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Invasion of Normandy

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Normandy Campaign
Part of World War II
A Navy LCVP disembarks troops at Omaha Beach.
A United States Navy LCVP disembarks troops at Omaha Beach
DateJune 6, 1944 – August 25, 1944
Location
Normandy, France
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Allied Powers Nazi Germany
Commanders and leaders
Dwight D. Eisenhower (Supreme Allied Commander)
Bernard Montgomery (land)
Bertram Ramsay (sea)
Trafford Leigh-Mallory (air)		 Gerd von Rundstedt (OB WEST)
Erwin Rommel (Heeresgruppe B)
Strength
326,000 (by June 11) Unknown
Casualties and losses
53,700 dead,
18,000 missing,
155,000 wounded		 About 200,000 dead, wounded and missing,
200,000 captured

The Battle of Normandy was fought in 1944 between the German forces occupying Western Europe and the invading Allied forces as part of the larger conflict of World War II. Over sixty years later, the Normandy invasion, codenamed Operation Overlord, still remains the largest seaborne invasion in history, involving almost three million troops crossing the English Channel from England to Normandy in then German-occupied France.

The majority of the Allied forces were composed of American, British, Canadian, and French units. Other countries including Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Poland also took a major part.

The Normandy invasion began with overnight airborne paratrooper and glider landings, massive air attacks and naval bombardments, and an early morning amphibious assault on June 6, "D-Day". The battle for Normandy continued for more than two months, with campaigns to establish, expand, and eventually break out of the Allied beachheads. It concluded with the liberation of Paris and the fall of the Falaise Pocket.

Prelude

Allied preparations

Invasion Training in England - Hitting the beach.
Training with live ammunition in England.
Eisenhower speaks with U.S. paratroops of the 502d PIR, 101st Airborne Division on the evening of June 5, 1944.

After the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), the Soviets had done the bulk of the fighting against Germany on the European mainland. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill had committed the United States and the United Kingdom to opening up a "second front" in Europe to aid in the Soviet advance on Germany, initially in 1942, and again in spring 1943.

The British under Churchill wished to avoid the costly frontal assaults of World War I. Churchill and the British staff favoured a course of allowing the insurgency work of the SOE to come to widespread fruition, while themselves making a main Allied thrust from the Mediterranean to Vienna and into Germany from the south. Such an approach was also believed to offer the advantage of creating a barrier to limit the Soviet advance into Europe. However, the U.S. believed from the onset that the optimum approach was the shortest route to Germany emanating from the strongest Allied power base. They were adamant in their view and made it clear that it was the only option they would support in the long term. Two preliminary proposals were drawn up: Operation Sledgehammer, for an invasion in 1942, and Operation Roundup, for a larger attack in 1943, which was adopted and became Operation Overlord, although it was delayed until 1944.

The planning process was started in earnest in March 1943 by British Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, who was nominated Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (or COSSAC for short). His plan was later adopted and refined starting in January 1944 by SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force), led by General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The short operating range of Allied fighters, including the British Spitfire and Hawker Typhoon, from UK airfields greatly limited the choices of amphibious landing sites. Geography reduced the choices further to two sites: the Pas de Calais and the Normandy coast. Because the Pas de Calais offered the shortest distance to the European mainland from the UK, the best landing beaches, and the most direct overland route to Germany, it was the most heavily fortified and defended landing site. Consequently, the Allies chose Normandy for the invasion.

In part because of lessons learned by Allied troops in the Dieppe raid of 19 Aug 1942, the Allies decided not to assault a French seaport directly in their first landings. Landings in force on a broad front in Normandy would permit simultaneous threats against the port of Cherbourg, coastal ports further west in Brittany, and an overland attack towards Paris and towards the border with Germany. Normandy was a less-defended coast and an unexpected but strategic jumping-off point, with the potential to confuse and scatter the German defending forces.

It was not until November 1943 [1] that General Dwight Eisenhower was named as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, effectively giving him overall charge of the Allied forces in Western Europe. In January 1944, General Sir Bernard Montgomery was named as operational commander for the invasion ground forces.

At that stage the COSSAC plan proposed a landing from the sea by three divisions, with two brigades landed by air. SHAEF quickly increased the scale of the initial attack to five divisions by sea and three by air, reflected in the plans for an additional assault at Utah Beach. In total, 47 divisions would be committed to the Battle of Normandy: 19 British, 5 Canadian and 1 Polish divisions under overall British command, and 21 American divisions with 1 Free French division, totalling 140,000 troops.

U.S. Soldiers march through a southern English coastal town, en route to board landing ships for the invasion of France.

About 6,900 vessels would be involved in the invasion under the command of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay (who had been directly involved in the North African and Italian landings), including 4,100 landing craft. 12,000 aircraft under Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory were to support the landings, including 1,000 transports to fly in the parachute troops. 10,000 tons of bombs would be dropped against the German defenses, and 14,000 attack sorties would be flown.

The objectives for the first 40 days were to:

  • create a lodgement that would include the cities of Caen and Cherbourg (especially Cherbourg, for its deep-water port);
  • break out from the lodgement to liberate Brittany and its Atlantic ports, and to advance to a line roughly 125 miles (190 km) to the southwest of Paris, from Le Havre through Le Mans to Tours.

The three-month objective was to control a zone bounded by the rivers Loire in the south and Seine in the northeast.

