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Communist International

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Communist International
LeaderGrigory Zinoviev (Chairman; 1919–1926)
Nikolai Bukharin (de facto; 1926–1928)
Dmitry Manuilsky (de facto; 1929–1934)
Georgi Dimitrov (General Secretary; 1934–1943)[1]
Founded4 March 1919; 106 years ago (1919-03-04)
Dissolved15 May 1943; 82 years ago (1943-05-15)
Preceded by
Succeeded byCominform
HeadquartersMoscow, Soviet Union
NewspaperCommunist International
Youth wingYoung Communist International
Ideology
Political positionFar-left
Anthem"Kominternlied"

The Communist International, abbreviated as Comintern and also known as the Third International, was a political international which existed from 1919 to 1943 and advocated world communism. It was founded at a congress in Moscow in March 1919, convened by Vladimir Lenin and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (RCP). It emerged from the collapse of the Second International during World War I, with the Bolsheviks aiming to create a new international body committed to revolutionary socialism and the overthrow of capitalism worldwide.[2]

Initially, the Comintern operated with the expectation of imminent proletarian revolutions in Europe, particularly Germany, which were seen as crucial for the survival and success of the Russian Revolution.[3] Its early years were characterized by attempts to foment and coordinate revolutionary uprisings and the establishment of disciplined communist parties across the globe, often demanding strict adherence to the "Twenty-one Conditions" for admission.[4] As these revolutionary hopes faded by the early 1920s, the Comintern's policies shifted, notably with the adoption of the "united workers' front" tactic, aiming to win over the working masses from reformist socialist parties.[5] Throughout the 1920s, the Comintern underwent a process of "Bolshevisation", increasing the centralization of its structure and the dominance of the RCP within its ranks. This process intensified with the rise of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union.[6]

The "Third Period" (1928–1933) saw the Comintern adopt an ultra-left line, denouncing social democratic parties as "social fascism" and advocating "class against class" tactics, which proved disastrous, particularly in the face of rising Nazism in Germany.[7] From 1934, the Comintern shifted to the Popular Front policy, advocating broad alliances with socialist and even liberal parties against fascism. This was formally adopted at its Seventh World Congress in 1935.[8] The Comintern played a significant role in organizing support for the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War, including the formation of the International Brigades.[9] However, this period also coincided with the Great Purge in the Soviet Union, during which many Comintern officials and foreign communists residing in Moscow were arrested and executed.[10]

With the signing of the Nazi–Soviet Pact in August 1939, the Comintern again changed its line, denouncing the war between Nazi Germany and the Western Allies as an "imperialist war" and abandoning its anti-fascist stance until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.[11] As a gesture to its Western Allies in World War II, Stalin unilaterally dissolved the Comintern on 15 May 1943.[12] While its formal structures were dismantled, mechanisms of Soviet control over the international communist movement persisted and were later partially revived through the Cominform (1947–1956).[13]

Background

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The Comintern, or Third International, was the direct descendant of the First International (1864–1872) and the Second International (1889–1916).[14] The First International, established by Karl Marx, aimed to coordinate the proletariat in its worldwide struggle against capitalism, based on the premise that "the working men have no country" and that horizontal class allegiance would supersede vertical national divisions.[14] The Second International, created in 1889, was a looser federation of autonomous socialist parties, comprising "left", "right", and "centrist" factions divided on issues such as bourgeois democracy, the national question, general strikes, and, crucially, war.[15]

The Second International foundered in August 1914 on the rock of national chauvinism when most of its constituent parties chose to support their respective national governments in World War I by voting for war credits.[16] Vladimir Lenin, a key figure in the Russian Bolshevik Party (later the Russian Communist Party, RCP), viewed this as a "sheer betrayal of socialism" and declared the Second International dead, calling for a Third International by the autumn of 1914.[17] During the war, a minority of intransigent revolutionaries coalesced around the Bolsheviks, forming the Zimmerwald Left. Lenin advocated turning the international war into a revolutionary civil war and was implacably hostile to parliamentary democracy.[16] The October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, led by the Bolsheviks, was seen by Lenin as the first act of a global drama, with European workers expected to follow suit. To achieve this, a new International, purged of reformist "traitors", was deemed an absolute necessity.[16]

Foundation and early years (1919–1923)

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The Communist International was founded at a congress of revolutionaries in Moscow from 2–6 March 1919.[18] The impetus for its creation came from the Bolsheviks' belief in the imminence of world proletarian revolution, spurred by the perceived collapse of capitalism after World War I and revolutionary upheavals across Europe, particularly the German "November Revolution".[3] The mission of the Comintern was to build a "world party" of communists dedicated to the armed overthrow of capitalist private property and its replacement by a system of collective ownership.[16]

First (Founding) Congress

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On 24 January 1919, a "Letter of Invitation to the First Congress of the Communist International" was relayed by wireless, identifying thirty-nine communist parties and revolutionary groups eligible to attend.[19] The congress convened in the Kremlin on 2 March 1919.[20] Of the fifty-one delegates, only nine arrived from abroad due to the Allied blockade of Russia; the rest resided in Soviet Russia, and many lacked authorized credentials.[20] Hugo Eberlein, the delegate of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), was mandated to oppose the immediate formation of a new International, reflecting Rosa Luxemburg's earlier concerns about premature Bolshevik dominance.[20] Despite Eberlein's abstention, the congress voted overwhelmingly to establish the Third International on 4 March 1919.[21]

The principal document of the congress was Leon Trotsky's "Manifesto to the Proletariat of the Entire World", which emphasized soviets (workers' councils) as the instrument of working-class unity and action, deeming the Russian model universally applicable. It dismissed "bourgeois democracy" and reiterated Lenin's insistence on the dictatorship of the proletariat.[22] The improvised nature of the congress meant that no formal statutes or rules were adopted, but an Executive Committee (ECCI) was elected, with Grigory Zinoviev as its first President.[23] While provision was made for foreign party representation on the ECCI, Bolsheviks predominated due to the prestige of the Russian Revolution and the weakness of foreign parties.[24]

Universalisation of Bolshevism

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The foundation of the Comintern institutionalized the split in the international labour movement between revolutionary communists and reformist social democrats. This schism was rooted in fundamentally different conceptions of the path to socialism.[25] Karl Kautsky, a leading theoretician of the Second International, condemned the Bolshevik coup in The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1918), arguing that socialism was inseparable from democracy and that a revolution in backward Russia could only result in a terroristic dictatorship.[26] Lenin, in his reply The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (1918), excoriated Kautsky, asserting that parliamentary institutions were a sham concealing bourgeois class rule and that "proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy". He proclaimed that Bolshevism could "serve as a model of tactics for all".[27]

Delegates at the Second World Congress, 1920

The Second World Congress, held in Petrograd and Moscow from 19 July to 7 August 1920, is considered the true founding congress of the Comintern.[28] It adopted the famous "Twenty-one Conditions" for admission, drafted primarily by Zinoviev under Lenin's guidance.[29] These conditions aimed to split the rank-and-file of European socialist parties from their "opportunist" leaders and enforce Bolshevik organizational principles.[28] Key conditions included: systematic removal of reformists and centrists from all responsible posts; combining legal and illegal activity; complete break with figures like Kautsky and Ramsay MacDonald; establishing communist cells in trade unions; adherence to democratic centralism based on iron discipline and periodic purges; unconditional support for every Soviet republic; and changing party names to "Communist Party".[30] Point sixteen stated that all decisions of Comintern congresses and the ECCI were binding on all parties.[31] The congress also ratified the Statutes of the Comintern, which established the annual world congress as the supreme body and the ECCI as the directing body between congresses. Point 8 of the Statutes stipulated that the work of the ECCI was performed mainly by the party of the country where it was located (Soviet Russia), which had five representatives with full voting rights, while other major parties had only one.[32]

This "universalisation of Bolshevism" was further elaborated in Lenin's pamphlet "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder (April 1920), which argued that "certain fundamental features of our revolution have a significance that is not local... but international".[33] The Third (June–July 1921) and Fourth (November–December 1922) Congresses reinforced the centralist Bolshevik model, creating ECCI bodies like the Presidium, Secretariat, Organisational Bureau (Orgburo), and International Control Commission (ICC) that paralleled Russian party structures.[34] The Comintern also began dispatching "agents" and "emissaries" to intervene in the affairs of national parties.[35] Funding for foreign communist parties and the Comintern's clandestine activities, managed by the International Liaison Department (OMS) from 1921, came from the Soviet state treasury, creating economic dependence.[36]

Despite the trend towards Russian dominance and centralisation, the Comintern in Lenin's era displayed a degree of pluralism and open debate not seen later. Figures like Paul Levi of the KPD and the Italian Amadeo Bordiga were not docile, and some national parties resisted or reinterpreted Moscow's directives.[37]

"United workers' front"

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Vladimir Lenin addressing the Third World Congress, 1921

By late 1920 and into 1921, with the failure of revolutionary upheavals in Europe (such as the factory occupations in Italy and the "March Action" in Germany in 1921), Lenin reluctantly concluded that proletarian revolution was no longer on the immediate agenda.[38] This led to the adoption of the "united workers' front" policy, formally expounded in ECCI theses on 18 December 1921.[39] The policy aimed to win over the majority of the working class by engaging in joint defensive struggles with socialist rank-and-file against the capitalist offensive.[40] It allowed for temporary alliances with reformist leaders ("united front from above") but primarily focused on unity "from below".[41] The slogan of the Third Congress (1921) was "To the masses!".[42]

The United Front policy was closely intertwined with changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy, particularly the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the search for trade relations with capitalist nations.[43] The Rapallo Treaty of April 1922 between Germany and Soviet Russia epitomized the growing tension between the Comintern's revolutionary goals and Soviet state interests.[44] The United Front tactics faced intense opposition from left-wing elements in many communist parties (e.g., in France and Italy), who found it inconceivable to court the "social chauvinists".[45] A conference of the three Internationals (Second, Comintern, and the Vienna Union or "Two-and-a-half International") in Berlin in April 1922, aimed at creating common action, failed amidst mutual suspicion.[46] The Comintern's trade union arm, the Profintern (Red International of Labour Unions), founded in 1921, played a crucial role in applying United Front tactics in the industrial field, though this often led to splits in national trade union movements, as in Czechoslovakia and France.[47]

The "German October" of 1923, a failed Comintern-inspired uprising in Germany, revealed fundamental limitations in Comintern thinking, including inadequate military preparations and a misjudgment of the German workers' mood.[48] This debacle convinced many Bolsheviks, notably Joseph Stalin, that European revolution was a distant prospect, reinforcing the priority of defending the Soviet state.[49]

Bolshevisation and Stalin's rise (1924–1928)

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The period from 1924 to 1928 was characterized by the "Bolshevisation" of the Comintern and its member sections. This entailed an increasing Russian dominance, the Russification of ideological and organizational structures, and the canonization of Leninist principles of party unity, discipline, and democratic centralism, particularly the concentration of power in the hands of the Russian party delegation to the ECCI.[50]

Impact of Soviet inner-party struggles

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Lenin, Nikolai Bukharin, and Grigory Zinoviev at the Second World Congress

The failure of the "German October" and Lenin's death in January 1924 intensified inner-party struggles in the Soviet Union, which profoundly affected the Comintern.[51] The triumvirate of Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and Stalin moved against Trotsky and his supporters. At an ECCI Presidium session in January 1924, Zinoviev attributed the German failure to the "opportunism" of Karl Radek, Heinrich Brandler, and August Thalheimer, implicating Trotsky by association.[52] "Trotskyism" was branded a "right deviation".[53]

The slogan of "Bolshevisation" was officially proclaimed at the Fifth Comintern Congress (June–July 1924).[53] In practice, it meant creating centralized, disciplined Leninist organizations fiercely loyal to the RCP majority in its struggle against the "Trotskyite opposition".[53] Zinoviev declared the need for "iron discipline" and the eradication of "social-democratism, federalism, 'autonomy'".[54] This led to a series of denunciations and expulsions: Brandler and Thalheimer were removed from the KPD leadership, replaced by leftists Arkadi Maslow and Ruth Fischer; Boris Souvarine was expelled from the French party; and Polish leaders like Adolf Warski were condemned.[54]

The Fifth Congress also marked a tactical shift to the left regarding the United Front. The Theses on Tactics rejected united fronts "solely from above" and re-emphasized the united front "from below" under communist party leadership as a means to unmask reformist "bosses".[55] Radek was removed from the ECCI, and Trotsky was demoted to non-voting status, replaced by Stalin.[55]

Joseph Stalin in the 1920s

However, the period 1925–1926 saw a tentative move back to the centre under Nikolai Bukharin's growing influence in the Comintern, emphasizing a broader conception of the United Front.[56] This coincided with Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country", first propounded in December 1924.[57] This theory argued that the Soviet Union could build socialism without the need for immediate world revolution, and that the main task of communist parties was to defend the USSR.[58] This implied a subordination of the Comintern's revolutionary mission to Soviet state interests and its foreign policy of "peaceful coexistence".[59] A key initiative of this period was the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee, formed in April 1925.[60]

By 1926, Zinoviev and Trotsky formed the United Opposition against the Stalin-Bukharin duumvirate, criticizing "socialism in one country" and the Comintern's rightward turn.[61] The ensuing power struggle dominated the Comintern, leading to Zinoviev's removal as Comintern President in October 1926 (replaced by a "collective leadership" headed by Bukharin) and Trotsky's expulsion from the ECCI and eventually the Soviet Union.[62]

National party responses

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Foreign communist parties responded to Bolshevisation in various ways. Many leaders and members, out of sincere respect for the Bolsheviks' revolutionary success or a sense of disorientation, accepted Moscow's directives, sometimes lapsing into deference.[63] Loyalty to the USSR as the first "socialist bastion" and a commitment to "internationalism" as defined by Moscow were powerful motivating factors.[64] Figures like Palmiro Togliatti of the Italian party ultimately aligned with the RCP majority, recognizing the operational necessity of Moscow's support.[65]

