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Battles of Khalkhin Gol

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Battle of Khalkhin Gol
Part of the Soviet-Japanese Border War

Soviet armoured vehicle during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol
Date11 May - 16 September, 1939
Location
Khalkhin Gol, Mongolia
Result Decisive Soviet victory
Territorial
changes		 status quo ante bellum
Belligerents
Soviet Red Army Imperial Japanese Army
Commanders and leaders
Georgy Zhukov Michitaro Komatsubara
Strength
57,000 30,000
Casualties and losses
6,831 killed, 15,952 wounded 8,440 killed, 8,766 wounded

The Battle of Khalkhin Gol, sometimes spelled Halhin Gol or Khalkin Gol and known in Japan as the Nomonhan Incident (after a nearby village on the border between Mongolia and Manchuria), was the decisive engagement of the undeclared Soviet-Japanese Border War (1939), or Japanese-Soviet War. It should not be confused with the conflict in 1945 when the USSR declared war in support of the other Allies of World War II and launched Operation August Storm.

Background

After the occupation of Manchukuo and Korea, Japan turned its military interests to Soviet territories. The first major Soviet-Japanese border incident (Battle of Lake Khasan) happened in 1938 in Primorye. Conflicts between the Japanese and the Soviets frequently happened on the border of Munchuria.

In 1939, Manchuria was a client state of Japan, known as Manchukuo. The Japanese maintained that the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia was the Halha River (also known in Russian as the Halhin Gol, or the Khalkhin Gol), while the Mongolians and their Soviet allies maintained that it ran some 16 kilometres (10 miles) east of the river, just east of Nomonhan village.

The principal occupying army of Manchukuo was the Kwantung Army of Japan consisting of some of the best Japanese units in 1939. Soviet forces consisted of the Trans-Baikal Front district responsible for the defense of the border between Siberia and Manchuria.

Prelude

The incident began on 11 May 1939, when a Mongolian cavalry unit of some 70-90 men entered the disputed area in search of grazing for their horses, and encountered Manchukuoan cavalry who drove them out of the disputed territory. Two days later the Mongolian force returned and the Manchukoans were unable to evict them.

At this point the Japanese Kwantung Army became involved -- a reconnaissance unit under Lt. Col. Yaozo Azuma was sent to engage the Mongolians on 14 May, but they retreated west of the river with few losses. Joseph Stalin ordered STAVKA, the Red Army's high command, to develop a plan for a counterstrike against the Japanese. To lead the attack, Georgy Zhukov, a young officer of promise, was chosen.

The Mongolians and Soviets continued to build up forces in the area, and Azuma's force returned a week later. This time the Japanese forces were surrounded by superior numbers of Soviet and Mongolian infantry and tanks, and on 28-29 May the Azuma force was destroyed, suffering 8 officers and 97 men killed and one officer and 33 men wounded, with 63% casualties.

Throughout June, however, there were continuing reports of Soviet and Mongolian activity on both sides of the river near Nomonhan, and small-scale attacks on isolated Manchukoan units. At the end of the month the local Kwantung commander, Lt. Gen. Michitaro Komatsubara, was given permission to "expel the invaders". The Japanese operation started on 1 July and was initially successful in crossing the Halha river. However, by the evening of 3 July the attack stalled and the Soviet forces, led by Zhukov, threw the Japanese back over the river. The front then stabilized with only minor actions for the rest of the summer.

The conflict expanded into a battle and both countries deployed large forces including tanks and airplanes along the Khalkhin river in the north of Manchuria. Japan sent a tank group, commanded by Major General Masaomi Yasuoka, which had two tank regiments, 3rd and 4th Tank Regiment commanded by Colonel Yoshimaru the first(26 Type 89 Medium Tanks,4 Type 97 Medium Tanks and 15 Type 94 Tankettes)and Colonel Tamada the second(8 Type 89 Medium Tanks,36 Type 95 Light Tanks and 4 Type 94 Tankettes). This battle is called the Nomonhan Incident in Japan.

Japanese artillery units (13th Field Artillery Regiment,under Col. Ise, 3rd Field Heavy Artillery Brigade HQ led by Major Gen.Hata, 1st Field Heavy Artillery Regiment under Col.Mishima, 7th Independent Field Heavy Artillery Regiment led by Col.Takatsukasa, Muling Heavy Artillery Regiment led by Lt.Col.Someya and 1st Independent Field Artillery Regiment led by Col.Miyao)was also deployed to the Nomonhan area also.