Deception

In the months leading up to the invasion, the Allies conducted a deception operation, Operation Bodyguard, designed to persuade the Germans that other points would be threatened as well as northern France (such as the Balkans and the south of France). Then, in the weeks leading up to the invasion, in order to persuade the Germans that the main invasion would really be coming to the Pas de Calais, as well as to lead them to expect an invasion of Norway, the Allies prepared a massive deception plan, called Operation Fortitude. Operation Fortitude North would lead the Axis to expect an attack on Norway; the much more vital Operation Fortitude South was designed to lead the Germans to expect the main invasion at the Pas de Calais, and to hold back forces to guard against this threat rather than rushing them to Normandy. An entirely fictitious First U.S. Army Group ("FUSAG"), supposedly supposedly located in southeastern England under the command of General Lesley J. McNair and General George S. Patton, was created in German minds by the use of double agents and fake radio traffic. The Germans had an extensive network of agents operating in England. Unfortunately for them, every single one had been "turned" by the Allies as part of the Double Cross System, and appropriate agents were dutifully sending back messages "confirming" the existence and location of FUSAG and the Pas de Calais as the likely main attack point. Dummy landing craft, constructed from scaffolding and canvas, were placed in ports on the eastern and southeastern coasts of Britain, and the Luftwaffe allowed to photograph them.

In aid of Operation Fortitude North, Operation Skye, was mounted from Scotland using radio traffic, designed to convince German traffic analysts that an invasion would be also mounted into Norway. Against this phantom threat, German troops that otherwise could have been moved into France were instead kept in Norway.

A smaller, but effective deception, Operation Titanic, was carried out by 6 SAS commandos. They were dropped with some 200 dummy paratroopers and sound effects equipment designed to confuse the enemy and take reinforcements away from the landings.

Special equipment

Some of the more unusual Allied preparations included armoured vehicles specially adapted for the assault. Developed under the leadership of Major-General Percy Hobart, these vehicles (called Hobart's Funnies) included "swimming" Duplex Drive Sherman tanks, mine-clearing tanks, bridge-laying tanks and road-laying tanks and the Armoured Vehicle, Royal Engineers (AVRE) - equipped with a large calibre mortar for destroying concrete emplacements. Some prior testing of these vehicles had been undertaken at Kirkham Priory in Yorkshire, England. The majority would be operated by small teams of the 79th Armoured Division attached to the various formations.

The invasion plan also called for the construction of two artificial Mulberry Harbours in order to get vital supplies to the invading forces in the first few weeks of the battle in the absence of deep-water ports, and Operation PLUTO (Pipe Line Under The Ocean), a series of submarine pipes that would deliver fuel from Britain to the invading forces.

Rehearsals and security

Allied forces rehearsed their roles for D-Day months before the invasion. On April 28, 1944, in south Devon on the English coast, 749 U.S. soldiers and sailors were killed when German torpedo boats surprised one of these landing exercises, Exercise Tiger.

The effectiveness of the deception operations was increased by a news blackout from Britain. Travel to and from the Irish Free State was banned, and movements within several miles of the coasts restricted. The German embassies and consulates abroad were flooded with all sorts of misleading information, in the well-founded hope that any genuine information on the landings would be ignored with all the confusing chaff.

In the weeks before the invasion it was noticed that the crossword of the British Daily Telegraph newspaper contained a surprisingly large number of words which were codewords relating to the invasion. MI5 first thought this was a coincidence; but when the word Mulberry was one of the crossword answers, MI5 then interviewed the compiler, a schoolmaster, but were convinced of his innocence. It was later revealed that the words were suggested by his pupils, and that they had heard nearby soldiers using them, without knowing what they meant.

There were several leaks on or before D-Day of which one is of interest. It involved General de Gaulle's radio message after D-Day. He, unlike all the other leaders, stated that this invasion was the real invasion. This had the potential to ruin the allied deceptions Fortitude North and Fortitude South. For example, Eisenhower referred to the landings as the initial invasion. The Germans did not believe de Gaulle and waited too long to move in extra units against the allies.

German preparations

File:Blaskowitz, Rommel, Rundstedt2.jpg
German commanders. Left to right: Colonel General Blaskowitz, Field Marshal Rommel, Field Marshal von Rundstedt

Through most of 1942 and 1943, the Germans had rightly regarded the possibility of a successful Allied invasion in the West as remote. Preparations to counter an invasion were limited to the construction by the Organisation Todt, of photographically impressive fortifications covering the major ports.

In late 1943, the obvious Allied buildup in Britain prompted the German Commander-in-Chief in the West, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, to request reinforcements. Most of his units were static garrison formations only, lacking transport and supporting services, and composed of men in low-grade physical categories (e.g. those who had lost fingers or toes to frostbite on the Eastern Front), or unwillingly conscripted Poles or other non-German nationalities.

In addition to fresh units, von Rundstedt also received a new subordinate, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. Rommel was originally intended only to make a tour of inspection of the Atlantic Wall. After reporting to Hitler, Rommel requested command of the defenders of northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands. These were organised as Army Group B in February 1944. (The German forces in southern France were designated as Army Group G, under General Johannes Blaskowitz).

Rommel had recognised that for all their propaganda value, the Atlantic Wall fortifications covered only the ports themselves. The beaches between were barely defended, and the Allies could land there and capture the ports from inland. He revitalised the defenders, who laboured to improve the defences of the entire coastline. Steel obstacles were laid at the high-water mark on the beaches, concrete bunkers and pillboxes constructed, low-lying areas flooded and booby-trapped stakes known as Rommelspargel (Rommel's asparagus) set up on likely landing grounds to deter airborne landings.

These works were not fully completed, especially in the vital Normandy sector, partly because Allied bombing of the French railway system interfered with the movement of the necessary materials, and also because the Germans were convinced by the Allied deception measures and their own preconceptions that the landings would take place in the Pas de Calais, and concentrated their efforts there.

Rommel's defensive measures were also frustrated by a dispute over armoured doctrine. In addition to his two army groups, von Rundstedt also commanded a headquarters known as Panzer Group West under General Freiherr Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg (usually referred to as von Geyr). This formation was nominally an administrative HQ for von Rundstedt's armoured and mobile formations, but it was to be renamed Fifth Panzer Army and brought into the line in Normandy. Von Geyr and Rommel disagreed over the deployment and use of the vital Panzer divisions.

Rommel recognised that the Allies would possess air superiority, and would be able to harass his movements from the air. He therefore proposed that the armoured formations be deployed close to the invasion beaches. In his words, it was better to have one Panzer division facing the invaders on the first day, than three Panzer divisions three days later when the allies would already have established a firm beachhead. Von Geyr argued for the standard doctrine that the Panzer formations should be concentrated in a central position around Paris and Rouen, and deployed en masse against the main Allied beachhead when this had been identified.

The argument went all the way up to Hitler, who characteristically imposed an unworkable compromise solution. Three Panzer divisions were given to Rommel, too few to cover all the threatened sectors, and three to von Geyr, not enough for a decisive intervention. (Four others were dispersed in Southern France and the Netherlands, under the tactical control of neither commander). Also, Hitler reserved to himself the authority to move most of these divisions, or commit them to action. On June 6, many Panzer division commanders were unable to move, as Hitler had not given the necessary authorisation.

The Allied invasion Plan

D-day assault routes into Normandy.

The order of battle was approximately as follows, east to west:

Large landing craft convoy crosses the English Channel on June 6, 1944.

Before the battle, the Allies had carefully mapped and tested the landing area, paying particular attention to weather conditions in the English Channel. A full moon was required both for light and for the spring tide. D-Day for the operation was originally set for June 5, 1944, but bad weather forced a postponement. The weather on June 6 was still marginal, but General Eisenhower chose not to wait for the next full moon. This decision helped catch the German forces off-guard, as they did not expect an attack in such conditions—so much so that, on June 4, Rommel returned to Germany for his wife's 50th birthday.

The 82nd Airborne had originally been tasked with dropping further west, in the middle part of the Cotentin, allowing the sea-landing forces to their east easier access across the peninsula, and preventing the Germans from reinforcing the north part of the peninsula. The plans were later changed to move them much closer to the beachhead, as at the last minute the 91 Luftlande Division was found to be in the area.

The Invasion Fleet was drawn from 8 different navies, comprising 6,939 vessels (1,213 warships, 4,126 transport vessels (landing ships and landing craft) and 1,600 support vessels which included a number of merchant vessels).

The overall commander of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, providing close protection and bombardment at the beaches, was Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay. The Allied Naval Expeditionary Force was divided into two Naval Task Forces: Western (Rear-Admiral Alan G Kirk) and Eastern (Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian).

The warships provided cover for the transports against the enemy whether in the form of surface warships, submarines or as an aerial attack and give support to the landings through shore bombardment. These ships included the Allied Task Force "O".

Full details of the naval participants in the landings are given at Operation Neptune.

Codenames

The Allies assigned codenames to the various operations involved in the invasion. Overlord was the name assigned to the establishment of a large-scale lodgement on the Continent. The first phase, the establishment of a secure foothold, was codenamed Neptune. According to the D-day museum [2]:

"The armed forces use codenames to refer to the planning and execution of specific military operations. Operation Overlord was the codename for the Allied invasion of northwest Europe. The assault phase of Operation Overlord was known as Operation Neptune. (...) Operation Neptune began on D-Day (6 June 1944) and ended on 30 June 1944. By this time, the Allies had established a firm foothold in Normandy. Operation Overlord also began on D-Day, and continued until Allied forces crossed the River Seine on 19 August 1944."
File:German coast artillery in the Pas-de-Calais area 02.jpg
German coast artillery in the Pas-de-Calais area, with laborers at work on casemate.
File:Beach defences 03.jpg
Mined stakes were part of the German defences on the Normandy beaches.

German defenses

The Germans had extensively fortified the foreshore area as part of their Atlantic Wall defences, causing the landings to be timed for low tide. It was guarded by four divisions, of which only one (352nd) was of high quality (in fact, the only quality was from a cadre of the 321st Division—the core of 352nd). The 352nd had many troops who had seen action on the eastern front and on the 6th, had been carrying out anti-invasion exercises. The other defending troops included Germans who, usually for medical reasons, were not considered fit for active duty on the Eastern Front, and various other nationalities such as Soviet prisoners of war from the southern USSR who had agreed to fight for the Germans rather than endure the harsh conditions of German POW camps.

German defenses located in the Allies' planned landing areas consisted of four divisional areas or responsibility, with reserves also deployed in these areas.

Divisional Areas

Adjacent Divisional Areas

Other divisions occupied the areas around the landing zones, including:

Mobile Reserves

The 21st Panzer Division (Generalmajor Edgar Feuchtinger) was deployed near Caen as a mobile striking force, and the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend (Brigadeführer Fritz de Witt) was stationed to the southeast. Its officers and NCOs were long-serving veterans, but the junior soldiers had all been recruited directly from the Hitler Youth movement at the age of sixteen in 1943, and it was to acquire a reputation for ferocity and war crimes in the coming battle. Some of the area behind Utah beach had been flooded by the Germans as a precaution against parachute assault.

