Occupation of Iraq (2003–2011)
The U.S.-led occupation of Iraq followed the collapse of Saddam Hussein's government brought on by the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was led by the government and military of the United States, with significant support from a multinational force including the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland and varying levels of assistance from Japan and several other allied countries. United States military and civilian officials, as well as some British officials, began the process of securing Iraq's infrastructure and rebuilding its governmental structures.
Central authority for the occupation was given to the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. From April to May of 2003 the ORHA was led by General Jay Garner. He was later replaced by U.S. civilian administrator L. Paul Bremer, and the agency renamed Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA appointed an Interim Governing Council in an attempt to involve a representative sample of Iraqi leaders in the management of the occupation.
Bremer later announced that by June 30, 2004 control of Iraq would be given to an Iraqi government; see Plans for return of sovereignty below for a summary of relevant U. S. statements.
Participating nations
Main article: Multinational force in Iraq
Well over 80% of the forces occupying Iraq after President Bush announced the "end of major combat operations" were American, and all forces were under the over command of the United States; the next largest contingent was those of the United Kingdom. There was a similarly large contingent of Spanish-speaking forces from Latin America and led by Spain; this contingent left in mid-Spring 2004.
Law and order problems
In the initial period of the occupation, there were particularly widespread law and order problems, including heavy looting, notably at the National Museum of Iraq, nuclear sites, and other facilities. This followed the collapse of the Saddam government and the disappearance of much of the traditional security infrastructure, which the occupying forces had been relying on to carry out most of the necessary police work.
U.S.-led occupation
Prior to the invasion, the U.S. promised a speedy transition to a democratic government, and the initial outline included the creation of an Iraqi constitution and the active role of Iraqis in the process of establishing a new government as well as in the interim authority. United States officials' public pronouncements have emphasized that the US invasion was not about occupation, but about liberation. From before the invasion until mid-May 2003, U.S. officials emphasized that an Iraqi-led government would be established "as soon as possible". Expectations of a quick handover faded as resistance to the occupation remained and fighting continued.
In November 2003, Paul Bremer announced the plan to turn political authority to the Iraqi governing council by June 30, 2004 with the expectation that a constitution would then be drawn up. The United States has stated its plans to enter into a security agreement with the new Iraqi government and maintain military authority until a new Iraqi army is established. The Bush administration has remained committed to this date despite being unable to identify the interim Iraqi government and the unstable security situation.
The U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority has, for administrative purposes, divided Iraq into three security zones: a northern zone in the Mosul - Kirkuk region, a central zone in the Baghdad - Tikrit region and a southern zone in the Basra - Nasiriya region. The northern and central zones are garrisoned by US troops, while the southern zone is garrisoned by Polish troops (around Nasiriya) and British troops (around Basra). [1]
In the early months of the occupation, looting and vandalism prevented the restoration of basic services such as water, electricity, and sanitation. By spring 2004, these services were mostly restored to pre-war levels. Ongoing work is continuing to provide sufficient sanitation. Uneven power distribution remains a problem, with cities in the northern and southern provinces receiving electricity 24 hours a day, while the Baghdad area continues to have periodic blackouts. [2] Because many Iraqis have been purchasing large appliances, summer 2004 will test the fragile power grid, when demand is expected to make a large increase. [3]
The treatment of human rights by the occupying forces has been subject to criticism, several US officers are under investigation for mistreating prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison, some already lost their position. [4] Mistreatments of Iraqis by British soldiers was reported as well, although of the many sets allegations and pictures, one set was later found to be forged. [5]
Former Baath Party members and military officers who have no criminal past or human rights abuses have been allowed to return to government positions. [6]
Reconstruction
For the reconstruction, contracts were awarded to private companies. Initially companies from countries that had opposed the war were excluded from these contracts, but due to protests this decision was reversed.[7] It was debated whether some companies favoured because they had connections to high-ranking members of the Bush administration, like Haliburton [8] [9] [10]. This suspicion had already been a concern during the global protests against the war on Iraq. An audit found that Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), may have overcharged the U.S. government $61 million for bringing oil products for the U.S. army into Iraq via a Kuwaiti subcontractor, Altanmia Commercial Marketing Co.[11] Some also argue that foreign contractors are doing work which could be done by unemployed Iraqis, which might be a factor fuelling resentment of the occupation. [12] [13] [14]
Civilian government
The establishment of a new civilian government of Iraq was greatly complicated by the religious divisions between the majority Shi'ite population and the formerly ruling Sunni class. Moreover, all the people in Saddam's ruling Ba'ath Party were tainted by the association. Also, in northern Iraq, Kurds had already had effectively autonomous rule for 12 years under the protection of the no-fly zone.