The Army air force involved in Nomonhan sucess was the 2nd Hikoshidan, commanded by General Tetsuji Giga .

The battle

Finally, in mid-August, Zhukov decided it was time to break the stalemate. He deployed approximately 50,000 Russian and Mongolian troops of the 57th Special Corps to defend the east bank of the Halhin Gol River, then crossed the river on 20 August to attack the elite Japanese forces with three infantry divisions, massed artillery, a tank brigade, and the best planes of the Soviet Air Force. Japanese forces at the time of the Soviet counterattack had crossed the river and held the Khalkin Gol mountain ranges nearest the river. However, within days of the Soviet attack, Japanese forces were obliged to abandon their foothold across the river due to a lack of adequate anti-tank weapons. On 27 August the Japanese attempted to break out of the encirclement, but failed. When the surrounded forces refused to surrender, Zhukov wiped them out with artillery and air attacks. The battle ended 31 August with the complete destruction of the Japanese forces. Remaining Japanese units retreated back across the river.

Japanese doctrine relied heavily upon close infantry tactics which remained the primary doctrine of the Japanese army from their 1905 Army Field manual and again in their 1938 updated Army Field manual. Japanese forces were supposed to make contact with the enemy main body with armored cars. Infantry forces would then assemble in a triangular attack pattern with artillery in the rear and light tanks acting as auxiliary support for the infantry. This battle formation turned out to be a disaster for the Japanese Imperial Army.

Soviet doctrine relied upon using mass concentrations of armor in the shape of a box. Light tank units would be the front of the box with medium tanks such as the T-28 consisting of the rest of the box. Behind the main box, the Soviet forces followed on with infantry supported by heavy tanks also arranged in a box configuration. Against Soviet tanks, the Japanese did not posses any real anti-tank means to stop the masses of Soviet armor. Due to the desert climate of the region, Soviet tank gunners were generally able to see their opponents at long ranges and shell the Japanese with impunity.

During the Nomonhan incident, the Kwantung Army, following this doctrine, used an armored force, the "Yasuoka Detachment", composed of two light and medium tank Brigades for support and conventional 6th Army infantry assaults which were severely handled by Soviet infantry with heavy artillery and armored support. Meanwhile the Soviets had been massing a major armoured force in form of five tank brigades(4th,6th,7th(Mech),8th(Mech) and 11th)(a mechanised brigade was a tank brigade with infantry support).

This force was allocated to the Soviet left and right wings. Once the Japanese were pinned down by the advance of the Soviet fixed center position, they were to sweep round the flanks and attack the Japanese in the rear, cutting lines of communication. Fixed artillery positions smashed the surviving remains of the frontal assault group. During one such strike the regimental commander´s vehicle received a hit and Colonel Yoshimaru was killed.

In these engagements Japanese units also experienced their first tank vs. tank battles. The 45mm gun of Soviet tanks could easily penetrate the thin armor of Japanese tanks at a long distance. On the other hand, the short-barreled gun of Japanese tanks were only effective against Soviet tanks from short distances. The "Yasuoka Detachment" tank group had lost 40% of its tanks in 10 days of battle and was ordered to withdraw.

Such plans were devised by Georgy Zhukov and he introduced these types of tactics with overwhelming success in WW2. This success was presaged by its triumph in the Nomonhan fighting where the Soviets destroyed nearly all of the Japanese "Yasuoka Detachment" Armored group and 6th Army infantry forces. The assault and the type of combined arms figthing received little attention at the time but was a portent, with some exactitude, of the nature of armored warfare used in World War II.

After that the Soviets took to the offensive with large forces and routed Japanese from Nomonhan. Japanese armored forces were totally defeated in the battle of Nomonhan.