Bureaucratisation within the Comintern and national parties also facilitated Russian control. As world congresses became less frequent, power devolved to the ECCI and its Presidium, which were disproportionately staffed by Bolsheviks and managed the day-to-day workings of the International.[66] However, there was also resistance. "Ultra-left" elements in parties like the KPD challenged the Russification of the Comintern and the perceived subordination of revolutionary goals to Soviet state interests.[67] There was also widespread reluctance to implement specific organizational prescriptions of Bolshevisation, such as the replacement of territorial branches with factory cells and the formation of communist fractions in reformist trade unions.[68] These measures often clashed with local traditions and practical difficulties, leading to slow implementation or outright disregard.[69]

Third Period (1928–1933)

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The years 1928–1933 in Comintern history are known as the "Third Period", a phase of "ultra-leftist" tactics that proved disastrous.[70] This period was characterized by the belief that capitalism was entering its final crisis, leading to a new revolutionary upsurge and impending imperialist wars.[70]

Defeat of the "right deviation"

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The concept of a "Third Period" was first introduced by Bukharin at the Seventh ECCI Plenum (November–December 1926). He posited it as a phase following the initial post-war revolutionary upheaval (First Period) and the relative capitalist stabilization (Second Period), where the internal contradictions of stabilization would lead to a new revolutionary wave.[71] This analysis remained Comintern orthodoxy through the Sixth World Congress (July–September 1928).[72]

However, by 1928, the political landscape within the Soviet Union was shifting. Stalin began to move against Bukharin and his allies (the "Right Opposition"), who resisted his policies of rapid industrialization and forced collectivization.[73] This struggle inevitably extended to the Comintern. The Sixth Congress, while formally still under Bukharin's influence, saw the Stalinist faction begin to construct a "right-wing deviation" within the Comintern, linking it to social democracy.[74] Stalin's pivotal speech at an ECCI Presidium meeting in December 1928 concerning the KPD (the "German question") signalled a decisive move against any "Right faction" in the Comintern, demanding "iron inner-party discipline" and condemning "conciliators".[75] This led to purges of "rightists" and "conciliators" in various parties, such as in Germany, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia.[76] Bukharin himself was removed from his Comintern duties in July 1929.[77] Leading Comintern officials like Dmitri Manuilsky, Osip Piatnitsky, Otto Kuusinen, and Klement Gottwald aligned with Stalin.[77]

Theory and practice of "social fascism"

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Soviet propaganda poster denouncing "social fascism", 1932

The central ideological tenet of the Third Period was the doctrine of "social fascism". This theory, formally expounded at the Tenth ECCI Plenum (July 1929), asserted that social democracy had transformed from a right-wing working-class party into a wing of the bourgeoisie, and in the context of capitalism's final crisis, had become the "moderate wing of fascism".[78] "Left" social democrats (like the Austro-Marxists or the British Independent Labour Party) were branded as the most dangerous enemies, as they allegedly deceived the workers with revolutionary phrases while supporting capitalism.[79]

This doctrine precluded any united front with social democratic leaders and mandated a strategy of "class against class", meaning communists should fight independently for the leadership of the working class.[80] In practice, this led to intense hostility towards social democratic parties and trade unions. The Comintern urged the creation of independent "Red" trade unions or revolutionary oppositions within existing unions, aiming to organize the unorganized and unemployed, who were seen as a key revolutionary force.[81] This policy proved largely counterproductive, isolating communists from the bulk of the organized working class and leading to a decline in membership and influence in many countries, such as Britain and Czechoslovakia.[82]

In Germany, the "social fascism" line had particularly tragic consequences. The KPD, under Ernst Thälmann, directed its main fire against the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), even engaging in joint actions with the Nazis against SPD-led governments (e.g., the Prussian referendum of 1931).[83] This division in the German labour movement fatally weakened its ability to resist the rise of Adolf Hitler.[84] While some local-level collaboration between communists and social democrats occurred, the official Comintern line remained largely unchanged even after Hitler's accession to power in January 1933.[85] Soviet foreign policy concerns, particularly the desire to maintain stable relations with Germany and prevent its alignment with Western powers against the USSR, also played a role in shaping the Comintern's approach, leading to a downplaying of the Nazi threat at times.[86]

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The disastrous consequences of the Third Period, epitomized by the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, led to a gradual and complex reorientation of Comintern policy towards the Popular Front. This era was simultaneously marked by the devastating impact of the Stalinist Great Purge on the Comintern itself.[87]

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Stalin and Georgi Dimitrov in Moscow, 1936

The catalyst for the shift away from "social fascism" came largely from events in France. In February 1934, joint actions by socialist and communist workers against a common fascist threat created a powerful groundswell for unity from below.[88] This coincided with a growing recognition within parts of the Comintern leadership, notably Georgi Dimitrov (who became General Secretary in spring 1934 after his Leipzig trial), that the old tactics had failed.[89] Dimitrov, with Stalin's cautious and vacillating support, began to advocate for broader anti-fascist alliances, including with social democratic parties ("united front from above") and even middle-class "democratic" forces.[90]

The process was driven by a "triple interaction": national factors (such as the anti-fascist unity in France), internal Comintern dynamics (Dimitrov's initiatives and debates between "innovators" and "fundamentalists" like Piatnitsky and Béla Kun), and Soviet foreign policy (the USSR's search for collective security against Nazi Germany, leading to its entry into the League of Nations in 1934 and the Franco-Soviet Pact in May 1935).[91] By mid-May 1934, Dimitrov was pushing for a change in line, and in July 1934, the French Communist Party (PCF) signed a "Pact of Unity of Action" with the French Socialists.[92] The PCF, under Maurice Thorez, then pioneered the call for a broader Rassemblement Populaire in October 1934, extending appeals to the Radical Party.[93]

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The Seventh World Congress of the Comintern (July–August 1935) formally ratified the Popular Front policy.[94] Dimitrov's main report defined fascism as "the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital" and called for a "broad people's anti-fascist front" based on the proletarian united front but extending to the peasantry and urban petty-bourgeoisie.[95] Communists were to defend bourgeois democratic liberties against fascism and present themselves as tribunes of national independence.[95] The Congress resolution allowed for communist participation in Popular Front governments under certain pre-revolutionary conditions, viewing them as potential "transitional forms" to proletarian revolution.[96]

However, the break with the past was partial. The universal applicability of the Bolshevik model was not challenged, and conditions for "organic unity" with socialists remained prohibitively strict.[97] The Popular Front era was marked by an unresolved tension between inherited ideologies and new initiatives.[95] While parties were given more leeway for local adaptation, Moscow's ultimate control remained, especially concerning foreign policy.[98]

French Popular Front demonstration in 1936, including Léon Blum (SFIO), Maurice Thorez (PCF), and Pierre Cot (Radicals)

In France, the Popular Front led to an electoral victory in May 1936 and the formation of a government under Léon Blum, which the PCF supported from outside.[99] This period saw massive growth in PCF membership and trade union influence, but was also characterized by a wave of strikes that alarmed the Radicals and complicated Soviet foreign policy aims of alliance with France.[100] In Spain, the Popular Front's narrow election victory in February 1936 was followed by Francisco Franco's military coup in July, leading to the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939).[101] The USSR and the Comintern provided significant military aid to the Republic, including the organization of the International Brigades.[102] However, Soviet intervention was also aimed at limiting the social revolution and was accompanied by Stalinist purges of Trotskyists (e.g., the POUM) and anarchists, which fatally divided the Republican camp.[103]

Comintern and the Great Purge

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The Popular Front era coincided with the Great Purge in the USSR (1936–1938), which had a devastating impact on the Comintern.[104] Foreign communists and political émigrés in Moscow were heavily targeted.[104] The repression was driven by Stalin's paranoia, xenophobia, and desire to eliminate all potential opposition, real or imagined.[105] Leading Comintern figures like Piatnitsky, Kun, and Vilhelm Knorin were arrested and shot.[106] Entire national sections, most notably the Communist Party of Poland (KPP), were accused of infiltration by enemy agents and dissolved (the KPP in 1938).[107] Thousands of foreign communists perished in the Gulag or were executed.[106] Comintern officials like Dimitrov and Manuilsky were complicit in the purges, though Dimitrov also attempted to save some individuals.[108] The Purge effectively paralyzed the Comintern apparatus and shattered any remaining illusions about its independence.[109]

Comintern in East Asia (1919–1939)

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The Comintern's influence in East Asia was shaped by the context of colonialism, anti-colonial nationalist movements, and the predominance of rural economies.[110] While initial interest focused on Japan, the only industrialized nation in the region, it was in China that the Comintern had its greatest impact.[110]

"Colonial question" and early approaches

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The First Comintern Congress (1919) devoted little attention to the "colonial question".[111] However, by the Second Congress (1920), as European revolution failed to materialize, the Bolsheviks began to see anti-imperialist struggles in the East as a way to stabilize the Soviet regime.[112] Lenin's theses on the national and colonial questions, debated with the Indian communist M. N. Roy, allowed for temporary alliances between communists and "bourgeois-democratic" nationalist forces in colonial regions, provided the proletarian movement maintained its independence.[113] The Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East (September 1920) and the Congress of Toilers of the Far East (January 1922)[114] further formalized this commitment, though they also highlighted the complexities of applying Bolshevik models in agrarian societies lacking a strong industrial proletariat.[115]

In Japan, the Communist International assisted in the socialist movement, eventually forming the Enlightened People's Communist Party, which evolved into the Japanese Communist Party in 1922.[116] In Korea, the Communist International and the Far Eastern Bureau of the CPSU assisted in the communist movement in Korea.