On May 16, 2003, U.S. officials abandoned the plan to cede authority to a democratically chosen interim civilian Iraqi government (similar to what had happened in Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan) and presented a resolution to the U.N. to give the United States and Britain broad power and lift economic sanctions on Iraq, allowing the occupying countries authority to use oil resources to pay for rebuilding the country. Passage of the resolution allowed them to appoint an interim government by themselves.
On July 13, 2003, an Iraqi Governing Council was appointed by Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator L. Paul Bremer. Due to the lack of support for the council in the population its members will be excluded from the caretaker government being planned by UN special envoy Brahimi to manage the country after June 30th, 2004 until elections canbe held in 2005. [15]
United Nations Resolutions
On May 22, 2003, the UN Security Council voted 14-0 to give the United States and Britain the power to govern Iraq and use its oil resources to rebuild the country. Resolution 1483 removed nearly 13 years of economic sanctions originally imposed after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The resolution allows U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to appoint a special representative to work with U.S. and British administrators on reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and the creation of a new government. The resolution created a new Development Fund for Iraq, which will collect funds from oil sales. The fund will be run by the United States and Britain to rebuild the country, and it will be overseen by a new advisory body composed of the United Nations and international financial institutions. It will begin its existence with a $1 billion deposit, funds transferred from the United Nation's oil-for-food account. The oil-for-food program will be phased out over a six month period. The resolution requires a one-year review, a step sought by both Germany and France. Syria, which was the sole Arab state represented on the council, was absent from the meeting.
On August 14, 2003, the UN Security Council voted 14-0 to "welcome" the creation of the Iraqi Governing Council. Resolution 1500 stopped short of formally recognizing the governing council as Iraq's legitimate governing body but called it an "important step" towards creating a sovereign government.
Elections
For several months the United States maintained that it intended to convene a constitutional convention, composed of influential Iraqis. The deadline for this convention was pushed back further and further by the U.S. interim authority until it appeared to have been suspended indefinitely. However, European demands for an early election and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani insistence for them eventually forced the United States to let the appointed Governing Council serve this function.
In the early months of the occupation, new officials were appointed to several local and regional positions (e.g. mayors, governors, local councils). The officials were chosen from a select group of individuals (including ex-Ba'ath party officials) in an attempt to speed the return to normality and to avoid the election of people opposed to the American and British presence. Certain religious clerics and other officials were considered to be overly radical or dangerous. On occasion the appointed officials were found to behave less than admirably. On June 30, 2003 the appointed mayor of Najaf was arrested on charges of corruption.
Though some protested the lack of initial democracy (as proposed by initial occupation head Jay Garner, who wanted elections within 90 days), it should be pointed out that in its ideal form democracy requires a civil society to function effectively and hold honest elections. Iraq had a very brief history of democracy and one-party rule had left the country ill-qualified to function as one. It was therefore very technically difficult, though not impossible, to hold elections so quickly after the war. In recent months however, civil society at a local level shows signs of recovery in some areas of Iraq. However, much to American disquiet it largely seems to be based around religious figures. Municipal and city elections were held in some of the southern and northern provinces. [16]
On November 15, the Iraqi Governing Council, announced that a transitional government would take over in June from the U.S.-led powers, and that an elected government would follow by the end of 2005 once a constitution had been drafted and ratified. The transitional government would be selected in June 2004 by a transitional council formed in May 2004.
