Battle of Shanghai
| Battle of Shanghai | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Second Sino-Japanese war | |||||||
| File:Sihang defenders.jpg Defending the Sihang Warehouse. | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| China, National Revolutionary Army | Japan, Imperial Japanese Army, Central China Theatre Army | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Chiang Kai-shek, Xie Jinyuan | Yanagwa Heisuke, Tada Shun | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 600,000 troops in 75 divisions and 9 brigades, 250 airplanes | 270,000 troops in 8 divisions, 3000 airplanes | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| ~200,000 | ~70,000 | ||||||
The Battle of Shanghai (simplified Chinese: 淞沪会战; traditional Chinese: 淞滬會戰; pinyin: Sōnghù Huìzhàn; lit. 'Battle at the ports of Shanghai'; Japanese: 第二次上海事変), also known as the Defence of Shanghai was the first of the 22 major engagements between the National Revolutionary Army and Imperial Japanese Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Some Japanese sources call the battle Second Shanghai Incident, but instead it signified the beginning of an all-out war between the two countries, not just some "incidents". The battle lasted three months and involved nearly one million troops, and is divided into three stages. The first stage lasted from August 13 to September 11, during which the National Revolutionary Army defended the city against the Japanese who were landing at the shores of Shanghai; The second stage lasted from September 12 to November 4, during which the two armies involved in a bloody house-to-house battle in an attempt to gain control of the city; and the last stage, lasting from November 5 to end of the month, involved the retreat of the Chinese army by flanking Japanese.
Background
The Battle of Shanghai was the first major battle in the Second Sino-Japanese War since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the course and decision for total war involved skillful diplomatic maneuverings on Chiang Kai-shek's part and the strategy of trading "space for time."
Strategic reasons
Since the outbreak of war on July 7, major military operations had occurred in and around North China in the Battle of Beiping-Tianjin. Originally, neither China nor Japan expected the skirmirsh at Marco Polo Bridge to escalate into a full scale war. Japan had expected a quick ceasefire and further gain of Chinese territory, similar to what had happened in earlier conflicts of Mukden Incident, Defense of the Great Wall, and Battle of Shanghai (1932). However, Chinese public opinion was vehemently opposed to any further concessions, and the Kuomintang Government under Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to fight a war of resistance. Therefore, Chiang decided to escalate the regional conflict in North China into a full scale war.
Chiang Kai-shek and his military advisors believed that the next logical step for the Japanese army was to march from the north, along the major north-south railways, and cut right into middle and eastern China. The Japanese strategy of fighting from the north to the south would have put the Chinese army in a situation where they had to set up a horizontal defense line, in an attempt to encircle the enemy through pincer movement. However, Chiang understood that his army, without adequate number of trucks and tracked vehicles, could not have made sufficient maneuver for such encirclement. On the other hand, the Japanese army had total superiority in North China and the mobility of its armor and artillery pieces was unmatched. In addition, most of the more robust Chinese defense works were built around Eastern China, around the Yangtze Delta, instead of in North China. Thus it would have been less strategically sound to transport and deploy Chinese troops up north.
Because the Japanese army was moving southward, if the Japanese army had cut through the Chinese defenders, the Chinese defense line would have been cut in the middle into two parts. The eastern part would have been chased to the sea in a scenario similar to the future Battle of Dunkirk. Japanese navy had total supremacy in the Chinese seas and the retreating Chinese forces would have been totally decimated by the enemy as they had nowhere to retreat to. Therefore, Chiang decided to establish a second front in Shanghai, to draw enemy troops to the eastern China theater. His plan worked as most Japanese troops arrived by amphibious landings at Shanghai, and Japanese troops from the North China theater did not factor much, until toward the end of the battle when they arrived as reinforcement. Chiang's plan was to fight as much as he can to delay the Japanese advance, while time was bought to move vital industries into the Chinese hinterlands. This strategy of trading "space for time" and diplomatic and domestic concerns were the basis of Chiang's decision to place his most capable, German-trained troops to fight in the battle.
Diplomatic and domestic reasons
Shanghai was a cosmoplitan city at the time and had many foreign investments and assets, including American, British and Japanese. To Chiang Kai-shek, the Japanese attack on the city would provide an impetus for the United States and the United Kingdom to enter the war on the side of China. Before the attacks, the U.S. and Great Britain have been unwilling to condemn Japan for its encroachments upon China because of their similar anti-Soviet Union political agenda.
Chiang believed that the war would affect their investments and would force them to propose a settlement on terms acceptable to China and that Japan could not sustain herself against America, the greatest economic power, and Great Britain, the greatest colonial power. To prove that an independent China was inseparable from the continuation of American and British interests, Chiang understood that he needed to make a grand stand at Shanghai to raise the stakes higher. A strong Chinese defense of the city would prove to the West that China was indeed capable of fighting and worth any military investment.