China and the First United Front

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Mikhail Borodin delivering a speech in Wuhan, 1927

In China, the Comintern engaged with both the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and the fledgling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in 1921.[117] Under Comintern guidance, the KMT was reorganized along Soviet lines.[118] In August 1922, the ECCI directed the CCP to enter the KMT as individuals, forming a "bloc within" – the First United Front.[119] This policy, aimed at achieving national independence and unification under KMT leadership, was contested by CCP leaders like Chen Duxiu but ultimately enforced by Moscow.[120] Comintern advisers like Mikhail Borodin played a significant role in both parties.[121]

The United Front initially benefited the CCP, which grew rapidly, particularly after the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925.[121] However, tensions mounted. After Sun Yat-sen's death in March 1925, Chiang Kai-shek consolidated power within the KMT. In March 1926, Chiang moved against the communists within the KMT, but the Comintern, under Stalin's direction, ignored this and continued to support the alliance and Chiang's Northern Expedition.[122] In April 1927, Chiang launched a brutal massacre of communists in Shanghai, effectively ending the First United Front.[123] The Comintern, seeking to preserve Stalin's infallibility, blamed CCP "rightists" and "leftists" for the disaster.[124] Chen Duxiu was removed as General Secretary.[125]

"28 Bolsheviks" and rural soviets

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The Sixth CCP Congress, held in Moscow in 1928 under Comintern supervision, confirmed Stalin's doctrinal "correctness" and initiated a deeper Bolshevisation of the CCP.[126] This period saw the rise of Moscow-trained Chinese cadres, the "28 Bolsheviks" like Wang Ming, who ensured CCP subordination to Comintern directives.[127] The Comintern line emphasized urban proletarian leadership, despite the CCP's growing rural base under figures like Mao Zedong.[128] Li Lisan's attempts to implement Comintern directives to seize major urban centers in 1930 ended in failure, for which he was made a scapegoat.[129]

Wang Ming became CCP General Secretary in 1931, marking the zenith of direct Comintern intervention.[130] However, the CCP leadership, particularly those in the Jiangxi Soviet like Mao, maintained a degree of autonomy, partly due to irregular communications with Moscow and Shanghai.[130] The Long March (1934–1935), forced by KMT encirclement campaigns, saw Mao rise to pre-eminence at the Zunyi Conference (January 1935), challenging the Moscow-backed leadership.[131] The Comintern's adoption of the Popular Front policy at its Seventh Congress (1935) and the growing threat of Japanese expansion led to the formation of a Second United Front between the CCP and KMT in 1937, following the Xi'an Incident.[132] By this time, however, direct Comintern influence over CCP policy had significantly diminished.[132]

World War II and dissolution (1939–1943)

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The period from August 1939 to June 1943 is widely regarded as marking the apogee of the Comintern's subordination to Stalin's foreign policy.[133]

Nazi–Soviet Pact and "imperialist war"

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Stalin and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop shaking hands after the signing of the Nazi–Soviet Pact, 1939

The signing of the Nazi–Soviet Pact in August 1939 led to a dramatic "about turn" in Comintern policy.[133] On 7 September 1939, following a personal interview with Stalin, Dimitrov received instructions to characterize the unfolding war as an "imperialist" conflict between two groups of capitalist states, for which the bourgeoisie of all belligerent states bore equal responsibility. The division between "fascist" and "democratic" capitalist countries was declared to have lost its former sense, and the Popular Front slogan was to be renounced.[134] ECCI Secretariat theses issued on 9 September directed communist parties in belligerent states to actively oppose the "unjust war" and expose its imperialist nature.[135] This marked a fundamental revision of the anti-fascist strategy pursued since 1934.[136]

The new line caused confusion and dissent in many communist parties. The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), for instance, initially supported the war against Nazi Germany but was forced to reverse its position after intervention from Moscow, leading to the replacement of Harry Pollitt as General Secretary by R. Palme Dutt.[137] The PCF was outlawed, and its leaders fled into exile or were arrested.[138] Throughout 1940 and early 1941, the Comintern maintained the "imperialist war" characterization, though the rapid collapse of France in summer 1940 prompted some tentative rethinking regarding communist participation in anti-Nazi resistance in occupied territories.[139]

"Great Patriotic War" and dissolution

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The German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 (Operation Barbarossa) led to another abrupt volte-face. The war was now redefined as a "Great Patriotic War" for the defense of the USSR and an anti-fascist struggle. Communist parties were instructed to give unstinting support to the Allied governments and build broad national fronts and resistance movements.[140]