The Governing Council revealed the timetable after the United States Government, in reaction to significant terrorist and insurgent activity against occupying troops and also aid organisations, abandoned its earlier plan that a sovereign government would take charge only after creating a constitution and elections held. Jalal Talabani, current chairman of the council, said the transition would involve "the creation of a permanent constitution by an elected council, directly elected by the people, and also the election of a new government according to the articles of this new constitution before the end of 2005."
In March of 2004 an interim constitution was formally created, called the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period. The document calls for the creation of an elected National Assembly to take place no later than January of 2005.
Plans for return of sovereignty
Various proposals have been made regarding full sovereignty for Iraq:
- Shortly after his appointment, Bremer announced that by June 30, 2004 control of Iraq would be given to an Iraqi government.
- On March 8, 2004 an interim constitution, the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period was approved by the governing council, which outlines how the sovereignty will be formally transferred.
- Prior to April, 2004 U. S. government officials referring to the transition date Iraq had used the language "sovereignty" or "full sovereignty." For example, on March 15, 2004 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated [17] that on June 30, "the Iraqi interim government will assume full sovereignty and the United States will open a diplomatic mission in Baghdad, the largest U.S. mission anywhere in the world."
- In April 2004, U.S. officials began to use the term limited sovereignty, notably Armitage's undersecretary Marc Grossman to a Congressional committee [18] on April 23, 2004.
- On May 25, 2004, George W. Bush used the language "full sovereignty," saying that "next month ... our coalition will transfer full sovereignty to a government of Iraqi citizens."
- On May 28, 2004 George W. Bush used the language "complete and full sovereignty," stating that this was his response to a query by UN special representative, Lakhdar Brahimi.
- On June 3, 2004, Brahimi publicly expressed disappointment about the transfer of power stating that "Bremer is the dictator of Iraq" and "He has the money. He has the signature." He also added "I will not say who was my first choice, and who was not my first choice .... I will remind you that the Americans are governing this country." According to a person who spoke with Brahimi recently, "He was very disappointed, very frustrated. I asked him why he didn't say that publicly (and) he said, `I am the U.N. envoy to Iraq, how can I admit to failure?'" [19]
Resistance to the occupation
The occupation was resisted from forces inside Iraq. In the initial months of the occupation, dozens of Iraqis were shot in anti-American demonstrations, mostly in the nation's Sunni Muslim areas. While Shi'a Muslim areas were mostly peaceful, Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, who returned to Iraq after decades in exile shortly after the occupation began, said: "We are not afraid of the British or American troops. This country wants to keep its sovereignty and the forces of the coalition must leave it."
In the early months following the start of the occupation, American and British deaths averaged one a day, in sniper attacks, suicide bombings at road checkpoints, and ambushes. Some attacks against occupying troops seem prompted by motivations of revenge (e.g., when six British soldiers were killed by angry Iraqis after they shot four demonstrators at a protest).
As the summer of 2003 gave way to autumn, the pattern of anti-occupation attacks shifted to include repeated, deadly suicide car bombings against high-profile targets in Baghdad, such as the headquarters of the U.N. and the Red Cross, foreign embassies, and police stations of the newly-formed post-Saddam Iraqi police force. At the same time, attacks on individual U.S. soldiers and vehicles, often in the form of buried roadside bombs, went on.
The casualties suffered by coalition troops during the occupation quickly grew to several times the number killed during the invasion itself. (see Casualties in the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq).
Though journalists reported that many residents of the Iraqi capital deplored the violence and appreciated coalition efforts to bring stability, it was clear by autumn 2003 that there were groups present in the country determined to continue violent resistance. It was not clear to what extent, if any, these groups were controlled by members of the former regime, or by non-Iraqi Islamic extremists such as al Qaeda.
