USS Liberty incident
Facts about the ship herself can be found in the article USS Liberty (AGTR-5).
USS Liberty was an American intelligence ship which was attacked in international waters near the Sinai Peninsula, north of El Arish, by Israeli fighter planes and torpedo boats on June 8, 1967 during the Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab States. In all, 34 American servicemen were killed and 172 wounded in the attack.
Israel maintains, and the US government has formally accepted, that the incident was entirely due to error. Israel contends it was assured by the United States that no US ships were in the area, and that its air and naval forces wrongly identified the Liberty at various stages as a Russian intelligence ship providing information to the Arabs or as the Egyptian vessel "El Quseir," which is a horse carrier one-fourth the size of the Liberty.
The United States and Israel exchanged diplomatic notes after several inquiries, and the US accepted an indemnity of $13 million.
Surviving crew members, as well as a number of Western observers and former US government officials (including then CIA director Richard Helms), assert that the attack was premeditated and deliberate and that Israel knew the ship was American.
This incident stands as the only peacetime attack on a US naval vessel not investigated by Congress [1]. The survivors want a full Congressional hearing; they hold that a proper investigation has never taken place and that all previous reports are incomplete, mention the incident in passing, and are intended to exonerate Israel. Among the theories presented as to why Israel carried out this action is that Israel may have been trying to get the US involved in the conflict on Israel's side, by convincing the US that Egypt was the aggressor.
Background
USS Liberty (AGTR-5) was originally the 7725-ton civilian cargo ship Simmons Victory. She was acquired by the United States Navy, converted to an auxiliary technical research ship, and began her first deployment in 1965, to waters off the west coast of Africa. She carried out several more operations during the next two years. During the Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab nations, she was sent to collect electronic intelligence in the eastern Mediterranean.
During the day preceding the attack, the ship was flown over by several aircraft. Their exact number and type is disputed; some of them are said to be Nord Noratlas "boxcars", a photograph presents a C-47 Dakota and yet other reports speak about Mirage III jet fighters. At least some of those fly-bys were from a close range. Many Liberty crewmen have proffered testimony that one of the aircraft flew so close to Liberty that her propellers rattled the deck plating of the ship and her pilots waved to the crew of the Liberty and her crewmen waved back.
The ship left the coast of Israel in the morning hours of June 8, 1967 and traveled westwards towards the coast of the Sinai Peninsula, where fighting was taking place. On the afternoon of that day the ship was steaming at about 5 knots (9 km/h) on the boundary of international and coastal waters approximately 13 miles (21 km) off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula near El-Arish. At about 2 p.m. the ship was attacked by several aircraft, most probably, a pair of Mirage IIIs carrying cannon and rockets and Dassault Mysteres carrying napalm.

About twenty minutes after the attack of the aircraft, the ship was approached by three torpedo boats bearing Israeli flags and identification signs. Initially, Captain McGonagle, who perceived that the torpedo boats "were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude," ordered a machine gun to engage the boats. After recognizing the Israeli standard and seeing apparent morse code signaling attempts by one of the boats (but being unable to see what was being sent, due to the smoke of the fire started by the earlier aircraft attack), McGonagle gave the order to hold fire. This order was apparently misunderstood in the confusion, and two heavy machine guns opened fire. Subsequently the Israeli boats opened fire and launched two torpedoes at Liberty (five, according to the 1982 IDF History Department report). One hit Liberty on the starboard side, forward of the superstructure, creating a great hole and resulting in the majority of the casualties for the incident.
After a while (see below for the disputed details), the boats withdrew from the area. They then returned with an offer of help; it was refused by the American ship. About three hours after the attack, an American representative was notified about it. He approached the ship on an Israeli helicopter, but he was neither able to land nor to establish communications with the crew, and so he flew back.
Though severely damaged, Liberty's crew kept her afloat, and she was able to leave the area under her own power. She was escorted to Malta by units of the US Sixth Fleet and was there given interim repairs. After these were completed in July 1967, Liberty returned to the United States. She was decommissioned in June 1968 and struck from the Naval Vessel Register. Liberty was transferred to MARAD in December 1970 and sold for scrap in 1973.
Facts in dispute
The events surrounding the attack, even very simple elements such as its duration, are a subject of fierce controversy. Among the disputed facts:
- Visibility of ensign: The most vehemently debated point is the visibility of the large American flag that the ship was flying; Americans claimed that it was visible in the wind. The Israeli pilots claimed that they were either unable to notice it altogether, or considered it an Egyptian diversion aimed to mislead the pursuers.
