplomatic pressure to punish the responsable of an act they considered "a violation of game rules".
The scandal was heavily publicized in Argentina, but ignored in the rest of the world, except for intelligence specific magazines and publications. Still, it made the CIA distrust SIDE, one of the biggest Latin American intelligence agencies in which they had come to trust and cooperate extensively during the 90's.
Operation Cabildo
During the AMIA case investigation, Judge Galeano, the judge working on the case, asked Hugo Anzorreguy, to help him un-stuck the investigation by briving a key witness who refused to testify, Carlos Telledín, with 400 thousand dollars so he would change his testimony.
SIDE participaed in paying the money to Telledín's wife, Ana Boragni, in a Lloyds Bank located on Cabildo Avenue in Buenos Aires.
Brives to senators
It has been proven, that the Executive Power, then under President Fernando de la Rúa ordered SIDE to provided money, from reserved funds, to brive several senators in 2001 to pass the new Labor reform that he was promoting. This became a huge scandal in Argentina, that heavily criticized the use of reserved funds (fondos reservados[18]). SIDE, even though it was ordered to do the operation by the Executive Power, was heavily criticized, questioning it's indepdendence and role. With SIDE participating in an operation which influenced the affairs of Argentine Politics, many press tabloids starting questioning the real function of the so called "dark" organism.
After the scandal became public, that President Fernando de la Rúa asked then Secretary of Intelligence, Fernando De Santibañes, to resign. De Santibañes did so, and is currently charged with participating in the Senate brives scandal.
Suspected participation in Piqueteros incidents
Judicial investigations and the Argentine press blame SIDE participating in the organization of events on 2002 that led to the death of Darío Santillán and Maximiliano Kosteki, two Piqueteros that were protesting in the Pueyerredón Bridge in Buenos Aires. Both men were killed by police officers armed with shotguns of the Buenos Aires Police. The role of SIDE in these events is that, for a few months SIDE had been producing intelligence reports that linked the Piqueteros to the Colombian terrorist group FARC. Furthermore, minutes before the assassinations, there were three phone calls, between Alfredo Fanchiotti, a policeman involved in the incident, and the Subsecretary of Intelligence, at the time, Oscar Rodríguez.
During the trial, police officers involved in the scene that day, declared that a man from SIDE approached them and told them that "Today there will be incidents". Furthermore implying SIDE on the events of that day. In 2005, President Nestor Kirchner ordered SIDE to open all its files on the assassinations.
It has been rumored that SIDE itself did intelligence gathering on the MTD Piquetero group, specifically on Darío Santillán and Maximiliano Kosteki themselves before their assassinations, and that the Subsecretary of SIDE, himself, ordered the assassinations of the piqueteros to Alfredo Fanchiotti, the police men in the scene who shot the men, when they talked on the phone that same day. Carlos Soria, then Secretary of State Intelligence, later declared that "Democracy works in order, we needed to establish order", making the theory that the assassinations were a plan by SIDE to psychologically manipulate the Piqueteros movements in Argentina, and establish order on the Piqueteros, more feasible.
The assassinations, which sparked outrage by Piquetero groups, made then interim President Eduardo Duhalde to call for elections earlier than planned, and since then, the Argentine government has established a non-repressive policy towards the Piqueteros.
In 2005, President Nestor Kirchner, signed a decree that released all of SIDE's files about the assassinations to the public, and made some SIDE staff and agents available for questioning.
Even though SIDE has released files of the events, press reports have concluded that no relevant information is contained in them.
Finally, nobody in SIDE has been charged with participating in the case, SIDE's involvement came up, when police officers confessed about having talked to SIDE agents and staff that day, nevertheless, SIDE has declined any involvement, and most allegations of official, full-scale SIDE involvement can be considered nothing more than a myth with few evidence (phone calls, and judicial testimony). But the press in Argentina has been eager to assign SIDE a significant role in the events of that day, furthermore tarnishing it's reputation.
Notes
- ^ In 2005, the Senate of Argentina abolished secret laws, it is not clear how SIDE is controlled by the National Executive Power.
- ^ In 2001, the Argentine Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 was approved by the Senate, creating the National Intelligence System.
- ^ The Argentine Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 created the National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence, which is supposed to handle internal criminal intelligence.
- ^ The Argentine Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 also created the National Directorate of Strategic Military Intelligence, which is supposed to coordinate all of the Argentine Armed Forces military intelligence organisms.
- ^ Article 24 of the Argentine Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 approved in 2001, mandates that no more of 2% of SIDE's personnel can be appointed by the current Secretary of Intelligence, and such personnel must exit the organization when the Secretary of Intelligence that appointed them, ends his term. Furthermore, such personnel contracted by the Secretary is classified as "Assesoring" personnel and are included in the Cabinet of Personnel.
- ^ The reform also put new rules on SIDE's directorates like the Directorate of Judicial Surveillance, to make SIDE more efficient and controlled on it's original intelligence purposes.
- ^ For more information on the AMIA case, consult AMIA Bombing.
- ^ The Sala Patria group, was a special division of SIDE. Two famous staff members, named by the Argentine press in many ocations, Alejandro Brousson (Alias: Alejandro Bousquet) and Patricio Miguel Finnen (Alias: Pedro Fonseca), were/led this group. Sala Patria led the AMIA investigation in SIDE for many years, and was also involved in famous operations such as the Nasrim Mokhtari fiasco, and the Telledin brives. The group was recently dissolved, both Patricio Miguel Finnen and Alejandro Brousson do not work in SIDE anymore. Sala Patria is now known as "Division 34: Transnational Crime and International Counterterorrism". Furthermore, Sala Patria's reputation was severely tarnished on allegations of corruption, and mishandling of the AMIA investigation.
- ^ Gorrarián Merlo's narration of the story of his kidnapping was published in a Página/12 newspaper interview.
- ^ Article 51 of the Argentine Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 renames SIDE (Secretaría de Inteligencia de Estado) to S.I (Secretaría de Inteligencia) and abolishes secret decree 416/76.
- ^ The old Interior Security Law 24.059 gets partially overriden by the new Argentine Intelligence Reform Law 25.520.
See also
- List of Secretaries of Intelligence
- Argentine intelligence agencies
- National Intelligence System
- National Intelligence School
- Directorate of Judicial Surveillance
- National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence
- National Directorate of Strategic Military Intelligence