Some unconfirmed media reports have suggested that Saddam loyalists and al Qaeda (or linked organisations) have entered into an alliance, whereby the secularist Saddamists supply the weapons and al Qaeda provides the fanatical personnel. Reports that Saddam had ties to al Qaeda are, as of yet, unconfirmed and debated; see Iraq and the War on Terrorism. By occupying Iraq the US has created a new frontline, and may possibly have allied together two violently opposed organisations. It is not clear whether this was an intended or unintended consequence.
Resistance to the occupation is particularly virulent in the Sunni centre of Iraq, which was the source of Saddam's power base. Coalition troops have had a much easier time policing the Shi'a south; though this may also have something to do with their far greater experience at policing civilian areas gained in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. Until the 2004 spring uprising, there were virtually no attacks on coalition forces in Polish (a.k.a multinational) zone, and most victims of it were from the local Shi'ite civilian population.
Guerrilla war
In late June of 2003 there was some public debate in the U. S. as to whether the resistance could be characterized as a guerrilla war.
On June 17th, Army Gen. John P. Abizaid said that forces in Iraq were "conducting what I would describe as a classical guerrilla-type campaign against us. It's low-intensity conflict in our doctrinal terms, but it's war however you describe it." In a statement to Congress on June 18th, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said "There's a guerrilla war there but we can win it."
However, U. S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, on June 31st, refused to accept the characterization of the situation in Iraq as a "guerrilla war" and blamed resistance on five groups:
- Foreign terrorists
- Criminals
- Looters
- Iranian-backed Shi'a radicals.
- Supporters of the former Saddam Hussein regime
"That doesn't make it anything like a guerrilla war or an organized resistance," Rumsfeld said. "It makes it like five different things going on [in which the groups] are functioning more like terrorists."
Sabotage
Sabotage of oil pipelines and refineries have been part of the resistance of the Iraqi insurgents. The United States had intended to quickly rebuild Iraqi infrastructure for production back to pre-war levels, but widespread sabotage crippled this initiative.
In the early months of the occupation, oil pipelines repeatedly came under attack. The northern oil pipeline to Turkey was destroyed immediately following the U.S. announcement of the intent to ship oil out via that route, and on June 23 a major pipe junction leading to Syria and Lebanon was destroyed. Together these attacks crippled much of the ability to transport northern Iraqi oil. In the south an attack on June 22 destroyed the main oil pipeline leading from southern oil fields to the Baghdad oil refineries. In addition widespread looting, which contractors believe to be systematic and intended as sabotage, has crippled the attempt to bring production in the supergiant Rumaila oil field back up to speed. By April 2004, after the establishment of Iraqi oil pipeline police, production in the north and south oil fields returned back to pre-war levels. The overall production is still 600,000 barrel per day below pre-war level, and 2.8 million barrel per day below US plans for 2004.
Some of the groups that have claimed responsibility for attacks on the coalition occupying forces and sabotage include the "Iraqi National Front of Fedayeen", "The Snake Party", and "The Return". For more information, see Iraqi resistance.
Spring 2004 Uprisings
On March 29, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority shut down Shiite Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's daily newspaper, al-Hawza, claiming it was an incitement to violence. Thousands of people turned out to protest. The ensuing riots ended up with the deaths of one Salvadoran and several American soldiers.
The United States arrested one of al-Sadr's top deputies and later announced the existence of a three-month-old arrest warrant, issued by an Iraqi judge, on al-Sadr, claiming that he was responsible for the killing of Abdul Majid al-Khoei [20], a Shiite cleric aligned with both Ayatollah Sistani and the US-led coalition, and son of the Grand Ayatollah Abdul-Qasim al-Khoei (who died in 1992). The warrant itself inspired further opposition, as Khoei's own followers blamed Baathists for the murder. The US-appointed Iraqi Minister of Justice stated that he had no knowledge of the warrant. The Iraqi Jurists Association declared the warrant "illegal".
On March 31, the world witnessed the killing and mutilation of four Blackwater USA employees in Fallujah. At the time of their ambush, these employees were providing security for food shipments.[21]
Some of Blackwater USA's employees have engaged in armed defense of installations. Insofar as these workers engage in aggressive combat, they could be considered as combatant mercenaries.