- Israeli aircraft markings: American survivors of the attack have made the claim that the Israeli aircraft were unmarked. Israel never responded to that claim specifically, although it is not certain to what extent the people on the ship would be able to notice markings (if present) on the aircraft. Everyday experience spotting low-flying jet aircraft indicates markings are next to impossible to be noted by the casual observer, even on solid ground and during a direct overflight; this difficulty would be likely to increase on a ship and in the rush of the attack.
- Jamming: An additional point on which Israel did not comment is the use of radio jamming. In the absence of reliable records, it is only left to speculate whether jamming (of Navy tactical and international maritime distress frequencies) did take place, or whether the deficiency in communications originated in the attack itself (i.e. loss of power and damage of antennas).
- Probability of identification: Americans claim the closer fly-bys should have been sufficient for identification. Israel acknowledged that the ship had been identified as American and neutral the previous day; however it claims that at 11 a.m., the ship moved out of the status board. An hour later, when explosions were heard in El-Arish, Israel claims to have re-acquired the ship without being aware that it was the same one that was flown over the day before.
- Effort for identification: The American crew claims that the attacking aircraft did not make identification runs over Liberty, but rather began to strafe immediately. One Israeli report claims several passes were made.
- Speed of the vessel: According to Israeli accounts, they made (admittedly erroneous) measurements that indicated that the ship was steaming at 30 knots (56 km/h), a speed typical of war vessels.
- Call for ID: Israel claims to have called the ship on radio several times without receiving an answer while the Americans deny ever receiving a call for identification.
- Visual communications: Joe Meadors, then the signalman on bridge, states that "Immediately prior to the torpedo attack I was on the Signal Bridge repeatedly sending 'USS Liberty US Navy Ship' by flashing light to the torpedo boats." However the Israeli boats claim to have read only the signal "AA", which was exactly the signal dispatched by the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim Al-Awal when it was engaged by the Israeli navy eleven years earlier. Meadors claims that he never sent "AA" (which would require him to identify himself as well); this disagreement may be settled by considering the fact that Liberty was unable to read signals sent from the boats.
- Israeli ships' actions after the torpedo hit: The American crew claims that after Liberty had been torpedoed, Israeli boats circled the ship shooting at descended (unmanned) life rafts and sailors on board the ship. Israelis claim that they suddenly recognized the ship as American almost immediately after it was hit and ceased fire. The former point of view was expressed by many of the crew members, while the latter one is reinforced by the statement the ship's captain had given to the Navy Court several days after the attack.
- Israeli offers of help: Reports differ regarding whether the Israeli boats offered help. The crew claims that the torpedo boats simply withdrew, while the captain and the Israeli crew report that help was offered; the captain stated had asked the Israeli boats to stay away by the means of signal flags.
- U.S. rescue attempts: It seems that at least two rescue attempts were launched from US aircraft carriers nearby; the reason why they did not reach their objective, as well as details of communications between US forces in the area and the While House, are generally unknown and only further complicate this enigmatic affair.
Subsequent inquiry
Three subsequent Israeli reports have all concluded that the attack was conducted because Liberty was confused with an Egyptian vessel and because of failures of communications between Israel and the US. The three Israeli commissions are:
- Ram Ron Investigation
- Israeli Examining Judges Investigation
- IDF History Department Investigation
On December 17, 1987, the issue was officially closed by the exchange of diplomatic notes between the US and Israel. Israel also eventually paid nearly US $13 million in compensation to the families of the victims.
Controversy
The Israeli government admitted that three crucial errors were made: the refreshing of the status board (nullifying the ship's classification as American), the erroneous identification of the ship as an Egyptian vessel, and the lack of notification from the returning aircraft informing Israeli headquarters of markings on the front of the hull (markings that would not be found on an Egyptian ship). As the general root of these problems, Israel blames the combination of alarm and tiredness experienced by the Israeli troops at that point of the war.
Israel denies any accusations that the attack was deliberate due to the following arguments:
- The attacking aircraft used napalm and machine guns, rather ineffective armament for attacking a ship.
- Liberty opened fire first on the gunboats.
- Due to the aircraft attack, Liberty was covered with smoke and was unable to conduct visual communications in any way.
- No adequate benefit has been put forward that the Israelis would derive from the attack on an American ship, especially considering the high cost of the predictable complications that must inevitably follow such an attack on a powerful ally.