Amongst such defeats during the Nomonhan Incident,Japanese artillery forces(13th Field Artillery Regiment-24 Type 38 75mm Field Guns 12 Type 38 12cm Howitzers under led of Col. Ise,3rd Field Heavy Artillery Brigade HQ by led of Major Gen.Hata,1st Field Heavy Artillery Regiment-16 Type 96 15cm Howitzers under command of Col.Mishima,7th Independent Field Heavy Artillery Regiment-16 Type 92 10cm Cannons guided by Col.Takatsukasa,Muling Heavy Artillery Regiment-6 Type 89 15cm Cannon led by Lt.Col.Someya and 1st Independent Field Artillery Regiment-8 Type 90 75mm Field Guns commanded for Col.Miyao) had an artillery duel against the Soviet. The result was the defeat of the Japanese. Japanese artillery were outranged by the Soviet artillery and the terrain was disadvantageous to the Japanese. However, the key problem was the supply of ammunition. Japanese artillery forces had used up most of their stockpiled ammunition in three days and they could not continue an artillery duel any longer. On the contrary, Soviet artillery continued the heavy bombardment with an abundant supply of ammunition and defeated the Japanese artillery.

In the war against China the Japanese did not experience a large artillery battle. They had forgotten the lessons of the Port Arthur siege. The result of the Nomonhan battle revealed the problems of Japanese artillery forces. However, while they were not improved upon Japan was driving toward the war in the Pacific.

The Japanese Army air force involved was the 2nd Hikoshidan, commanded by General Tetsuji Giga . At the time of the August offensive it consisted of 4 scout planes attached to air force headquarters, 15 Mitsubishi Ki-15 serving with the ground troops, and two combat wings with 125 aircraft: 12th Hikodan with 88 fighters, commander unidentified. Three fighter groups took part in the offensive, all of which later saw combat against the American Volunteer Group in Burma: 1st Sentai commanded first by Maj Fumio Harada and later by Maj Tadashi Yoshida ; 11th Sentai; and 64th Sentai commanded by Cap Tateo Kato . A fourth group, the 24th Sentai, evidently did not take part in the offensive. 9th Hikodan with 24 Mitsubishi Ki-30 and 13 Mitsubishi Ki-21, commanded by Maj Gen Ikkaku Shimono. The combat units included one squadron of the 10th Sentai (Kawasaki Ki-32 plus 2 (Mitsubishi Ki-15), three squadrons of the 16th Sentai (Mitsubishi Ki-30), and one squadron of the 61st Sentai Mitsubishi Ki-21 and Ki-1s commanded by Col Kiso Mikami Japanese ground commanders tended to discount verbal reports of air recon. Photos were rare because cameras difficult to operate.

The 2nd Hikoshidan was worn down by August. In July, the Japanese had claimed 481 Russian planes while losing 14 of their own. In August they claimed 134 while losing 23. On the Russian side, Soviet AF officer A. B. Vorozheikin says the loss ratio was 4 Russ to 1 Jap in May but improved to 1:3 in June, 1:4 in July, and 1:10 in August.

Nomonhan got most of Nakajima's production of Ki-27 fighters. The crews were exhausted and replacement pilots untrained. Flying up to 6 hrs daily. "An air staff officer remembers the drawn faces, glazed eyes, and hollow cheeks of Japanese aviators. Scout pilots . . .were having difficulty with their respiratory systems."

Prior to the August offensive, 52 airmen were killed and 24 wounded, including Col Katsumi Abe c/o 15th Sentai killed by Russian strafing Aug 2. Lt Col Korjiro Matsumura c/o 24th Sentai shot down Aug 4 in fight with Russian veterans of Spanish Civil War, undersides of their wings painted violet. He was pinned by the tail of his own plane, his flight suit set afire, and lost all the fingers on one hand, but was rescued by another pilot who landed, pulled him free,and bundled him into his one-seater fighter. In all 80 percent of squadron commanders killed or wounded since fighting began. 70 percent of JAAF pilots had upwards of 1,000 hrs flight time. The big push, 21 August 1939 In July, Kwantung Army hq at Hsinking urged Imperial Army High Command for permission to launch an air offensive against Soviet-Mongol strongpoint at Tamsag. This was approved on Aug 7. "Operation S" set for dawn Aug 21. Estimated Soviet air strength 80-90 fighters, 30-40 larger planes. Says Giga had eight groups with 88 fighters, 24 light bombers, 13 heavy bombers, 21 scouts. 16th Sentai light bmr: 6-plane sq took off at 4:20 a.m. Bmrs in two tiers escorted by 50 ftrs flew across Halha for Tamsag airfield 60 km SW Higashi-watashi crossing. First squadron bombed at 6 a.m., still dark but could see outline of airfield, encountered flak returning. Second squadron (?) saw 16 large planes on field, encountered 20 I-16s (Polikarpov single-wing open cockpit fighter) when returning and took some hits. Third squadron could not find target and instead bombed tank formation. From 10th Sentai lt bmr 6 planes saw 10 Tupelov SB twin-engined bombers on airfield NE Tamsang, bombed them and claimed 2 destroyed. Escorting 12th Fighter Wing met no planes.

