Sunni region (Iraq)
Sunni region الإقليم السني | |
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![]() The spiral minaret of the Great Mosque of Samarra, located in the proposed region (2017) | |
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![]() Map depicting the potential boundaries of a proposed Sunni Region encompassing the Sunni Arab-majority areas of Iraq | |
Country | ![]() |
Ethnic groups | ![]() |
Religion | Sunni Islam |
The Sunni region (Arabic: الإقليم السني), also referred to as the Anbar region (Arabic: إقليم الأنبار), is a proposed semi-autonomous region of the Republic of Iraq that would encompass the Arab Sunni-majority regions of the country and act as the representative of the Sunni Arab population of Iraq.
History
[edit]After the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the new Iraqi government was federalized. Article 1 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution institutionalized a federal structure of Iraq, which Sunni Arabs initially rejected. Nevertheless, it was approved, and Iraq became a federal republic, with the Kurdistan Region being constitutionally recognized.[1] The rise of sectarian violence, especially after the 2006 al-Askari shrine bombing, and increasing marginalization of Sunni areas by the Shia-led government prompted a gradual re-evaluation of federalism among Sunni elites.[2] The proposal included regions such as Anbar, Diyala, Saladin, Nineveh, Kirkuk and the outskirts of Baghdad.[3] Despite similar marginalization, tensions persisted between Arabs and Turkmen over certain regions in Nineveh, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salah al-Din governorates.[4] Between 2006 and 2008, U.S.-backed Sunni tribal militias, known as the Sahwa (Awakening) Councils, helped drive out al-Qaeda from Anbar. This brief period of local empowerment fueled calls for greater provincial control over security and governance, especially after Baghdad failed to integrate Sahwa fighters into national security institutions.[5] By 2011, provincial councils in Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Nineveh began calling for application of Article 119 of the constitution, which allows for the creation of new federal regions. These calls were framed as responses to sectarian discrimination, arbitrary arrests, and economic neglect by Baghdad.[6] Sunni leader Thaer Al-Bayati stated that the proposal for autonomy has widespread backing among Sunni Iraqis.[7] After the defeat of the Islamic State in 2017, there was a significant increase in Sunni Arab demands for autonomy.[8][9][10][11][12]
References
[edit]- ^ Dawisha, Iraq, pp. 266–268
- ^ Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, pp. 121–124
- ^ "Why Sunni autonomy is back on the agenda in Iraq". Amwaj.media.
- ^ Visser, Iraq’s Fragmentation, pp. 66–67.
- ^ Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 341–343
- ^ Visser, Iraq’s Fragmentation, pp. 91–92
- ^ "Sunni bloc push for autonomy reignites tensions in Iraq".
- ^ Dawisha, Adeed. Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation. Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 335.
- ^ Dodge, Toby. Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. Routledge, 2013, p. 178.
- ^ Haddad, Fanar. Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 191.
- ^ Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 273.
- ^ Visser, Reidar. Iraq’s Fragmentation: Political and Economic Crisis in the Middle East. Hurst & Co., 2016, pp. 103–104.