Fallujah
The Fallujah counteroffensive Operation Vigilant Resolve was launched on April 5 in response to the March 31 murder and mutilation of four of Blackwater's employees. Roads leading into and out of the city were closed. When the US marines tried to enter the city fierce fighting erupted. Insurgents opened fire with heavy machine guns, rockets, and rocket propelled grenades. The marines answered by bringing in tanks and helicopters trying to overcome the opposition. The ensuing firefight resulted in a large number of casualties. Dozens of marines were killed and injured. 271 of non-coalition forces were killed and 793 were injured according to official counts for the period of April 5 through April 22. Conflicting reports leave it unclear how many of the dead and injured were rebel fighters or women and children. [22] [23][24]. Arab media report that snipers have shot civilians and target ambulances trying to take the injured to hospital. These reports have been confirmed by numerous Western eye-witnesses ([25], [26], [27], [28], [29]). There are also reports of ambulances and aid convoys being used to smuggle weapons and fighters into the city. [30] Coalition officials have claimed that insurgents are using mosques and schools as command posts and weapon storage facilities. A suicide bomb vest factory was allegedly discovered by marines days after entering the city.[31] [32]
After several failed attempts at ceasefires, the US backed out of the city. A marine commander, commenting on the reasons, stated "We don't want to turn Fallouja into Dresden". The US handed authority of the city over to a former Iraqi general who served under Saddam Hussein, and whose fighters the US acknowleges include many members of the insurgency. Today, the city is widely viewed as a free rebel town; banners in the city streets proclaim victory over the United States, and the mosques have spoken praise of the insurgents. [33] The general, Muhammed Latif, told Reuters, ""I want the American soldier to return to his camp. What I want more is that he returns to the United States," [34]. The old Iraqi army uniforms have been brought back in the Falluja brigade. [35]
US marines encircled Fallujah with an earthwall, trying to control access to the city. Though they allowed women and children to leave the city, when a male tried to leave, he was sent back. Very few western journalists reported from Fallujah, while Arab news-organisations, including al-Jazeera were still reporting from the city. The Americans were often critical about these reports.
After a car bombing killed Izzadine Saleem, the then-head of the Iraqi Governing Council, Ahmed Chalabi blamed the attack and others like it on the deal in Falluja. "The terrorists are free to roam around and they have been given sanctuary in Fallujah," Chalabi said. "The garage is open and car bombs are coming repeatedly." [36]
Muqtada al-Sadr
On April 4th, coalition forces closed Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's newspaper al-Hawza, claiming that it contained incitements to violence. One example provided was that on February 26th, an article claimed that a suicide bombing in Basra that killed 53 people was a rocket fired by the Americans, and not a car bomb. In response, al-Sadr launched a day of protests. During these protests, insurgents (which may or may not have been tied to al-Sadr) ambushed an American patrol guarding a trash collecting unit was ambushed in Sadr-City resulting in the deaths of 8 soldiers. Meanwhile, several dozen of al-Sadr's followers were killed during their protests.
The coalition responded by arresting one of al-Sadr's closest aides, leading to al-Sadr calling on his followers to rise up. The next days fighting erupted in many cities in southern Iraq, including Karbala,Kut, Nassiriya and Basra.
The United States announced the existence of a three-month-old arrest warrant, issued by an Iraqi judge, on al-Sadr, claiming that he was responsible for the killing of US-aligned cleric al-Khoei. The warrant itself inspired further opposition, as Khoei's own followers blamed Baathists for the murder, the US-appointed Iraqi Minister of Justice stated that he had no knowledge of the warrant, and the Iraqi Jurists Association declared the warrant "illegal". Al-Sadr, who had previously created his own parallel government and a militia called the al-Madhi Army, instructed his followers to no longer follow along with the occupation, and suggested that they attack American soldiers, and his followers took control of several southern cities, often with the support of local authorities and police.
During the first few days of the uprising al-Sadr stayed in Kufa were he traditionally had a large following. On April 7 he moved to Najaf, into a building close to the shrine of the Imam Ali, the holiest shrine in the Shia faith.
