Sino-Indian War
The Sino-Indian war was a short border war between India and the People's Republic of China (PRC), the world's two most populous countries, which took place in late 1962. It was triggered by a dispute over the Himalayan border in the Aksai Chin. The disputed area was strategic for China as it contained a major road between Tibet and Xinjiang.
Causes of the War
The border between British India and China had never been marked clearly. For reasons of security, Britain maintained a forward claim in the Himalayas, but administrative borders were further south. The main British claim was the McMahon Line which had been negotiated between British and Tibetan representatives. The PRC did not recognize this border, however, although it was held as the de facto border after the independence of both nations in the late 1940s. The PRC quickly annexed Tibet after a quick invasion in 1950. Tibets small army of 8 thousand was no match for the PRC's forty thousand troops. Dissent was broken brutally, the Buddhist religion was deemed anti revolutionary and the revered Tibetan religious leader Dalai Lama went into exile into India, narrowly escaping capture at the hands of the Chinese.
India and the PRC shared good relations through the 1950s, including the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, proposed by the prime ministers of the two countries in 1953. This was a facade for most of the time as the PRC regarded India as a creation of the United Kingdom and an artificial entity. India for its part was not keen to disturb the status quo- newly independent, it thought of the PRC as a kindred spirit which too had suffered under colonialism and was quick to dismiss the overt hostility emanating from Beijing as an aberration.
However, after the PRC established control over Tibet in 1950, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was forced to adopt a policy of forward military deployment in the border areas, after China repeatedly sent aggressive patrols scouting into Indian territory. China reacted angrily, disputing India's claims about border areas. For several years up to 1962, India and China both maintained forces in the disputed area. At times, each side accused the other of having moved troops into 'their' side of the border as each side tried to extend its line of actual control. A few skirmishes occurred during this time. China had been planning for a conflict for quite some time and brought into position, its Korean conflict hardened units and commanders. China also kept up the tempo of political rapprochment with India- to keep the Indian political establishment off balance.
As the frequency of Chinese incursions into the disputed area increased,the elected Indian Government could no longer deny the reality and in face of increasing public censure, convened a meeting on November 2, 1961 to formulate a response. In the exercise codenamed Operation ONKAR, India decided to move troops and establish patrol posts as far forward as possible, in some sectors even north of the McMahon line, in an effort to extrude the Chinese presence from all territory claimed by India.
This "Forward Policy" infuriated China, which regarded the territory as its own and gave Beijing the reason to begin the war it was prepared for.
Events in the War
Indian and Chinese units were in close contact throughout September; however, hostile fire was infrequent. On September 8, 1962, a 60-strong (misreported as 600) People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit surrounded one of the Indian forward posts at Dhola on the Thagla Ridge, three kilometers north of the McMahon line. Nehru was attending a Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference in London, and when told of the act, told the media the Army had been instructed to "free our territory." However, Nehru's directives to Defense Minister Krishna Menon were unclear, and the response, codenamed Operation LEGHORN, was slow to move. By the time an Indian battalion reached the Thagla Ridge on September 16, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River. The day after, India's Chief of the Army Staff Kaul ordered that Thagla Ridge be retaken.
On September 20, a firefight developed at one of the bridges on the river, killing nine Chinese and Indian soldiers.
On October 12, Nehru proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India claimed.
With this declaration, China decided it was time to put its plan to annex the Indian Northeast into motion1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two coordinated attacks 1000 kilometers apart in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namkachu river. After securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory, the Chinese made an offer to negotiate on October 24. The Indian government promptly rejected this offer, and tried to regroup during the lull in the fighting.
Indian resistance had been determined. The Indian deployment was spread over a large area. Logistics were difficult to maintain, since the road network was poor. Many Indian units required airlift for resupply. In addition, many deployments were at altitudes over 14,000 feet, which required special high-altitude equipment and conditioning. The Indian "jawans" (soldiers) were also not well supplied or trained for mountain combat. Despite these limitations, the Indians fought fiercely. Whilst some units were outflanked and defeated, others fought tenaciously and caused high chinese casualties. The Chinese persisted with their "human wave" attacks- wherein they would attack an isolated Indian outpost enmasse, after bringing down direct and indirect artillery fire. Despite the atrocious losses, the Chinese pushed on, keeping in tune with their strategy.
By November 18, the PLA had penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border. Due to logistical problems and to avoid a massive Indian couneroffensive, the PLA did not advance farther and on November 21 declared a unilateral cease-fire. This allowed the PLA to claim political victory whilst not having to face an Indian counteroffensive. They could terminate the conflict on their terms. The US, under Kennedy's orders, was non committal but did send in some supplies to India in November, 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities. The PLA withdrew to positions it occupied before the war and on which China had staked its diplomatic claim.
Results of the War
Defence Minister Menon resigned.
India's defeat in 1962 led to a revision of Indian military doctrine, training, organization and equipment. The Nehru government also decided to assimilate several territories that they saw as a source of espionage and resupply to potential enemies. In retrospect this defeat turned out to be a blessing in disguise. Nehru lost his clout in India and passed away in 1964 (the defeat gravely disrupted his Excellency's health).
Many Indians still regard the territorial acquisitions as an illegal occupation, and for this reason proposals to formalize the border at the line of actual control have proven impossible to implement. In fact, some Indians today still blame China for damaging it's international prestige as a result of this war. However, neither the Indian nor the PRC government appear very interested in disturbing the status quo, and the disputed boundary, called by Indians the Line of Actual Control or the McMahon Line is not considered a major flashpoint now. However, in the 1980s India began to actively patrol up to the LAC, causing a regional crisis.
Military commissions from India and China meet regularly in the capitals of both countries to discuss the status of the border.