However, appeasement permeated the international community and Chiang had no good reason but blind faith that the foreign powers would help. His German advisor, General Alexander von Falkenhausen, told Chiang that the Nine-Power Treaty was basically a piece of scrap paper and that he should place no hope that the international community would come to intervene. In addition, the Japanese initially had no strong intention to escalate the Marco Polo Bridge Incident into an all-out war. They had expected that the Chinese make further concessions as they did since 1931. Thus, besides public opinion and Chinese nationalism, there was no other strong impetus to make a frontal war because Chiang could have ordered his men to back down like before. On the other hand, if Chiang decided to put up a great resistance, he risked losing his nascent German-trained divisions that were barely ready to meet the enemy head-on. Thus for Chiang, fighting the war would bolster his public image among the Chinese, but would decrease his political power, which was based on military power. However, stepping down and making more concessions would make him lose public support, but would maintain his political power and grip on a unified China. The Battle of Shanghai would prove to be a grat gamble for Chiang.
While a Chinese victory would be desirable, defeat would not be so bad either because it might force the British and the Americans to intervene to prevent China from aligning with the Soviet Union. However, if the British and the Americans did not intervene, then Chiang would have to fight a war of attrition with its home front moved into the interior. In addition, the national sentiment at the time was geared heavily towards Chinese nationalism and patriotism and that further concessions to Japan was simply counter-productive to the troops' morale.
The Battle
On August 13, more than 10,000 Japanese troops pressed towards the Kongkew district of Shanghai and encountered the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps. The Japanese expected a swift victory to conquer Shanghai in three days and China in three months. However, they faced strong resistance.
On August 22, the Japanese 3rd, 8th, and 11th Divisions made an amphibious assault under cover from naval bombardments and proceeded to land in at Chwansa, Shihtzelin, and Paoshan districts of Shanghai. The Chinese were unable to counterattack efficiently because of heavy enemy naval firepower, and had to give ground soon after the landing.
By September 17, the Chinese retreated to the North Shanghai Railway Station further inland to set up a defensive line at Lotien-Shuangtsaoten section of the railway. During mid-September vicious house-to-house fighting erupted and 100,000 Japanese troops broke the Lotien line. The Chinese retreated further to the southern bank of Wentsaopang creek and took up defensive positions along the Kwangfu-Szesiangkungmiao-Liuho line.
The Japanese further increased their men to 200,000 during October and launched an offensive on the Wentsaopang creek region. The Chinese also started their counter-offensive. This caused tremendous casualties on both sides. On October 23, the Japanese broke through Chinese lines, forcing them to make an orderly tactical withdrawal further south to the hilltops of the Blue Dragon Ridge. The Chinese fought relentlessly to hold their higher ground. But with casualties of some thirty thousand, the Chinese retreated. However, a group of 800 Chinese troops successfully covered the retreat of the bulk of Chinese forces by fortifying the Sihang Warehouse and defending it against all odds against more than 10 Japanese attacks in 4 days. The story of "The 800 Heroes" (simplified Chinese: 八百壮士; traditional Chinese: 八百壯士; pinyin: Bā Bǎi Zhùangshì) spawned a patriotic song of the same name, and successfully raised the morale in an otherwise grim situation. With Chinese lines faltering throughout the city, the Japanese demanded a surrender on November 7th. However, the Chinese refused to surrender and bitter close-quarters battle continued, with Japanese planes strafing and bombing the city. The last Chinese troops evacuated from the city and retreated further south on November 12.
Aftermath and Appraisal
The Battle of Shanghai was a military defeat but a morale-boosting victory for the Chinese. It made clear to the world that the Chinese would no longer stand by and watch as Japanese forces "peacefully" conquered its territory piece by piece. It also demonstrated that the Chinese would not surrender under intense Japanese fire, something that Chiang wanted to show to the Americans and the British to bring them to his side.
However, to prove his point, Chiang also had to send his German-trained divisions into savage battles with the better-equipped and navally-supported Japanese army. The divisions participating in the battle lost one-third of their men in the battle and it greatly reduced the NRA's manpower. In addition, as General Li Tsung-jen pointed out in his memoir, Chiang knew the Chinese army had a slim chance of winning and Shanghai was likely to be lost. Li Tsung-jen proposed that the National Revolutionary Army should preserve its strength and move further inland to capital Nanking to prepare for a more robust defense there. Strategically speaking, Li believed that China was a vast country and it made no difference if a city could be held for a few months longer at the expense of huge casualties.
But Chiang believed that it was necessary to prove Chinese valor to the foreign powers in the city to bring them to China's side. In addition, the Chinese fought tenaciously so that the city would not fall in three days, and that China would not fall in three months as the Japanese had proclaimed. This proved to be a huge morale-booster to the Chinese troops. But Chiang's calculation backfired, as no foreign powers came for effective intervention and the futile defense of the city with heavy casualties also decreased the ability of China to mount effective counteroffensives against the Japanese in later battles. Plus, the heavy casualties inflicted by the Chinese and difficulties in conquering the city caused Japanese troops to carry out the infamous Nanjing Massacre as a retributive action against Chinese resistance.
All in all, although the price paid was astronomical, the battle was a proving ground for China's unwillingness to surrender and make any concessions to Japan and its determination to resist Japanese aggression.
See also