The Comintern was officially dissolved on 15 May 1943, with the ECCI Presidium recommending its disbandment.[141] The stated reasons were that the centralized international organizational form had become a drag on the further strengthening of national working-class parties and that the diverse conditions in different countries required greater independence and maneuverability.[142] Stalin, in a rare interview, added that the dissolution would expose the "lie of the Hitlerites" that Moscow intended to intervene in other nations and "Bolshevise" them, and would facilitate the work of patriots in uniting freedom-loving peoples against Hitlerism.[143]

The dissolution is widely seen as a gesture by Stalin to appease his Western Allies (Britain and the United States), particularly to facilitate the opening of a second front in Europe.[144] It also reflected the reality that the Comintern had largely ceased to function effectively as a centralized directing body during the war due to disrupted communications.[145] Some scholars argue that the "real dissolution" of the centralized apparatus had already occurred at the start of the war.[146] After 1943, an organizational framework continued in Moscow under Dimitrov, attached to the CPSU Central Committee as the International Department, and through "special institutes" (numbered 99, 100, and 205) that carried on tasks like training cadres, maintaining radio links, and gathering intelligence.[147] This ensured continued Soviet influence over the international communist movement, which would re-emerge more formally with the creation of the Cominform in 1947.[148]

Organization

[edit]
The Communist International published a namesake theoretical magazine in a variety of European languages from 1919 to 1943

The Comintern's organizational structure was designed to be a centralized "world party". Its supreme body was the World Congress, which was supposed to meet annually (later less frequently) to decide on program and policy.[32] Between congresses, the Comintern was directed by its Executive Committee (ECCI).[149] The ECCI, in turn, elected a Presidium to handle day-to-day affairs, and a Secretariat.[35] Other important bodies included the Organisational Bureau (Orgburo) and the International Control Commission (ICC), which was responsible for discipline and ideological purity.[35] The International Liaison Department (Otdel mezhdunarodnoi sviazi, OMS), established in 1921, managed the Comintern's clandestine activities, including funding, communications, and forging documents.[150]

The ECCI and its subsidiary bodies were based in Moscow.[151] The statutes stipulated that the Communist Party of the host country (the Soviet Union) would have a disproportionate influence, holding five seats on the ECCI, while other major parties held one.[152] National communist parties were considered "sections" of the Comintern, bound by its decisions.[31]

World Congresses and Plenums

[edit]

The Comintern held seven World Congresses:[153]

  1. First (Founding) Congress: Moscow, 2–6 March 1919
  2. Second Congress: Petrograd and Moscow, 19 July–7 August 1920
  3. Third Congress: Moscow, 22 June–12 July 1921
  4. Fourth Congress: Petrograd and Moscow, 5 November–5 December 1922
  5. Fifth Congress: Moscow, 17 June–8 July 1924
  6. Sixth Congress: Moscow, 17 July–1 September 1928
  7. Seventh Congress: Moscow, 25 July–21 August 1935

The ECCI also convened thirteen Enlarged Plenums between 1922 and 1933, which served as important decision-making forums between congresses:[154]

  1. First Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 24 February–4 March 1922
  2. Second Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 7–11 June 1922
  3. Third Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 12–23 June 1923
  4. Fourth Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 12–13 July 1924
  5. Fifth Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 21 March–6 April 1925
  6. Sixth Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 17 February–15 March 1926
  7. Seventh Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 22 November–16 December 1926
  8. Eighth Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 18–30 May 1927
  9. Ninth Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 9–25 February 1928
  10. Tenth Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 3–19 July 1929
  11. Eleventh Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 26 March–11 April 1931
  12. Twelfth Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 27 August–15 September 1932
  13. Thirteenth Enlarged Plenum: Moscow, 28 November–12 December 1933

Comintern-sponsored organizations

[edit]

Several international organizations (communist fronts) were sponsored by the Comintern:

Bureaus

[edit]

Historiography

[edit]

The historiography of the Comintern is diverse and has evolved significantly, particularly with the opening of Soviet archives in the late 1980s.[156] Early Western scholarship during the Cold War often depicted the Comintern as a monolithic tool of Soviet foreign policy, emphasizing its subordination to Moscow.[157] "Dissident communist" critiques, such as those by former members like Franz Borkenau or Trotskyist writers, often focused on the Comintern's degeneration under Stalin compared to an idealized Leninist phase.[157] Official communist historiography, particularly during the Soviet era, presented a sanitized and ideologically controlled narrative.[158]

More recent "scientific" scholarly studies, including those by E. H. Carr and Fernando Claudin, have offered more nuanced interpretations.[159] Carr, while not completing a single-volume history, extensively analyzed the Comintern's relationship with Soviet foreign policy, allowing for a degree of autonomous action by Comintern leaders and national parties.[160] Claudin, in his Marxist analysis, argued that the Comintern failed to differentiate between Russian and Western European conditions, leading to flawed strategies.[160]