After fierce fighting during the first days of the uprising, his followers took control over many cities in southern Iraq. In Kut the Ukrainian occupational contingent was forced out of the city. The Italians were contained inside their base in Nassiriya and in Basra the governor's palace was occupied. In Karbala Polish and Bulgarian forces were able to hold their own after battle lasting whole night.
The Americans reacted by dispensing a reactionary force on April 8 to Kut, forcing al-Sadr followers to melt away into the city's population. The same happened in most of the other cities and control was nominally ceded. Only in Najaf and Kufa did the Americans not enter. These two cities are effectively under the control of al-Sadr followers.
The US has sent 2500 marines to Najaf to try to 'arrest or kill' al-Sadr.
At the moment al-Sadr is protected by his fellow Shi'ite leaders who have forbidden the Americans to enter the city. Negotiations are going on between al-Sadr and other leaders to find a solution to the stand-off. Initially hopeful that al-Sistani would force al-Sadr to capitulate, the coalition was disappointed where, while he called for all sides to show restraint, he focused instead on condemning coalition activities in Fallujah.
In mid May of 2004, US forces began pushing into Najaf. In the process, they invaded several mosques to sieze weaponry, and there were reports of damage on some of Shia Islam's holiest shrines. The US has reported a steady stream of al-Madhi army casualties, al-Sadr and hospital officials have disputed the numbers, and both have claimed that many of them were civilians. The al-Madhi army has claimed few American casualties, but on May 17, it was reported that the army drove Italian troops from their base in Nasiriyah called "Libeccio" ("southwest wind") [37]. 10 Italians were wounded, along with 20 al-Madhi army fighters wounded and two killed, in the assault. Meanwhile, a convoy transporting the Italian official in charge of the city came under attack, and two Italians were wounded. The base was peacefully retaken the next day in a negotiated settlement with local clan leaders.
While the US has continually insisted that he has little support, and there have been limited clashes with the smaller SCIRI, he has seldom been condemned by his more senior clerics. Islamic courts have expanded their influence in areas he controls, the sacred Imam Ali mosque now ends its call for prayers with a request for divine protection for him, and his followers have clearly been large in number. [38] Many believe that al-Sistani has not spoken out against al-Sadr for fear of turning Shiite against Shiite. A poll in Iraq found that, in mid May, 32% of Iraqis strongly support al-Sadr, and another 36% somewhat support him.
Hostages
In response to the US offensives, some members of Iraqi resistance took foreign hostages. This included citizens of both coalition members, and countries opposed to the invasion. To date this includes people from South Korea, Japan, Great Britain, Israel, America, Canada, France, Italy, China, Russia, and Ukraine.
The hostage taking appears to be uncoordinated with different groups making various demands, and some hostages being released, whilst others are killed. Al-Sadr has denied any involvement with the hostage taking.
Fall-out
As a result of the uprisings U.S. General John Abizaid, has requested an addition 10,000 troops be sent to Iraq after admitting that a number of Iraqi security personnel had abandons their posts or joined the insurgents. On April 16, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced that he had approved General Abizaid's request and had extended the tour of roughly 20,000 soldiers, who were scheduled to be rotated out of Iraq, by three months.
A fresh mass grave was found near Ramadi, containing the bodies of over 350 Iraqis [39]. It is unclear whether this mass grave contained dead civilians and/or militants.
Withdrawal from Iraq by coalition members
A few days after a terrorist attack at Madrid, popular opposition to the occupation was reinvigorated in Spain and the ruling Partido Popular was accused of deceiving the public by blaming the attack on ETA rather than fundamentalist Muslims. A new government was elected and announced that they no longer support the United States occupation of Iraq and are withdrawing all of their troops. The prime minister elect José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party who ousted former conservative prime minister Jose Maria Aznar stated, "The occupation is a fiasco. There have been almost more deaths after the war than during the war," he said. "The occupying forces have not allowed the United Nations to take control of the situation." On April 17, 2004, Zapatero ordered the immediate withdrawal of Spanish troops to avoid being involved in an anticipated struggle for the Shiite holy city of Najaf.
Following on the heels of this, several other nations that once formed the Coalition of the Willing have begun to balk at their role. The Dutch refused a US offer to commit their troops to Iraq past June 30, while Honduran officials stated that they plan to withdraw their troops as well - the announcement coming one day after they had stated that they would stay. The troops of the Dominican Republic will leave Iraq as soon as possible. It is speculated that El Salvador and Guatemala will likely follow suit. South Korea is not withdrawing its troops, but has cancelled its plans to deploy an additional 3,600 troops to around Kirkuk, opting instead for regions they consider more stable (which may prove problematic to US military planners).
On the heels of the 2004 spring uprising, Kazakhstan confined its 30 troops to their headquarters indefinitely, and announced that they will be withdrawn after its tour ends in May. New Zealand has announced that it will withdraw its 60 troops in September, and Singapore has announced that its 200 troops have returned home and that it has no plans to send any further troops. Thailand, who was already planning not to renew their troop commitment after September, has announced that it is investigating withdrawing its troops before the June 30 transition. Portugal has announced a similar investigation. The Philippines have put a hold on new deployments and are planning to pull out. Bulgaria isn't pulling out, but is letting any of its troops who want to leave go home; 62 out of 480 had left as of April 17th. Nicaragua is leaving as well, claiming that they are too poor to pay for their deployment. President Ricardo Maduro announced that the troops will be pulled out shortly. Many other nations, while staying in, are facing strong opposition at home and have elections coming up soon (such as Australia and Denmark).
Many nations that have announced withdrawal plans or are considering them have stated that they may reconsider if there is a new UN resolution that grants the UN more authority in Iraq.
See also
- 2003 invasion of Iraq
- U.S.-led occupation of Iraq timeline
- Casualties in the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq
- Human rights situation in post-Saddam Iraq
- Iraqi resistance
- Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
- United Nations actions regarding Iraq
- Iraq disarmament crisis
- Iraq Survey Group
- Deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq
- Dover test
External links and references
- Upcoming poll results, May 2004
- Opinion poll of Iraqis 2004-04-28
- Critical reports from occupied Iraq
- Iraq-o-meter - Some statistics [some out-of-date]
- The Promise of Democracy, Billmon.org, June 3, 2003 - Quotations on transitional government and occupation
- Carter, Paul, "Faux Pax Americana", Washington Monthly, June 2003 - Iraq lessons that using fewer troops can win a war, but can't keep the peace.
- Tomchick, Maria, "This Is What A Guerilla War Looks Like", ZNet, June 30, 2003.
- Klein, Naomi, "Privatization in Disguise"
- Robert Fisk: "A Convenient Carnage", Counterpunch, 2. March 2004.
- Mitch Jeserich "Banking on Empire", CorpWatch, 4. February 2004. article about how Iraq's oil revenues have been mortgaged to fund the occupation ministries.
- U.S. outlines post-CPA Iraq March 15th, 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage: Iraq will have "full sovereignty" following June 30th
- Limited Sovereignty For Iraq Is Described April 23rd, 2004, Undersecretary Marc Grossman to Congressional committee: Iraq will have only "limited sovereignty" following June 30th
- Bush, Jun 24: Iraq will have "full sovereignty"
- Bush, Jun 28: Iraq will have "complete and full sovereignty"
- Faces of the fallen: U.S. fatalities in Iraq
- Forces: U.S. & Coalition/Casualties
- Is Iraq Another 'Vietnam'?, Monthly Review, June 2004.
Related Amnesty International links
- Amnesty International Report on Iraq
- Iraq: Tribunal established without consultation
- Iraq: Amnesty International seeks clarification on house demolitions by US troops in Iraq
- Reconstruction must ensure the human rights of Iraqis
- Memorandum on concerns related to legislation introduced by the Coalition Provisional Authority
- Iraq: Forcible return of refugees and asylum-seekers is contrary to international law
- Holding human rights hostage