Second wave attacked 11 a.m. Squadron from 16th Sentai bombed southern airstrip, claimed five of eight large planes. Another squadron same group intercepted by fighters so turned for home and attacked ground installations; lost one plane and claimed 3 fighters. 61st Sentai Mitsubishi Ki-21s with 12 planes met eight fighters at southern airstrip and claimed two; on way home claimed three more. 12th Ftr Wing? met 50-60 enemy planes, claimed 27 ftrs and 1 SB bomber, lost 3 own. In afternoon, supported Jap ground forces by bombing tanks and vehicles near Fui Heights; met enemy planes. 16th lt bmr claimed 6 of 30 I-16s, losing one man killed and two wounded. Escorting 11th Sentai fighters claimed 11 of 40-50 I-15s (Polikarpov biplane fighter) and I-16s. Evening: 10th Sentai squadron bombed 3 ftrs taking off from concealed aistrip west of Hara Heights. Escorting fighters engaged 50 enemy fighters, claimed 9, lost 1 from 64th Sentai. Still, had failed to neutralize enemy air so scheduled followup for next day.

AUG 22: 61st Sentai heavies attacked by 30 I-16s, claimed 6 but los 1 with entire crew of 5. Fighters met 30 enemy, claimed 3, lost 1 from 1st Sentai to AA. Scouts attached to 23rd Div reported that Soviet armor was endangering Jap positions, so Giga called off the air offensive to support the ground forces. AA shot down scout from 10th Sentai. Capt Koji Motomura , 11th Sentai sq ldr, shot down while single-handedly battling 30 I-16s strafing ground forces north of 23rd Div hq. Though claimed 109 Russ planes in two days, had actually lost air supremacy. Worst losses since outbreak of Nomonhan fighting, say 8 planes first day, 6 the second. Plus 22-24 killed or wounded. Jap airmen exhausted but ordered to keep flying. Soviets reinforced air. climax battle 28-31 Aug, Soviet AF reported four encounters with JAAF, downing 4 bombers and 45 fighters. Major battle 31 Aug, when 126 Soviet fighters bounced 27 Jap bombers and 70 fighters, shooting down 22. Japs claimed 20 Russ planes that day, losing 3 planes and 4 men. Altogether, Japs claimed 108 Soviet a/c shot down while losing 29 (and 20 airmen killed and 32 wounded) from 23 thru 31 Aug.After 5 Sept, major changes in JAAF. Operational strength down from 160 planes on 29 Aug to 141 planes on 5 Sept.

The 31st Sentai and 64th Sentai had come up from China in July and August. More reinforcements began to move on 1 Sep. Giga's 2nd Hikoshidan absorbed by Koihiro Ebashi increasing air strength at Nomonhan by 50% with 9 new squadrons -- 6 fighter, 1 recon, 2 light bomber -- to a total of four wings (hikodan?) with 34-37 squadrons and up to 325 planes. Russians likewise reinforced air units at the front. On 13 Sep, Ebashi gave go-ahead. 225 planes airworthy; fighters and some light bombers deployed to forward bases. Weather improved on 14 Sep. Maj Tadashi Yoshida's 1st Sentai (Ki-27) bounced about 28 Soviet I-15 and I-16 fighters in afternoon, claiming 3. Weather still fair on 15 Sep, and Ebashi sent all Ki-27s and two light bombers groups plus scouts -- total 200 planes -- to hit enemy airfields. 20 Nates from Lt Col Issaku Imagawa's 59th Sentai engaged 50 Russ fighters, claimed 11. But one squadron followed Russ to south, was ambushed, and lost six Nates and their pilots, inc. s/l Mitsugu Yamamoto. 24th Sentai under newly arrived Capt Toshio Sakagawa claimed 13 Russ fighters; Sakagawa wounded but lost not planes. Total Jap claims: 39 in air, 4-5 on ground; lost 9, with 8 pilots killed incl 2 squadron leaders, plus three lt bombers damaged. Russ say six air battles: 1, 2, 4, 5, 14, and 15 Sept, the last being the biggest, with 102 Jap planes engaging 207 Russ. Russ claimed 20, lost 6. Altogether for Sept, Russ claimed 70, lost 14; Japs claimed 121, lost 24.

The aftermath JAAF casualties 141 killed, including 17 officers squadron leader or higher, w/ highest ranking being Col Katsumi Abe , c/o 15th Sentai. One-third of losses were over enemy lines. Plus 89 wounded. 10% of casualties in May and June, 26 percent in July, 50 percent in August, 14 percent in September.Russ returned bodies of 55 JAAF airmen from west side of the Halha. In one PW compound, the Russians held 500-600 Japanese prisoners, including a JAAF colonel. The released [bodies?] included Maj Fumio Harada, 1st Sentai c/o shot down 29 July, possibly by Senior Lt V. G. Rakhov, who claimed to have shot down a Jap "ace" that day, who bailed out, tried to commit suicide, but was captured alive. As Rakhov told the story, the Japanese prisoner asked to meet the Russian pilot who defeated him, then bowed "in tribute to the victor"

Also [the body of?] 1st Lt Naoyuki Daitoku of 11th Sentai. The Russians sent him to Shintan hospital at Kirin, with MPs guarding the train and toilet doors always kept open, to prevent suicide attempts. Tight security also at hospital, where most of the orderlies were actually MPs. As the story was told, two coffins were carried into the hospital the day before a six-hour "trial," after which guards were forbidden to go into the officers' rooms. They duly shot themselves, Harada supposedly after being given a loaded pistol and a Japanese publication describing his "heroic death in action" .

JAAF Master Sgt Shiko Miyajima , Ki-27 pilot of 24th Sentai, bellied in 22 June, wandered 4 days without food or water, captured by a Mongol patrol and imprisoned under harsh conditions for 10 months, returned to Japanese forces in 1940, tried, and sentenced to two years and 10 months for "desertion under enemy fire." Released 31 Dec 1942. Gen Giga in August 1940 made commander of a bomber basic training school, then retired in Oct 1941 at age of 56 and spent most of WWII as a farmer. unit citations to Col Noguchi's 11th Sentai for air battles in May, Lt Col Matsumura's 24th Sentai for combat in June. Also to all three wings and to a squadron of 16th Sentai.Russ I-16 fighters used 82 mm rockets to attack Jap ground positions, and some claim of using air-to-air missiles against Jap planes. I-16 saw service on Western front until 1943, and in Spanish service under 1952. Says it was replaced at Nomonhan by the retractable-gear I-153 Chaika fighter-bomber, much more powerful than the I-15.

JAAF had trained only 1,700 pilots in 30 years; losses at Nomonhan crippled it. By December 1941, army flight schools graduating 750 pilots a year.

Aftermath

Following the battle, the Red Army attacked what remained of the Japanese forces and drove them back into Manchukuo. On 16 September the Japanese asked for a cease-fire and nearly two years later signed a treaty in which they agreed to abide by the existing border.

Some sources[citation needed] have suggested that Stalin had been informed by Germans that Germany had no hostile intentions against the USSR at the time. This allowed for the temporary redeployment of some elite units of the Red Army to the east. Stalin took the chance and relocated all the few already existing fully mechanized units to the eastern theatre for deployment against the Japanese whose forces of tanks and armored cars were considerably weaker. The Japanese were surprised by the highly mechanized status of what they believed to be "local command troops", and some even took these just emerging mechanized units as an already generally existing standard of the Red Army.[citation needed] The devastating outcome of this "testing of Red Army strength" in the end convinced the Japanese Army to choose the "southern strike" (attacking the more promising and comparatively more weakly defended South East Asian areas), and to dismiss the "northern strike" option. As known, Soviet spy Richard Sorge informed his superiors of the Japanese decision to "go south". As he had already correctly predicted the German attack of June 22, Stalin could redeploy his Siberian elites and throw them into the battle for Moscow in December, 1941.