At least some of the survivors of Liberty have often claimed that the attack was premeditated. In particular, Jim Ennes, a junior officer on Liberty's bridge at the time of the attack, has published a book titled "Assault on the Liberty". Like virtually all accounts of the "Liberty" incident, it has come under heavy criticism by those disagreeing with its point of view.
Ennes and Joe Meadors, another survivor of the attack, run a web site that was built "with support and encouragement from the USS Liberty Veterans Association." Meadors states that the classification of the attack as deliberate is the official policy of the association, to which all known survivors belong. Other survivors run several additional websites.
Several books and a BBC documentary try to prove that USS Liberty was attacked on purpose. They are backed in this position by some representatives of the US intelligence community. Critics claim that many of them include incorrect assumptions and use fuzzy reasoning. As examples, they bring the claim that the ship was attacked to prevent the U.S. from knowing about the forthcoming attack in the Golan Heights, and applying a quote describing the execution of 5 Palestinian guerillas wearing Egyptian uniforms (an act allowed under rules of war) to "prove" the mass murder of 150 Egyptians. However, other killings of Egyptian captives were also reported in mainstream media sources (e.g. TIME, Oct. 2 1995), including an incident in which Retired General Arieh Biro admitted shooting prisoners, and the discovery in the Sinai of mass graves containing about 90 civilians and soldiers. When evaluating the merits of this theory, one must balance Israel's need to keep a possible war crime secret, versus the probably more serious consequences of attacking an ally.
For years some people have claimed that audio tapes existed of the Israeli pilots identifying the ship as American before they attacked. There are other conspiracy claims that the Liberty radio compartment made such interceptions and that the U.S. submarine Amberjack had gathered damning evidence during the attack by means of its periscope.
On July 2, 2003, as a result of US Florida Judge Jay Cristol lawsuit using the Freedom of Information Act, the National Security Agency made two significant admissions: that there had been no radio intercepts made by USS Liberty, and that there had been no radio intercepts made by the US submarine [[USS Amberjack (SS-522)|Amberjack]. The National Security Agency released copies of the recordings it made from an EC-121 aircraft in the vicinity of the attacks during the time periods 2:30 p.m. Sinai time to 3:27 p.m. Sinai time. These tapes contain nothing to support the prior conspiracy claims and show that the helicopters were first dispatched to rescue Egyptians, and then demonstrate the confusion as to the identification of the target ship.
Cristol adds: "The tapes confirm that the helicopter pilot observed the flag at 3:12 p.m. This perfectly dove-tails with the audio tapes which the Israel Air Force released to Judge Cristol of the radio transmissions before, during and after the attack. The English translations of those tapes are published in Appendix 2, of Judge Cristol's book "The Liberty Incident". The NSA tapes are the last significant piece of evidence which remained classified until now. They clearly corroborates the Israeli Air Force tapes and support the decisions of ten official U.S. investigations and 3 or more official Israeli investigations, all of which concluded that the tragic event was a case of mistaken identity. [2]
Israeli officials and Jewish organizations world-wide have complained that these materials are often used as a pretext for anti-Semitic declarations and acts. They claim that these reviews often do not give Israel the benefit of the doubt, turning this extremely ambiguous history into a circus for Israel-bashing. Meadors and Ennes have denied an anti-Semitic pretext in their work, and express sharp disapproval at the use of the USS Liberty incident in anti-Semitic contexts.
Position of USS Liberty Veterans Association on the events of June 8th
Letter of position from the USS Liberty Veterans Association providing their view of the attack:
Without changing anything the author wrote in his account we feel a clarification is in order.
At a little after 2pm in the afternoon of June 8, 1967 the USS Liberty was attacked by at least three unmarked Israeli Mirage aircraft. Those aircraft used rockets, cannon and machine gun fire to target the ship's communications and defensive capabilities. Each of the ship's 4 gun tubs and each of the ship's antenna mounts sustained a direct hit by either rocket or cannon fire.
After the Mirages had finished their attack we were hit by slower Mystere aircraft armed with napalm.
The aircraft were followed closely by three torpedo boats who fired five torpedoes at the ship. One struck the ship on our starboard side killing 25 men. The torpedo boats then slowly circled the ship while firing from close range at Liberty crewmen who ventured topside to help their wounded shipmates.
Some have argued that napalm is ineffective when used against a ship. Combine napalm with the slow circling of the Liberty by Israeli torpedo boats as they fire upon Liberty crewmen and the Israeli refusal to offer immediate aid upon cessation of hostilities and some have concluded that the intent of the attackers was to leave no survivors. Indeed, that is what would have happened had their scenario been carried out to its completion.
