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Bombing of Manado

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Bombing of Manado
Part of Permesta-PRRI Rebellion

Indonesian B-25 Mitchell documentary on North Sulawesi
Date22 February 1958
Location
Result
  • Indonesian government victory
  • Manado infrastructure nearly destroyed during Bombing
  • Heavily damaged to Permesta mainpost
Belligerents
 Indonesia Permesta
Commanders and leaders
Indonesia Omar Dhani
Indonesia Leo Wattimena
Ventje Sumual
Units involved
Indonesian Air Force Unknown
Strength
2 Bombers B-25 Mitchell Thousand of Soldiers
Casualties and losses
Unknown aircraft Thousand Soldiers were killed
Thousand of civilians Killed during bombing

The Bombing of Manado was the responds attack by Indonesian National Armed Forces for an proclamation of rebel movement on Sulawesi known as Permesta. The B-25 Mitchell squadron carried out the Aerial bombing in Manado during the bombing the hospital’s at mount maria was destroyed they also bombing the Permesta mainpost including their radio stations and the officer houses. The bombing affected to the Alexander Evert Kawilarang decision to joined Permesta and started the beginning of bloody rebellion.

Background

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The PRRI rebellion in the west and Permesta rebellion in the east arose for a combination of reasons. Foremost was that certain ethnic groups in Sulawesi and central Sumatra felt that government policies from Jakarta were stagnating their local economies, which in turn limited any opportunities for regional development.[1] Also, there was some animosity towards the Javanese ethnic group, who were the most numerous and influential in the newly created unitary state of Indonesia.[2] Indonesia's political arena was centered on the island of Java and yet the country's economic resources mostly came from other islands in Indonesia.[3][4][5] In effect this conflict was less about any thoughts of secession from the Indonesian state and more about a fair division of economic and political power in Indonesia.[6][7]

Efforts before the declaration

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In early 1957, both civil and military leaders from Makassar visited Jakarta. In January 1957, Lt. Col. Muhammad Saleh Lahade and Maj. Andi Muhammad Jusuf Amir (M. Jusuf) met with Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution.[8] At that time, Lahade was Chief of Staff of the South and Southeast Sulawesi Security Command (Ko-DPSST or Komando Pengamanan Sulawesi Selatan Tenggara), while M. Jusuf was the commander of the Hasanuddin Infantry Regiment (RI-Hasanuddin).[9] Then in February, Sulawesi Governor Andi Pangerang Pettarani met with Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and Minister of Home Affairs R. Sunarjo.[10][11] Pangerang urged the central government to strive to provide greater autonomy for the local regions in eastern Indonesia. In addition to greater autonomy at the regional level, a greater share of government revenue should be given to the regions for the implementation of local development projects.[12] Meanwhile, Lahede and Jusuf tried to urge the leadership of the Indonesian Army to similarly support greater regional autonomy and revenue sharing that would be used for local regional development. In addition, they also requested that the Ko-DPSST, which was under the direct auspices of army headquarters rather than under the Army and Territorium VII (TT-VII or Tentara dan Territorium VII) headquartered in Makassar, to be replaced with a Regional Military Command (KDM or Komando Daerah Militer).[8]

At the end of February 1957, Andi Burhanuddin and Henk Rondonuwu left for Jakarta representing the Sulawesi provincial government as a last effort to urge the central government on the matters discussed in the previous meetings. Apart from them, the commander of TT-VII, Lt. Col. Ventje Sumual, also visited Jakarta for the same purpose and met with sympathetic officers in the military.[11] On 1 March 1957, Sumual together with Burhanuddin and Rondonuwu returned to Makassar, because their efforts were unsuccessful. The civil and military leadership in Makassar met a few days before on 25 February 1957 to plan the declaration of Permesta in the event that there was no concrete response from the central government.[13]

Permesta proclamation

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At 3:00 am on 2 March 1957 at the governor's residence in Makassar and in front of about 50 attendees, Sumual proclaimed a state of war for the entire TT-VII region, which encompassed the entire territory of eastern Indonesia.[14] After the proclamation, Lahade read the Universal Struggle Charter or Permesta Charter.[15] The end of the charter stated that "first of all by convincing all leaders and layers of society, that we are not breaking away from the Republic of Indonesia, and are merely fighting for the betterment of the fate of the Indonesian people and the settlement of remaining issues of the National revolution." The charter was signed by the attendees. After the charter was read, Governor Pangerang asked everyone to remain calm and carry out their respective duties and responsibilities.[16]

The following day, the composition of the military government was announced in which Sumual served as military administrator with Lahade as chief of staff. There was also a Central Advisory Council (or Dewan Pertimbangan Pusat) consisting of 101 members and four military governors under Sumual. The four military governors were Andi Pangerang for South and Southeast Sulawesi, Maj. Daniel Julius (D. J.) Somba for North and Central Sulawesi, Lt. Col. Herman Pieters for Maluku and West Irian, and Lt. Col. Minggu for Nusa Tenggara. At the time, Somba was the commander of the 24th Infantry Regiment (RI-24) based in Manado, Pieters was the commander of the 25th Infantry Regiment (RI-25) based in Ambon, and Minggu was the commander of the 26th Infantry Regiment (RI-26) based in Bali. Panggerang was formally appointed as military governor on 8 March, while Somba was formally appointed in Manado on 11 March.[17]