The landings

Pathfinders synchronising their watches in front of an Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle.

The French Resistance

The various factions and circuits of the French Resistance were included in the plan for Overlord. Groups were tasked with attacking railway lines, ambushing roads or destroying telephone exchanges or electricity sub-stations. They were to be alerted to carry out these tasks by means of the messages personelles, transmitted by the BBC in its French service from London. Several hundreds of these were regularly transmitted, masking the few of them that were really significant.

One famous pair of these messages is often mistakenly stated to be a general call to arms by the Resistance. A few days before D-Day, the first line of Verlaine's poem, "Chanson d'Automne", was transmitted. "Les sanglots lourdes des violons de l'automne" [1] (Long sobs of autumn violins) alerted resistants in the Orléans region to attack rail targets within the next few days. The second line, "Bercent mon coeur d'une langueur monotone" (wound my heart with a monotonous langour), transmitted late on June 5, meant that the attack was to be mounted immediately.

The German intelligence service (the Abwehr) had discovered the meaning of this particular pair of messages. They rightly interpreted them to mean that invasion was imminent or underway. On hearing the second part, they alerted their superiors, and all Army commanders in France. Unfortunately for them, they had issued a similar warning a month before, when the Allies had begun invasion preparations and alerted the Resistance, but then stood down because of a forecast of bad weather. The Abwehr having given this false alarm, their genuine alarm was ignored or treated as merely routine.

In addition to the tasks given to the Resistance as part of the invasion effort, the Special Operations Executive planned to reinforce the Resistance with three-man liaison parties, under Operation Jedburgh. The Jedburgh parties would coordinate and arrange supply drops to the Maquis groups in the German rear areas. Also operating far behind German lines and frequently working closely with the Resistance, although not under SOE, were larger parties from the British, French and Belgian units of the Special Air Service brigade.

Airborne landings

The airborne landings were intended to secure the flanks of the assault area.

British landings

The British 6th Airborne Division was the first full unit to go into action, at sixteen minutes past midnight, in Operation Tonga. One set of objectives was Pegasus Bridge and other bridges on the rivers at the east flank of the landing area. The bridges were very quickly captured by glider forces and held until relieved by the Commandos later on D-Day. Another objective was a large gun battery at Merville. Although this larger glider and paratroop force was widely scattered, the battery was destroyed. However, the diminished assault team suffered 50% casualties in the attack.

American landings

The 82nd (Operation Detroit) and 101st Airborne (Operation Chicago) were less fortunate in quickly completing their main objectives. Partly owing to unmarked landing zones, radio silence, poor weather and difficult terrain, many units were widely scattered and unable to rally. Efforts of the early wave of pathfinder teams to mark the landing zones were largely ineffective. Some paratroopers drowned when they landed in the sea or in deliberately flooded areas. After 24 hours, only 2,500 of the 6,000 men in 101st had assembled. Many continued to roam and fight behind enemy lines for days. The 82nd occupied the town of Sainte-Mère-Église early in the morning of June 6, giving it the claim of the first town liberated in the invasion.

Sword Beach

Main article: Sword Beach
German defense at Ouistreham , August 2005

On Sword Beach, the regular British infantry got ashore with light casualties. They had advanced about five miles (8 km) by the end of the day but failed to make some of the deliberately ambitious targets set by Montgomery. In particular, Caen, a major objective, was still in German hands by the end of D-Day.

1 Special Service Brigade, under the command of Brigadier The Lord Lovat DSO and MC, went ashore in the second wave led by No.4 Commando with the two French Troops first, as agreed amongst themselves. The 1 Special Service Brigade's landing is famous due to it being lead by Piper Bill Millin. The British and French of No.4 Commando had separate targets in Ouistreham: the French a blockhouse and the Casino, and the British two batteries which overlooked the beach. The blockhouse proved too strong for the Commando's PIAT (Projector Infantry Anti Tank) weapons, but the Casino was taken with the aid of a Centaur tank. The British Commandos achieved both battery objectives only to find the gun mounts empty and the guns removed. Leaving the mopping-up procedure to the infantry, the Commandos withdrew from Ouistreham to join the other members of 1st SAS Brigade (Nos.3, 6 and 45), in moving inland to join-up with the 6th Airborne.

Juno Beach

German defense at Juno Beach. Picture was taken in August 2005
Main article: Juno Beach

The Canadian forces that landed on Juno Beach faced 11 heavy batteries of 155 mm guns and 9 medium batteries of 75 mm guns, as well as machine-gun nests, pillboxes, other concrete fortifications, and a seawall twice the height of the one at Omaha Beach. The first wave suffered 50 percent casualties, the second highest of the five D-Day beachheads.

Personnel of Royal Canadian Navy Beach Commando "W" landing on Mike Beach, Juno sector of the Normandy beachhead. June 6th, 1944.

Despite the obstacles, within hours the Canadians were off the beach and beginning their advance inland. The 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) was the only Allied unit to meet its June 6 objectives, when it crossed the Caen–Bayeux highway over nine miles (15 km) inland.

By the end of D-Day, 15,000 Canadians had been successfully landed, and the 3rd Canadian Division had penetrated further into France than any other Allied force, despite having faced such strong resistance at the beachhead. The 21st Panzer division launched the first D-Day counterattack between Sword and Juno beaches, and the Canadians held against several stiff counterattacks by the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend on June 7 and 8.

Gold Beach

Main article: Gold Beach

At Gold Beach, the casualties were also quite heavy, partly because the swimming Sherman DD tanks were delayed, and the Germans had strongly fortified a village on the beach. However, the 50th Division overcame its difficulties and advanced almost to the outskirts of Bayeux by the end of the day. With the exception of the Canadians at Juno Beach, no division came closer to its objectives than the 50th.

