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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Template:Treatybox The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, or, much more rarely, NNPT) is a treaty, opened for signature on July 1, 1968, to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The vast majority of sovereign states (188) are parties to the treaty. However two out of seven confirmed nuclear powers (i.e., those that have openly tested nuclear weapons) and one possible nuclear power have not ratified the treaty, and one self-proclaimed nuclear power has withdrawn. The treaty was proposed by Ireland. Finland was the first to sign. In New York City, on May 11, 1995, the parties to the treaty decided by consensus to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions.

The treaty is often summarized as having three pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. [1]

Treaty pillars

First pillar: non-proliferation

Five states are permitted by the NPT to own nuclear weapons: France (signed 1992), the People's Republic of China (1992), Soviet Union (1968; obligations and rights now assumed by Russia), United Kingdom (1968), and the United States (1968). These were the only states possessing such weapons at the time the treaty was opened to signature, and are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These 5 Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) agree not to transfer "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" technology to other states, and non-NWS parties agree not to seek or develop nuclear weapons.

The 5 NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in alliance with a Nuclear Weapons State. However, these undertakings have not been incorporated formally into the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time. The United States, for instance, has indicated that it may use nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states". The previous United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, has also explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of the country's nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states". In January 2006, Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the "rogue state's" power centers.

Second pillar: disarmament

Article VI and the preamble indicate that the NWS parties pursue plans to reduce and liquidate their stockpiles; Article VI also calls for "...a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." In Article I, the Nuclear Weapon States declare not to "induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to ... acquire nuclear weapons." A preemptive-strike doctrine and otherwise threatening postures can be viewed as induction by non-NWS parties. Article X states that any state can withdraw from the treaty if they feel that "extraordinary events", for example a perceived threat, force them to do so.

Third pillar: the right to peacefully use nuclear technology

Since very few of the nuclear weapons states and states using nuclear reactions for energy generation are willing to completely abandon possession of nuclear fuel, the third pillar of the NPT provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons.

For some states, this third pillar of the NPT, which allows uranium enrichment for fuel reasons, seems to be a major loophole. However the treaty gives every state the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and as the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station designs use enriched uranium fuel, it follows that states must be allowed to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Peaceful uranium enrichment can arguably be considered a small step away from developing nuclear warheads, and this can be done by withdrawing from the NPT. No state is known to have successfully constructed a nuclear weapon in secret while subjected to NPT inspection.

Countries that have signed the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States and maintained that status have an unbroken record of not building nuclear weapons. In some regions, the fact that all neighbors are verifiably free of nuclear weapons reduces any pressure individual states might feel to build those weapons themselves, even if neighbors are known to have peaceful nuclear energy programs that might otherwise be suspicious. In this, the treaty works as designed.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN's nuclear regulatory body, has said that if they wanted to, forty countries could develop nuclear bombs.

History

See also: nuclear proliferation

The treaty was proposed by Ireland, and opened for signature in 1968, Finland was the first to sign. By 1992 all five then-declared nuclear powers had signed the treaty, and the treaty was renewed in 1995 (and followed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996). Several NPT signatories have given up nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs. South Africa undertook a nuclear weapons program, allegedly with the assistance of Israel, and may have conducted a nuclear test over the Atlantic, but has since renounced its nuclear program and signed the treaty in 1991 after destroying its small nuclear arsenal. Ukraine and several other former Soviet Republics destroyed or transferred to Russia the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union.

United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing

At the time the treaty was being negotiated, NATO had in place secret nuclear weapons sharing agreements whereby the United States provided nuclear weapons to be deployed by, and stored in, other NATO states. This would appear to be an act of proliferation violating Articles I and II of the treaty. The NATO states argued internally that the U.S. controlled the weapons in storage, and that no transfer of the weapons or control over them was intended "unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which the treaty would no longer be controlling", so there is no breach of the NPT. These agreements were disclosed to some of the states, including the Soviet Union, negotiating the treaty, but most of the states that signed the NPT in 1968 would not have known about these agreements and interpretations at that time [2].

As of 2005 the United States still provides about 180 tactical B61 nuclear bombs for use by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey under these NATO agreements [3]. Many states, and the Non-Aligned Movement, now argue this violates Articles I and II of the treaty, and are applying diplomatic pressure to terminate these agreements. They point out that the pilots and other staff of the "non-nuclear" NATO states practise handling and delivering the U.S. nuclear bombs, and non-U.S. warplanes have been adapted to deliver U.S. nuclear bombs which must have involved the transfer of some technical nuclear weapons information. NATO believes its "nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more fundamentally political" [4].

India, Pakistan, Israel

See also India and WMD, Pakistan and WMD, Israel and WMD

Three states - India, Pakistan, and Israel - have declined to sign the treaty. India and Pakistan are confirmed nuclear powers, and Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, although it is not known to have conducted tests (see List of countries with nuclear weapons). These countries argue that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, but the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid.

India and Pakistan have publicly announced possession of nuclear weapons and have detonated nuclear devices in tests, India having first done so in 1974 and Pakistan following suit in 1998 in response to another Indian test during a time of intense tensions regarding the disputed Kashmir region. India is estimated to have enough fissile material for more than 150 warheads. Pakistan reportedly has 60. The Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny possesion of nuclear weapons, although this is now regarded as an open secret after Israeli nuclear expert Mordechai Vanunu -- later abducted and jailed by Israel -- revealed the program to the British Sunday Times in 1986.

In early March of 2006, India and the United States finalized a controversial deal to provide India with US civil nuclear technology. Proponents of the deal note that India will now classify 14 of its 22 nuclear facilities as being for civilian use, and thus open to inspection. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director the IAEA at the time, welcomed the deal by calling India "an important partner in the non-proliferation regime". However, attempts made by Pakistan to sign a similar agreement have been thwarted by the U.S. as well as the international community. The argument put forth is that Pakistan lacks the same energy requirements, and that the track record of Pakistan as a nuclear proliferator makes it impossible for it to have any sort of nuclear deal in the near future. [5]

North Korea

See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction, Six-party talks

North Korea ratified the treaty, but withdrew from the treaty on January 10, 2003 following U.S. accusations that it had started an enriched uranium weapons program, and the U.S. stopping fuel oil shipments under the Agreed Framework which had resolved plutonium weapons issues in 1994 [6]. On February 10, 2005, North Korea publicly declared that it possessed nuclear weapons and pulled out of the six-party talks hosted by China to find a diplomatic solution to the issue. "We had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and have manufactured nuclear arms for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration's evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK," a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement said regarding the issue [7]. Six-party talks resumed in July 2005, but recessed on August 7 with no progress. The parties met again the week of August 29.

On September 19, 2005, North Korea announced that it would agree to a preliminary accord. Under the accord, North Korea would scrap all of its existing nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities, rejoin the NPT, and readmit IAEA inspectors. The difficult issue of the supply of light water reactors to replace North Korea's indigenous nuclear power plant program, as per the 1994 Agreed Framework, was left to be resolved in future discussions [8]. On the next day North Korea reiterated its known view that until it is supplied with a light water reactor it will not dismantle its nuclear arsenal or rejoin the NPT [9].

Iran

Main article: Iran's nuclear program

Iran is a signatory state of the NPT and has recently as of 2006 resumed development of its uranium enrichment program, obstensibly for its civilian nuclear energy program, as it is entitled to do under the terms of the NPT. It has been accused of reactivating this program to covertly develop an independent nuclear weapon program by the United States and European Union, in violation of the NPT. There has been some concern over the possibility of a nuclear armed Iranian state, with specific anxieties raised after controversial remarks made by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad about the state of Israel [10].Iran remains under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency, who have currently presented no evidence of a nuclear weapons program.

Some argue that Iran's extensive oil and gas reserves cast doubt on the economic viability of purely civilian nuclear power. [citation needed] However modern economic theory holds that the relevant consideration is the "opportunity cost" of oil. The argument is that by burning oil internally, Iran must forgo revenue that would have come from selling the oil. Under this analysis Iran faces essentially the same choice in its oil-use decisions as an oil importer.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on August 9, 2005. The full text of the fatwa was released in an official statement at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. [11]

See also: Iran and weapons of mass destruction

Leaving the Treaty

Article X allows a state to leave the treaty if "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country", giving three months' notice. The state is required to give reasons for leaving the NPT in this notice.

NATO states argue that when a state decides to go to war, the treaty no longer applies; effectively the state leaves the treaty with no notice. This is a necessary argument to support NATO nuclear weapons sharing policy, but a troubling one for the logic of the treaty. See United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing above.

Future

The inclusion of (civilian) nuclear power in the July 2005 Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate is politically sensitive, as India, which tested its first atomic bomb in 1974, refuses to sign the NPT. Prior to the announcement of the Asia-Pacific Partnership, on 18 July 2005, US President George W. Bush had met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and declared that he would work to change US law and international rules to permit trade in US civilian nuclear technology with India. [12] It is feared that in combination with US attempts to deny Iran (an NPT signatory) civilian nuclear technology, this would effectively destroy the NPT.[13]

Every five years, there is a Review Conference on the treaty. At the seventh Review Conference in May 2005, there were stark differences between the United States, which wanted the conference to focus on proliferation, especially on its allegations against Iran, and most other countries, who emphasized the lack of serious nuclear disarmament by the nuclear powers. The non-aligned countries reiterated their position that NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement violates the treaty.

Parties to the treaty

Notes:

  1. The Republic of China (Taiwan) was an original signatory of the NPT, but was effectively expelled from the UN in 1971. Though the UN no longer recognizes the ROC, the ROC states it will continue to abide by the treaty.
  2. through the Soviet Union.
  3. through Yugoslavia.
  4. through the Yemen Arab Republic and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

See also

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