Of the 30,000 troops on the Japanese side, 8,440 were killed and 8,766 wounded. The Red Army committed 57,000 infantry, 498 tanks, and 346 armored cars to the battle, and claimed total losses (killed and wounded) of 9,284 men. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, new documents about the battle changed the numbers considerably. The actual number of casualties in the battle was 23,926, of whom 6,831 were killed, 1,143 reported missing and 15,952 wounded. While the Red Army did win the battle, it was not as one-sided a battle as previously believed.[citation needed]

Weapons employed in the battle

Japan

Aircrafts

Tanks

Artillery

  • 75mm short range field guns (1905)
  • 105mm long range field howitzer Type 1(1915)
  • 25mm short range anti-tank guns (1920)
  • Type 94 37mm Anti-Tank Gun (1936)
  • Type 92 70mm Infantry Gun (1932)
  • Type 98 20mm AA Machine Cannon (1938)
  • Type 38 75mm Field Guns
  • Type 38 12cm Howitzers
  • Type 96 15cm Howitzers
  • Type 92 10cm Cannons
  • Type 89 15cm Cannon
  • Type 90 75mm Field Guns

Infantry weapons

Soviet Union and Mongolia

Aircrafts

Tanks

Armoured Cars [1]

Artillery

  • 150mm howitzer
  • 105mm howitzer
  • 76mm AT-zig anti-tank/infantry support gun
  • 45mm anti-tank/infantry support gun

Infantry weapons

  • 120mm mortar
  • 80mm mortar

[1] BA Armoured cars with tank turrets were found to be easier to maintain and more mobile on the Mongolian plains than tanks. Mongol Armored Battalions had these vehicles exclusively and the Soviets had 3 Armoured Car Brigades against 2 Tank Brigades in this Campaign.

Influence on World War II

Although this engagement is little-known in the West, it had profound implications on the conduct of World War II. It may be said to be the first decisive battle of World War II because it determined that the two principal Axis Powers, Germany and Japan, would never geographically link up their areas of control (at least through Russia - there was still the possibility that they would link up via the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, but this, too, was impossible by mid-Spring, 1942), since the defeat convinced the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo that the policy of the North Strike Group, favored by the army, which wanted to seize Siberia as far as Lake Baikal for its resources, was untenable. Instead the South Strike Group, favored by the navy, which wanted to seize the resources of Southeast Asia, especially the petroleum and mineral-rich Dutch East Indies, gained the ascendancy, leading directly to the attack on Pearl Harbor two and a half years later in December 1941.

It was the first victory for the famed Soviet general Georgy Zhukov, earning him the first of his four Hero of the Soviet Union awards. The battle experience gained by the Siberian army was put to good use in December 1941 outside Moscow, under the command of Zhukov, when Siberian divisions spearheaded the first successful Soviet counteroffensive against the German invasion of 1941. The decision to move the divisions from Siberia was aided by the Soviet's masterspy Richard Sorge in Tokyo, who was able to alert the Soviet government that the Japanese were looking south and were unlikely to launch another attack against Siberia in the immediate future.

The after effects of the battle remained far reaching for Japan: expansion into Siberia remained checked for 1939 but the Imperial Japanese High Command still wished to eventually try to invade Siberia in the near future. This meant that an offensive posture was assumed by the Kwantung army in Manchuria. Defense of Manchuria was kept at a minimum since the Japanese command assumed that eventually Mongolia and parts of Siberia bordering Manchuria would be taken. These views would be disastrous to Japan when the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria in 1945 during their operation 'August Storm'. Without defenses in place, Manchuria would easily fall to the USSR by September 1945.

Other effects from the battle included renewed Japanese interest in southeast Asia and China. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident also was a direct result of Japan concentrating on expanding into China after their rebuff into Mongolia at Khalkin-Gol. By invading China, Japan would then eventually become entangled in World War II. The Soviet Union benefited from the battle. The battle proved the failure of Japanese doctrine against Soviet doctrine. This finding would contribute to the Soviet Union declaring war on Japan in 1945 and invading Manchuria.

See also

  • Neutrality pact, signed on April 13, 1941 between the Soviet Union and Japan

Reference

  • Alvin D Coox, "Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939", ISBN 0804718350
  • Part of discussion on historychannel.com, comments on Japanese HQ (Tokyo) strategy, which did not want to get in conflict with USSR while China war was running, but considered it the unwanted action of local commanders. Did not influence "North or South" strike decision, which was based on general evaluations etc. Well worth reading.
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