No.47 (RM) Commando was the last British Commando unit to land and came ashore on Gold east of Le Hamel. Their task was to proceed inland then turn right (west) and make a ten-mile (16 km) march through enemy territory to attack the coastal harbour of Port en Bessin from the rear. This small port, on the British extreme right, was well sheltered in the chalk cliffs and significant in that it was to be a prime early harbour for supplies to be brought in including fuel by underwater pipe from tankers moored offshore.

Omaha Beach

File:Approaching-omaha.jpg
Troops in an LCVP landing craft approach Omaha beach June 6, 1944.
Main article: Omaha Beach

Omaha Beach was the bloodiest landing beach on D-Day. Elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and U.S. 29th Infantry Division faced the German 352nd Division, one of the best trained on the beaches. Allied intelligence said that the beachhead was commanded by the less trained 714th division. Troops were expecting an easy fight. Allied intelligence failed to realize that the 714th division had been replaced by the 352nd a few days before the invasion. As a result, the battle was hectic, and Americans had an extremely hard time capturing the beach head. Omaha was the most heavily fortified beach, and the pre-landing bombardment (from the Navy and Air Force) of the bunkers had proved to be ineffective. On the Eastern sector, 27 of the 32 DD tanks deployed never reached the beach. On the Western sector the DD's were landed directly on the beach, but suffered heavy losses due to German 88s defending the beach. The official record stated that "within 10 minutes of the ramps being lowered, the leading company had become inert, leaderless and almost incapable of action (mostly every officer and NCO had been killed or wounded ...). It had become a "struggle for survival and rescue". There were about 1,000 killed (and overall more than 3,000 casualties), most in the first few hours. Commanders considered abandoning the beachhead, but small units, often forming ad hoc groups, eventually took the beach and pressed inland.

Pointe du Hoc

Main article: Pointe du Hoc

The massive, concrete cliff-top gun emplacement at Pointe du Hoc was the target of the U.S. 2nd Ranger battalion. The task was to scale the 100 foot (30 metre) cliffs under enemy fire with ropes and ladders, and then attack and destroy the guns, which were thought to command the Omaha and Utah landing areas. On capturing the emplacements the guns were found to have been moved.

Utah Beach

Main article: Utah Beach

Casualties on Utah Beach, the westernmost landing zone, were 197 out of around 23,000 landed, the lightest of any beach. Relatively little German opposition was encountered. The U.S. 4th Infantry Division was able to press inland relatively easily over beach exits that had been seized from the inland side by the 502nd and 506th Parachute Infantry Regiments of the 101st Airborne Division. This was partially by accident, as their planned landing was further down the beach. By early afternoon the 4th Infantry Division had succeeded in linking up with elements of the 101st. American casualties were light, and the troops were able to press inward much faster than expected, making it an almost complete success.

After the landings

File:NormandySupply.jpeg
Landing supplies at Normandy.
How the beachheads were supplied on D-Day. Photo taken 6 June 1944 by Steck SC190631 public domain.
The build-up of Omaha Beach: reinforcements of men and equipment moving inland.

Once the beachhead was established, two artificial Mulberry Harbours were towed across the English Channel in segments and made operational around D+3. One was constructed at Arromanches by British forces, the other at Omaha Beach by American forces. The Omaha harbour was destroyed in severe storms around D+13. Around 9,000 tons of material was landed daily at the Arromanches harbour until the end of August 1944, by which time the port of Cherbourg had been secured by the Allies, and had begun to return to service.

The German defenders positioned on the beaches put up relatively light resistance, being ill-trained and short on transport and equipment, and having been subject to a week of intense bombardment. An exception was the 352nd Infantry division, moved earlier by Rommel from St. Lo, which defended Omaha beach. The tenacity of the 352nd's defence, and perhaps also the indication by Allied intelligence that there would be only two 2 battalions of the 716th Division there, was responsible for Omaha's high casualty rate. Other German commanders took several hours to be sure that the reports they were receiving indicated a landing in force, rather than a series of raids. Their communication difficulties were made worse by the absence of several key commanders. The scattering of the American parachutists also added to the confusion, as reports were coming in of Allied troops all over northern Normandy.

Despite this the 21st Panzer division mounted a concerted counterattack, between Sword and Juno beaches, and succeeded in reaching the sea. Stiff resistance by anti-tank gunners, and fear lest they be cut off, caused them to withdraw before the end of 6 June. According to some reports the sighting of a wave of airborne troops flying over them was instrumental in the decision to retreat. The Allied invasion plans had called for the capture of Carentan, St. Lo, Caen and Bayeux on the first day, with all the beaches linked except Utah, and Sword (the last linked with paratroopers) and a front line six to ten miles (10 to 16 km) from the beaches. In practice none of these had been achieved. However, overall the casualties had not been as heavy as some had feared (around 10,000 compared to the 20,000 Churchill feared), and the bridgeheads had withstood the expected counterattacks.

Priorities in the days following the landing for the Allies were: to link the bridgeheads; to take Caen; and to capture the port of Cherbourg to provide a secure supply line.

The German 12th SS (Hitler Youth) Panzer division assaulted the Canadians on June 7 and June 8, and inflicted heavy losses, but were unable to break through. Meanwhile, the beaches were being linked—Sword on June 7, Omaha June 10, Utah by June 13. The Allies were actually reinforcing the front faster than the Germans. Although the Allies had to land everything on the beaches, Allied air superiority and the destruction of the French rail system made every German troop movement slow and dangerous.