Bombing

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The central government carried out a bombing raid of Manado six days after Somba's statement. At 8:15 am on 22 February 1958, two B-25 Mitchell bombers from the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) targeted the radio station in the city.[18] The two B-25 bombers under command of Omar Dhani and Leo Wattimena attacked and Bombing the Permesta radio station and mainpost to disabled Permesta communications, after atttacking the radio stations the bomber dropping bombs around mount Maria, Manado. During the Bombing the B-25 squadron dropping bombs through cities building and civilians house affected to thousand of civilians death.[19]

After dropping bombs to the Permesta main base and the radio centre, the squadrons turn their attack to the houses of rebels commander and barrack, the rebels shooted the bomber even they missed the shoots and also they attacked the house of Ventje Sumual mother in law when the squadrons attacked the barracks and destroyed it. This Bombing was the disaster of Manado by suffering heavy casualties including the death of civilians.[20][21]

Aftermath

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The bombing in Manado hastened the decisions of two Minahasan officers who were initially not enthusiastic about joining Permesta. They were Warouw who had joined Sumual to meet Sukarno in Tokyo and Col. Alexander Evert (A. E.) Kawilarang who at that time was the military attaché in Washington, D.C.[22] Kawilarang was an experienced officer in the Indonesian Army who previously commanded three military territories: TT-I/Bukit Barisan in Medan, TT-III/Siliwangi in Bandung, and also TT-VII before Warouw and Sumual.

The bombing also resulted in the people of North Sulawesi being more enthusiastic to the Permesta cause. Two days after the bombing, KDM-SUT announced and instructed former soldiers of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL or Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger) to report and join Permesta. It is estimated that around 2000 of them self-reported. Even though they were old because KNIL was formed during the Dutch occupation, they could train younger inexperienced enlistees who joined Permesta.[23] The training was held in Langowan near Tondano for three months, which resulted in the formation of seven companies from the number of youth who were trained.[24] In addition, a female unit was formed and was named the Permesta Women's Troops (PWP or Pasukan Wanita Permesta).[25]

References

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  1. ^ Lundstrom-Burghoorn (1981), p. 43.
  2. ^ Schouten (1998), p. 215.
  3. ^ Harvey (1977), p. 3.
  4. ^ TEMPO (2008).
  5. ^ Liwe (2002), p. 89.
  6. ^ Jacobson (2002), pp. 2–3.
  7. ^ Liwe (2002), p. 18.
  8. ^ a b Harvey (1977), p. 44.
  9. ^ Usman (2010), pp. 150, 156.
  10. ^ Harvey (1977), pp. 41–42.
  11. ^ a b Turner (2017), p. 177.
  12. ^ Harvey (1977), p. 42.
  13. ^ Harvey (1977), pp. 45–47.
  14. ^ Ricklefs dan Nugraha (2008), p. 531.
  15. ^ Harvey (1977), p. 47.
  16. ^ Liwe (2002), p. 99.
  17. ^ Harvey (1977), p. 49.
  18. ^ Conboy dan Morrison (1999), p. 38.
  19. ^ Abdullah, Rizieq (2022-01-31). "Kisah Bergabungnya Kolonel Alex Kawilarang dengan Permesta: Murka saat Manado Dibom". Merdeka.com. Retrieved 2025-06-03.
  20. ^ Aswin, Lumintang (2013-09-13). "Kolonel Alex Kawilarang Kecam Pemerintah Pusat". tribunnews.com (in Indonesian). Retrieved 2025-06-03.
  21. ^ Petrik, Manatasi (2017-06-15). "Perang Saudara di Sulawesi pada Bulan Puasa 1958". tirto.id (in Indonesian). Retrieved 2025-06-03.
  22. ^ Harvey (1977), p. 102.
  23. ^ Harvey (1977), p. 104.
  24. ^ Conboy dan Morrison (1999), p. 44.
  25. ^ Harvey (1977), p. 105.

Citations

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  • Conboy, Kenneth; Morrison, James (1999). Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-193-9.
  • Schouten, M. J. C. (1998). Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian society: Minahasa 1677–1983. Leiden: KITLV Press.
  • Jacobson, M. (2002). Cross Border Triangles and Deterritorialising Identities. Assessing the Diaspora Triangle: Migrant-Host-Home. SEARC Working Papers Series. Vol. 19. Hong Kong: South East Asia Research Series Publications.
  • Harvey, Barbara S. (1977). Permesta: Half a Rebellion. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
  • "Herman Nicolas 'Ventje' Sumual: Lelaki di Balik Permesta" [Herman Nicolas 'Ventje' Sumual: The Man Behind Permesta] (in Indonesian). TEMPO. 10 March 2008. Retrieved 18 May 2021.
  • Liwe, Amelia Joan (2010). From Crisis to Footnote: The Ambiguous Permesta Revolt in Post-Colonial Indonesia (PhD). Madison: University of Wisconsin, Madison.
  • Ricklefs, Merle Calvin; Nugraha, Moh. Sidik (2008). Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200–2008 [Modern History of Indonesia 1200–2008] (in Indonesian). Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta.