Jump to content

Islamic fundamentalism in Iran: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Browse history interactively
← Previous editNext edit →
Content deleted Content added
VisualWikitext
Line 3: Line 3:
== Background history ==
== Background history ==


Until two hundred years ago, in spite of the many schools and interpretations, many muslims in Iran lived within the tradition. It was a living tradition, emphasizing the harmony of law, art, and all forms of knowledge. Also a significant Iranian scholar followed the tradition of Persian [[sufism]] and [[pluralism]]. Currently in Iran there exist three main types of Islam: traditionalists (represented by [[Hossein Nasr]] and [[Yousef Sanei]]), modernists (represented by [[Abdolkarim Soroush]]) and fundamentalists (represented by [[Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi]], [[Ali Khamenei]] and several [[Grand Ayatollah]]s).
Until two hundred years ago, in spite of the many schools and interpretations, many muslims in Iran lived within the tradition. It was a living tradition, emphasizing the harmony of law, art, and all forms of knowledge. Also a significant Iranian scholar followed the tradition of Persian [[sufism]] and [[pluralism]]. Currently in Iran there exist three main types of Islam: traditionalists (represented by [[Hossein Nasr]] and [[Yousef Sanei]]), modernists (represented by [[Abdolkarim Soroush]]) and fundamentalists (represented by [[Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi]] (neo-cons), [[Ali Khamenei]] and several [[Grand Ayatollah]]s).


==Emergence==
==Emergence==

Revision as of 13:48, 23 December 2006

Today there are basically three types of Islam in Iran: traditionalism, modernism, and a variety of forms of revivalism usually brought together as fundamentalism.[1] Neo-fundamentalists in Iran are a subgroup of fundamentalists who have also borrowed from Western countercurrents of populism, fascism, anarchism, Jacobism, and Marxism.[2] Like other fundamentalists in Iran, neo-fundamentalists are millitant and anti-modernists.

Background history

Until two hundred years ago, in spite of the many schools and interpretations, many muslims in Iran lived within the tradition. It was a living tradition, emphasizing the harmony of law, art, and all forms of knowledge. Also a significant Iranian scholar followed the tradition of Persian sufism and pluralism. Currently in Iran there exist three main types of Islam: traditionalists (represented by Hossein Nasr and Yousef Sanei), modernists (represented by Abdolkarim Soroush) and fundamentalists (represented by Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi (neo-cons), Ali Khamenei and several Grand Ayatollahs).

Emergence

The birth date of fundamentalist Islam in Iran is believed to be in 18th century, when secular humanism and its associated art and science entered Iran.[3] Neo-fundamentalist Islam in Iran mainly speaks of reviving Islam in opposition to modernism. But most so-called fundamentalists are pseudo-traditional, as can be seen in their attitude toward modern technologies and the destruction of the environment.[4]

Viewpoints

As in the course of the Persian Constitutional Revolution nearly a century earlier, the concept of justice was at the center of the ideological debates among the followers of the three Islamic orientations during and after the revolution. The conservatives (fundamentalists) adhered to the traditional notion of Islamic justice, one which, much like the Aristotelian idea of justice, states that "equals should be treated alike, but unequals proportionately to their relevant differences, and all with impartiality." The radicals (neo-fundamentalists), on the other hand, gave a messianic interpretation to the concept, one that promised equal distribution of societal resources to all—including the "unequals." And finally, those with a liberal orientation to Islam understood the notion of justice in terms of the French revolutionary slogan of egalit`e, i.e., the equality of all before law.[5]

While the fundamentalists (conservatives) were generally suspicious of modern ideas and resistant to modern lifestyles at the time of Iranian revolution, the Islamic radicals (neo-fundamentalists) were receptive to many aspects of modernity and willing to collaborate with secular intellectuals and political activists.[6]

Many of the so-called neo-fundamentalists, like Christian fundamentalists, pull out a verse from the scriptures and give it a meaning quite contrary to its traditional commentary. Also, even while denouncing modernism as the "Great Satan", many fundamentalists accept its foundations, especially science and technology. For traditionalists, there is beauty in nature which must be preserved and beauty in every aspect of traditional life, from chanting the Qur'an to the artisan's fashioning a bowl or everyday pot. Many fundamentalists even seek a Qur'anic basis for modern man's domination and destruction of nature by referring to the injunction to 'dominate the earth' -- misconstruing entirely the basic idea of vicegerency: that man is expected to be the perfect servant of God.[7]

An exapmle of environmental problem is overpopulation of earth. Neo-fundamentalists's family policy is to increase the population dramatically. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's call for increasing Iran's population from 70 to 120 milions can be understood in the same line.

In Mehdi Mozaffan's chapter on a comparative study of Islamism in Algeria and Iran, he says, "I define Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism as a militant and anti-modernist movement ... not every militant Muslim is a fundamentalist. but an Islamic fundamentalist is necessarily a militant".[8]

After the triumph of the revolution in February 1979, and the subsequent liquidation of the liberal and secular-leftist groups, two principal ideological camps became dominant in Iranian politics, the "conservatives" (fundamentalists) and the "radicals" (neo-fundamentalists). The radicals' following of Khomeini of the revolution rather than his incumbency of the office of the Supreme Jurist (Vali-eFaqih) or his theocratic vision of the "Islamic Government." Today, Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi clearly rejects Khomeini's "Islamic Republic" and supports the idea of "Islamic government" where the votes of people has no value.[9]

Abadgaran described itself as a group of Islamic neo-fundamentalist[10], have the control over current Iranian government. However it lost the 2006 city council election.

While conservatives have been silent or accept the Holocuast, neo-fundamentalists doubt in it and believe that the existence of Israel is based on Holocaust. Thus by denying Holocaust, neo-fundamentalists are to shake the foundations of Israel. It is note worthy that, Holocaust in itself is not a matter of concern for neo-fundamentalists. They may even pretend that they have doubts, as this will serve their ultimate goal (to their mind).

Contrary to Iranian traditionalists, neo-fundamentalists as well as Iranian liberals have been under the influence of western thinkers. The Islamic neo-fundamentalists have also borrowed from Western countercurrents of populism, fascism, anarchism, Jacobism, and Marxism.[11]

Fadayan-e Islam

Fadayan-e Islam was founded in 1946 as an Islamic fundamentalist organization. The founder of the group was Navab Safavi, a neo-fundamentalist cleric. The group's aim was to transform Iran into an "Islamic state". To achieve their objective, the group committed numerous terrorist acts. Notable among these was the 1946 assassination of Ahmad Kasravi, an intellectual who had criticized the mullahs (Shia Islamic clergy). The group also assassinated two prime ministers (Ali Razmara and Hassan Ali Mansour, 1951 and 1965) and an ex-prime minister (Hazhir, 1949).

Haghani school

Haghani Circle is a neo-fundamentalist school of thought in Iran founded by a group of clerics based in the holy city of Qom and headed by Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, an influential cleric and theologian.

The school trains clerics with both a traditional and modern curriculum, including a secular education in science, medicine, politics, and Western/non-Islamic philosophy (the topics that are not taught in traditional schools). It was founded by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Ayatollah Dr. Beheshti and Ayatollah Sadoughi.

Many famous theologians and influential figures in Iran's politics after the revolution were associated (as teacher or student) with the Haghani Circle or follows its ideology.

Ansar e Hezbollah

Ansar-e-Hezbollah is a militant neo-fundamentalist group in Iran. Mojtaba Bigdeli is a spokesman for the Iranian Hezbollah.

Basij

Basij is a military neo-fundamentalist network established after the Iranian revolution. In July 1999, Ezzat Ebrahim-Nejad was shot dead in Tehran University dormitory by a member of Basij military force. The event initiated a huge demonstration. In 2001, a member of the Basij, Saeed Asgar attempted to assassinate Saeed Hajjarian a leading reformist and political advisor to reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. Asagar was arrested and sentenced to spend 15 years in jail, but was released after spending only a short term in prison. Human Rights Watch informs that the Basij belong to the "Parallel institutions" (nahad-e movazi), "the quasi-official organs of repression that have become increasingly open in crushing student protests, detaining activists, writers, and journalists in secret prisons, and threatening pro-democracy speakers and audiences at public events." Under the control of the Office of the Supreme Leader these groups set up arbitrary checkpoints around Tehran, uniformed police often refraining from directly confronting these plainclothes agents. "Illegal prisons, which are outside of the oversight of the National Prisons Office, are sites where political prisoners are abused, intimidated, and tortured with impunity." [12] On March 8 2004 the Basij issued a violent crackdown on the activists celebrating the International Women's Day in Tehran.[13] On 13 November 2006, Tohid Ghaffarzadeh, a student at Sabzevar University was murdered by a Basij member at the University. The murderer reportedly said that what he did was according to his religious beliefs. Tohid Ghaffarzadeh was talking to his girl friend when he was approached and stabbed with a knife by the Basij member.[14]

Leaders

Notable figures

References and further readings

  • Iran’s Tortuous Path Toward Islamic Liberalism, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2, Winter 2001
  • Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition: Essays by Western Muslim Scholars (Perennial Philosophy Series) by Joseph Lumbard and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, World Wisdom (October 23, 2003) ISBN-13: 978-0941532600.
  • Traditional Islam in the Modern World by Seyyed Hossein, Nasr Kegan Paul International(1995) ISBN-13: 978-0710303325.
  • R. Scott Appleby, eds., Accounting for Fundamentalisms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 403–424.
  • Islamic Fundamentalism, Edited by Abdel salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. Boulder, CO.
  • Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity, By ROBERT D. LEE. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. 0-8133-2798-9.

Notes

  1. ^ [1]
  2. ^ [2]
  3. ^ [3]
  4. ^ [4]
  5. ^ [5]
  6. ^ [6]
  7. ^ [7]
  8. ^ [8]
  9. ^ [9]
  10. ^ [10]
  11. ^ [11]
  12. ^ hrw.org, Overview of human rights issues in Iran, December 31 2004
  13. ^ Confronting State Terrorism, Asian Centre for Human Rights Review, Special Issues for 60th Session of the UNHCR, March 24 2004
  14. ^ [12]

See also

Stub icon

This Iran-related article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Islamic_fundamentalism_in_Iran&oldid=96100394"