The country behind Utah and Omaha beaches was characterised by bocage; ancient banks and hedgerows, up to three metres thick, spread one to two hundred metres apart, and so both being impervious to tanks, gunfire, and vision, and making ideal defensive positions. The U.S. infantry made slow progress, and suffered heavy casualties, as they pressed towards Cherbourg. The elite airborne troops were called on again and again to restart a stalled advance. Hitler expected the Cherbourg garrison to resist to the end, and deny the port to the Allies, but the Cherbourg commander surrendered on June 26, after destroying most of the facilities, making the harbor inoperable for a few months.

Rightly believing Caen to be the "crucible" of the battle, Montgomery made it the target of three separate attacks from June 7 to July 1, before it was bombed on and attacked on July 7 in Operation Charnwood. Seeking a decisive breakout into the open country that led to Paris, Montgomery launched a breakthrough attempt at Villers-Bocage on June 13; later between July 18 and July 20 Montgomery launched a major offensive from the Caen area with all three British armoured divisions, codenamed Operation Goodwood. Poorly planned, it was eventually stopped by determined and improvised resistance from the 1st and 12th Panzer divisions, heavy flak units, and the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division. The British tank casualties were very high; yet the German reserves remained committed holding the eastern (British) sector, and could not be used to combat the American Operation Cobra, launched on July 24. Cobra succeeded beyond expectations, and the advance guard of the U.S. VIII Corps rolled into Coutances at the western end of the Cotentin Peninsula, on July 28, penetrating the German line for the rest of Lieutenant General George S. Patton's U.S. Third Army to advance through into northwestern France.

On the front of the Commonwealth, several more attempts after Goodwood were launched against prepared German defences; Operation Spring was a Canadian assault on the Verrierres Ridge launched on 25 July, which met with only limited success and extremely heavy casualties. Both German and Allied divisions were brought in to reinforce this small area, and at the start of August a second Army headquarters became operational, as First Canadian Army took over responsibility for part of the bridgehead. Additional armoured units like the 1st Polish Armoured Division and the 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division were also put into the line. Operation Totalise was launched on 6 August 1944 and again, made limited gains at great cost in lives and equipment. The bulk of German resistance in the region was finally eliminated on August 21, with the successful closure of the Falaise Gap by Canadian, Polish, and US troops. The First Canadian Army and 2nd British Army both advanced to the line of the Seine, bringing the war in Normandy in their sector to a close, and meeting the projected schedule set by SHAEF with time to spare.

Between the Americans of Patton's now-rampaging 3rd Army, which had activated on 1 August 1944, and the Commonwealth were the Free French, eager to liberate their capital. The clandestine French Resistance in Paris started the ball rolling when they rose against the Germans on 19 August; and the French 2nd Armored Division under General Jacques Leclerc, along with the US 4th Infantry Division pressing forward from Normandy, received the surrender of the German forces there and liberated Paris on August 25.

Chronology

Political considerations

The Normandy landings were long foreshadowed by a considerable amount of political maneuvering amongst the Allies. There was much disagreement about timing, appointments of command, and where exactly the landings were to take place. The opening of a second front had been long postponed and a particular source of strain between the Allies. Stalin had been pressing the Western Allies to launch a "second front" since 1942, but Churchill had argued for delay until victory could be assured, preferring to attack Italy and North Africa first.

The appointment of Bernard Montgomery was questioned by some Americans, who would have preferred the urbane Harold Alexander to have commanded the land forces. Montgomery, in turn, had doubts about the appointment of Dwight D. Eisenhower. In the event, however, Montgomery and Eisenhower cooperated to excellent effect in Normandy: their well-known disagreements came much later.

Normandy presented serious logistical problems, not the least of which being that the only viable port in the area, Cherbourg, was heavily defended and many among the higher echelons of command argued that the Pas de Calais would make a more suitable landing area on these grounds alone.

Campaign Close

Normandy Campaign Streamer

The campaign in Normandy is considered by historians to end either at midnight on 24/25 July 1944 (the start of Operation Cobra on the American front) or 25 August 1944 (the advance to the Seine). The original Overlord plan anticipated a ninety day campaign in Normandy with the ultimate goal of reaching the Seine; this goal was met with time to spare. The Americans were able to end the campaign on their front early with the massive breakout of Operation Cobra.

The US official history describes the fighting beginning on 25 July as the "Northern France" campaign, and includes the fighting to close the Falaise Gap which the British/Canadians/Poles still considered to be part of the Battle of Normandy.

Aftermath and strategic appraisal

Normandy American Cemetery (at Omaha Beach)

Although the Normandy landings were costly in terms of men, the defeat inflicted on the Germans was one of the largest of the war. Strategically, the campaign led to the loss of the German position in most of France and the secure establishment of a major new front. By September, Allied forces of seven field armies (two of which came through southern France in Operation Dragoon) were approaching the German frontier.

The British 3rd Division's failure to take Caen on D-Day was to have repercussions for over a month, seriously delaying any forward progress. The fortuitous capture of Villers-Bocage followed by the failure to reinforce it, and its subsequent recapture by the Germans, also hampered attempts to extend the Caen bridgehead and push on. By D+11, June 17, forward momentum had stagnated.

Lack of forward progress is often attributed to the nature of the terrain in which much of the post-landing fighting in the US and parts of the British sectors took place, the bocage. These were small farm fields separated by high earth banks covered in dense shrubbery, which were well suited for the defence.