And, let's not forget their use of helo-borne assault troops.
Let me spend some time addressing the above claim that "Subsequent ten American commissions of inquiry and three Israeli ones have all concluded that the attack was conducted because of USS Liberty being confused with an Egyptian vessel, and failures of communications between Israel and the US."
The legal counsel to the US Navy Court of Inquiry has said publicly that the Court of Inquiry was a sham whose conclusions were dictated by Washington.
The President of the Court of Inquiry and his legal counsel concluded that the attack was deliberate but reported falsely that it was a tragic accident because they were ordered by Washington to report falsely and "officers follow orders" said the Counsel to the Court.
That report can be found in the July 26 issue of Navy Times and in follow-up issues.
Washington directed that the Court conclude that the attack was a tragic accident, despite the fact that the Court determined that it was deliberate. So the Court of Inquiry was a sham.
Of the ten US investigations cited, only the fraudulent US Navy Court of Inquiry bothered to interview survivors. The others either did not look into deliberateness at all -- examining peripheral issues such as the adequacy of communications and of command and control -- or were merely reports to their bosses which summarized the results of the fraudulent Court of Inquiry Report. So nine of those ten investigations were poisoned fruit of the poisoned tree, which was the first investigation.
One has to ask why is there controversy in the first place? If the attack has been the subject of some 10 US investigations why are there any questions remaining outstanding at all? Surely all of the questions and alleged points of controversy are very basic and would be included in even a rudimentary investigation. Do you think, perhaps, if someone were to actually read the reports they claim were of the attack would find out that they weren't investigations of the attack at all?
An addition to the recommended reading list is A History of Israel by Ahron Bregman (ISBN 0333676319). The publisher tells readers that "There is a rare extract from a radio exchange between air control and Israeli pilots on the fourth day of the Six Day War, showing that the Israelis did realize that the ship they were bombing was the American USS Liberty, but still went on to attack it."
Joe Meadors
Vice President
USS Liberty Veterans Association
Email: [email protected]

See also
- compare Gulf of Tonkin incident
- compare Capture of USS Pueblo
External links
- The official website of the Veterans of USS Liberty
- Veteran of USS Liberty website
- Analysis of the USS Liberty Incident
- Transcript of the US Navy Court of Inquiry Report. It should be noted that this transcript has been edited by the Department of Defense prior to its being released to the public. Lt. Lloyd Painter's testimony regarding the deliberate machine gunning of the USS Liberty's life rafts by Israeli torpedo boat personnel was removed.
- Logs of the USS Liberty as reconstructed by the Navy Court
- Additional information released by the National Security Agency on July 2003, including audio recordings (mostly in Hebrew), their transcripts (in English), follow-up reports, and a report originally released in 1999.
- Pages devoted to USS Liberty Incident maintained by the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, including a collection of contemporaneous diplomatic documents and telegrams.
- Guardian review of a book by James Bamford that attempts to prove the attack was premeditated
- Critical review of the Bamford book at CAMERA
- Dead in the Water - a BBC documentary
- Criticism of a History Channel documentary on the Liberty Incident at CAMERA
- The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship, by A. Jay Cristol (ISBN 157488414X)
- Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship, by James M. Ennes, Jr. (ISBN 0972311602) Currently in its 9th printing.
- Casualty list of the USS Liberty
- El-Quseir, the official Israeli ID for the Liberty
- Possible strategic and political backgrounds by Eric Margolis, foreign correspondent for the Toronto Sun.
- The 'USS Liberty': Case Closed by Israeli historian Michael Oren
- Assault on Liberty Still Covered Up After 26 Years at Washington-Report
- Affidavit by Ward Boston, a counsel of the Navy's inquiry, that Johnson and McNamara ordered a conclusion of mistaken identity despite "overwhelming evidence to the contrary"
- Excerpt from Cockburn & St. Clair Politics of Antisemitism (Amazon)
- Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Israel Deliberately Attacked US Ship, originally appeared in Houston Chronicle, 09 Jan 2004
- San Diego Union-Tribune: Lifting the "fog of war"
- Naval Institute Proceedings: Friendless Fire?
- Autobiography of Richard Helms (ISBN 037550012X), CIA director at the time of the incident, expresses opinion that the attack was deliberate.
- Marine Corps Times, July 1 2002 quotes CIA ex-director Richard Helms that attack was not accidental. Helms declines to elaborate further.