Victory in Normandy was followed by a pursuit to the French border in short order, and Germany was forced once again to reinforce the Western Front with manpower and resources from the Soviet and Italian fronts.

Assessment of the battle

The Allies were victorious in Normandy due to several factors. The Allies ensured material superiority at the critical point (concentration of force) and logistical innovations like the PLUTO pipelines and Mulberry harbors enhanced the flow of troops, equipment, and essentials such as fuel and ammunition. Movement of cargo over the open beaches exceeded Allied planners' expectations, even after the destruction of the US Mulberry in the channel storm in mid-June. By the end of July 1944, 1 million American, British, Canadian, French and Polish troops, hundreds of thousands of vehicles, and adequate supplies in most categories were ashore in Normandy. Although there was a shortage of artillery ammunition, at no time were the Allies critically short of any necessity. This was a remarkable achievement considering they did not hold a port until Cherbourg fell.

Allied Intelligence and counterintelligence efforts were successful beyond expectations. The Operation Fortitude deception plan before the invasion kept German attention focused on the Pas-de-Calais, and indeed high-quality German forces were kept in this area, away from Normandy, until July. Prior to the invasion, few German reconnaissance flights took place over Britain, and those that did saw only the dummy staging areas. Ultra decrypts of German communications had been helpful as well, exposing German dispositions and revealing their plans such as the Mortain counterattack.

Allied air operations also contributed significantly to the invasion, via close tactical support, interdiction of German lines of communication (preventing movement of supplies and reinforcements- particularly the critical Panzer units), and rendering the Luftwaffe as practically useless in Normandy. German naval units were largely ineffective.

Despite initial heavy losses in the assault phase, Allied morale remained high. Casualty rates among all the armies were tremendous, and the Commonwealth forces had to create a new category - Double Intense - to be able to describe them. Manpower problems would plague the Allies for the remainder of the war. Britain disbanded an entire division (the 59th) in Normandy, and Canada would bring about conscription for overseas service in November 1944 due to the losses in Normandy and later operations in the Low Countries.

Faulty German dispositions and decisions also contributed to Allied victory. German commanders at all levels failed to react to the assault phase in a timely manner. Communications problems exacerbated the difficulties caused by Allied air and naval firepower; local commanders also seemed unequal to the task of fighting an aggressive defence on the beach, as Rommel envisioned. For example, the commander of the German 352nd Infantry Division failed to capitalize on American difficulty at Omaha, committing his reserves elsewhere when they might have been more profitably used against the American beachhead.

At German Headquarters, the high command remained fatally fixed on the Calais area, and von Rundstedt was not permitted to commit the armored reserve. When it was finally released late in the day, success was immeaurably more difficult, and even the 21st Panzer Division, which was able to counterattack a bit earlier, was stymied by strong oppositon that had been allowed to build at the beaches. Still, to their credit, the Germans generally fought with their customary energy and skill, despite uneven performance by some units. The Panzer units faced withering air interdiction that reduced their effectiveness, yet they offered glimpses of what might have been possible in way of counterattack, had additional mobile forces like the 12 Waffen-SS Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehr been committed earlier into the battle. Despite local Allied material superiority, the Germans kept the Allies bottled up for nearly two months, before the dam broke.

Much has been written about the Allied delay at taking Caen as the battle developed. Pre-invasion schedules were not always fulfilled as planned. Nevertheless it must be admitted that the Land Forces Commander, British General Bernard Montgomery maintained mastery of the developing battle. His concept that Caen would be a "pivot" was accurate, and as the battle of Normandy developed, the British forces faced the bulk of German armor in the theatre. While US forces faced fewer German armored divisions, their own armor was severely limited by both the close in terrain of the bocage, and the large number and variety of German anti-tank weapons deployed all along the front. The open terrain on the British front on the eastern flank left the Germans little choice but to concentrate their armor there. Eventually this played into Allied hands when the breakout took place, not in the east as planned, but in the west in Operation Cobra.

Normandy and the Eastern front

The lodgement established at Normandy was vital for the Allies to bring pressure on German armies in western Europe. The Normandy invasion in France diverted German resources and attention from the Eastern Front and thereby aided the Soviets materially, as did American Lend Lease supplies in the areas of transportation and foodstuffs. The Germans had long expected an Allied invasion of France and had been required to garrison the country as well as divert manpower and materials to coastal fortifications along many hundreds of miles of shore. Hitler's thinking is documented in his Führer Directive 51, of November 1943, which stressed that the Western approaches to the Reich were to be strengthened even at the expense of those in the East. In addition, Hitler was anxious to hold on to the Belgian and northern French coasts as bases for the "V" weapons to be launched against England.

Hitler maintained his "West first" focus after the landings in Normandy and all efforts were made to contain Allied forces within the lodgement area; in fact as the fighting in Normandy increased in tempo, Hitler accepted the annihilation of an entire German Army Group on the Russian front. Hitler would continue to redeploy desperately needed units from the East against the Western Allies, with this practice peaking in December 1944 in the Ardennes Offensive.

Success on D-Day was critical. Had the Invasion of Normandy failed, Hitler would have deployed more forces to the Eastern Front, conveivably preventing or even turning back future Soviet advances into Belorussia, Poland, and the Balkans. Alternatively, Stalin, fearing the full brunt of Hitler's armies, might have settled for a cease-fire and a return to pre-war borders.

War memorials and tourism

The visitor to Normandy today will find many reminders of June 6, 1944. Most noticeable are the beaches, which are still referred to on maps and signposts by their invasion codenames. Then come the vast cemeteries, row upon row of identical white crosses and Stars of David, immaculately kept, commemorating the American dead, Commonwealth graves are standard white headstones engraved with the persons religious symbol, and their unit insignia. Streets near the beaches are still named after the units that fought there, and occasional markers commemorate notable incidents. At significant points, such as Pointe du Hoc and Pegasus Bridge, there are plaques, memorials or small museums. The Mulberry harbour still sits in the sea at Arromanches. In Sainte-Mère-Église, a dummy paratrooper hangs from the church spire. On Juno Beach, the Canadian government has built the Juno Beach Information Centre, commemorating one of the most significant events in Canadian military history. In Caen is a large Museum for Peace, which is dedicated to peace generally, rather than to the battle itself. The people of Normandy will continue to remember Operation Overlord long into the future.

Every year on June 6, American cartoonist and World War II veteran Charles M. Schulz (1922–2000) reserved his Peanuts comic strip to memorialise his comrades who fell at Normandy.

Notes

  1. ^ Verlaine originally wrote, "Les sanglots longues", and "Blessent mon coeur". For some unknown reason, the BBC replaced them with slightly different words.

Documentaries

  • Morning: Normandy Invasion (June–August 1944), episode 17 of the famous 1974 ITV series The World at War features an extensive coverage of the Allied preparations and the actual events
  • D-Day: The Lost Evidence 100 minute 2004 "History Channel" documentary that relies on Allied reconniaissance photos, computer graphics, reenactments, and the first-hand eye witness accounts of combatants, (Allies and Germans), who were there.
  • Battlefield-The Battle for Normandy, 100 minute 2001 documentary that compares Allied and German commanders, personnel,equipment, and tactics before, durning, and after the June-August battle.

Dramatizations

Films
TV
Video games
Wargames

See also

Break Out From the Hedgerows: A Lesson in Ingenuity

Sources

  • The Longest Day, Cornelius Ryan, Simon & Schuster 2nd ed., 1959, ISBN 0671208144
  • D-Day, Warren Tute, John Costello, Terry Hughes, Pan Books Ltd, 1975
  • Normandy 1944, Allied Landings and Breakout; Osprey Campaign Series #1; Stephen Badsey, Osprey Publishing, 1990
  • D-Day: The Invasion of Normandy, June 6, 1944, Michael J. Varhola, Savas, 2001.
  • Operation Cobra 1944, Breakout from Normandy; Osprey Campaign Series #88; Steven J. Zaloga, Osprey Publishing, 2001
  • D-Day 1944 (3), Sword Beach & the British Airborne Landings; Osprey Campaign Series #105; Ken Ford, Osprey Publishing, 2002
  • D-Day 1944 (4), Gold & Juno Beaches; Osprey Campaign Series #112; Ken Ford, Osprey Publishing, 2002
  • D-Day 1944 (1), Omaha Beach; Osprey Campaign Series #100, Steven J. Zaloga, Osprey Publishing, 2003
  • D-Day 1944 (2), Utah Beach & the US Airborne Landings; Osprey Campaign Series #104, Steven J. Zaloga, Osprey Publishing, 2004
  • Morning: Normandy Invasion (June–August 1944), episode 17 of BBC series The World at War (1974)

Bibliography

Written in part by Christopher Daniel McDevitt.

Further reading

  • Those who wish to study the Normandy Campaign in more detail will find a number of volumes in the U.S. Army in World War II series, produced by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, particularly useful. Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel-Attack (1951), remains a basic source, but a number of other studies bear heavily upon the operation. They include:
  1. Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy (1968);
  2. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (1961);
  3. Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (1954);
  4. Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies (1953); and
  5. Graham A. Cosmas and Albert E. Cowdrey, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations (1992).
  • The Historical Division of the War Department produced three volumes on the event. All have been reprinted by the Center of Military History. Classified as the American Forces in Action series, they are:
  1. OMAHA Beachhead (6 June-13 June 1944) (1989);
  2. UTAH Beach to Cherbourg (1990); and
  3. St. Lo (7 July-19 July 1944) (1984).
  • A number of abbreviated summaries have been written. Among the most useful are:
  1. Charles MacDonald, The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War II (1969); and
  2. Charles MacDonald and Martin Blumenson, "Recovery of France," in Vincent J. Esposito, ed., A Concise History of World War II (1965).
  • Memoirs by Allied commanders contain considerable information. Among the best are:
  1. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (1951);
  2. Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (1983);
  3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (1948);
  4. Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic (1948); and
  5. Sir Frederick Edgeworth Morgan, Overture to Overlord (1950).
  • Almost as useful are biographies of leading commanders. Among the most prominent are:
  1. Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1970), and Eisenhower, Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952 (1983);
  2. Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years, 1942-1944 (1983); and
  3. Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe, 1943-1945: Success or Failure (1984).
  • A number of general histories also exist, many centering on the controversies that continue to surround the campaign and its commanders. See, in particular:
  1. John Colby, War From the Ground Up: The 90th Division in World War II (1989);
  2. Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign (1983);
  3. Max Hastings, Overlord, D-Day, June 6, 1944 (1984);
  4. John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris (1982);
  5. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-45 (1981); and
  6. Stephen T. Powers, "Battle of Normandy: The Lingering Controversy," Journal of Military History 56 (1992):455-71.
  • Journalists were among the foremost observers of the invasion. Two studies of their work that stand out are:
  1. Barney Oldfield, Never a Shot in Anger (1956); and
  2. Richard Collier, Fighting Words: The Correspondents of World War II (1989). CMH Pub 72-18

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