The opening of the Comintern archives in Moscow has spurred new research, often confirming the extent of Soviet control, particularly under Stalin, but also revealing complexities in the relationship between the center and national sections, and internal debates within the Comintern apparatus.[161] There is ongoing debate about the degree of autonomy retained by national parties and the interplay between Moscow's directives and indigenous factors in shaping communist policies.[162]

Legacy

[edit]

The legacy of the Comintern is overwhelmingly viewed as one of failure in achieving its original aims of worldwide socialist revolution and the liberation of colonial peoples.[163] Instead of being a pluralistic body of enthusiastic revolutionaries, it was gradually transformed into a bureaucratized instrument of the Soviet state, particularly under Stalin.[164] The concept of proletarian internationalism became identified with devotion to the USSR and the duty to protect the "first socialist motherland".[165]

The Comintern's insistence on "iron discipline", intolerance of political rivals, and the ossification of Marxist thought under Stalinism hindered the development of strategies more applicable to diverse national conditions.[165] The processes of Bolshevisation and later Stalinisation led to the demotion, expulsion, and purging of those who resisted Moscow's line.[165] The Comintern legitimized the absurdities of "social fascism", justified the Great Purge and the mass repression of loyal communists, and supported the Nazi–Soviet Pact.[165]

However, the Comintern's legacy is also seen as ambiguous. In the 1920s, it nurtured a range of theoretical responses to contemporary problems, with figures like Trotsky, Bukharin, and Antonio Gramsci offering diverse solutions.[166] During the Popular Front era and World War II, communists were among the most active anti-fascists.[167] The threat of communism may also have spurred capitalist governments to undertake social reforms.[167] After World War II, communism expanded significantly, partly due to the Soviet war effort and the groundwork laid by the Comintern in consolidating disciplined communist parties.[167]

Ultimately, the universalisation of a Bolshevik model specific to Russian conditions, later subjected to Stalinist hyper-centralisation, is seen as a core reason for the Comintern's failures and the eventual demise of the communist ideal.[168] The Leninist party structure and its associated dogmas proved to be an enduring constraint on communist parties adapting to changing post-war realities.[169]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ McDermott and Agnew 1996, pp. 14, 53–54, 85, 124.
  2. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. xviii–xix, 12–13.
  3. ^ a b McDermott & Agnew 1996, p. 1.
  4. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 17–18.
  5. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 27, 31.
  6. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 41–42, 67.
  7. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 68, 98–99, 111.
  8. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 120–121, 130.
  9. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 139, 141.
  10. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 142–143, 146.
  11. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 191, 193–194.
  12. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 204–205.
  13. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 210–211, 217.
  14. ^ a b McDermott & Agnew 1996, p. xviii.
  15. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. xviii–xix.
  16. ^ a b c d McDermott & Agnew 1996, p. xix.
  17. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. xix, 6.
  18. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 1, xv.
  19. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 12, 220.
  20. ^ a b c McDermott & Agnew 1996, p. 12.
  21. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 12–13.
  22. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 13, 222–223.
  23. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 13–14.
  24. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, p. 14.
  25. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, p. 3.
  26. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 6–7.
  27. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, p. 7.
  28. ^ a b McDermott & Agnew 1996, p. 17.
  29. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 17, 226–228.
  30. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 17–18, 226–228.
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  32. ^ a b McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp. 23, 225.
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  169. ^ McDermott & Agnew 1996, p. 218.

Works cited

[edit]
  • McDermott, Kevin; Agnew, Jeremy (1996). The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin. London: Macmillan Press. ISBN 978-0-333-55284-1.

Further reading

[edit]
  • Barrett, James R. "What Went Wrong? The Communist Party, the US, and the Comintern." American Communist History 17.2 (2018): 176–184.
  • Belogurova, Anna. "Networks, Parties, and the" Oppressed Nations": The Comintern and Chinese Communists Overseas, 1926–1935." Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 6.2 (2017): 558–582. online
  • Belogurova, Anna. The Nanyang Revolution: The Comintern and Chinese Networks in Southeast Asia, 1890–1957 (Cambridge UP, 2019). focus on Malaya
  • Caballero, Manuel. Latin America and the Comintern, 1919–1943 (Cambridge University Press, 2002)
  • Carr, E. H. Twilight of the Comintern, 1930–1935. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982. online free to borrow
  • Chase, William J. Enemies within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934–1939. (Yale UP, 2001).
  • Dobronravin, Nikolay. "The Comintern, 'Negro Self-Determination' and Black Revolutions in the Caribbean." Interfaces Brasil/Canadá 20 (2020): 1–18. online
  • Drachkovitch, M. M. ed. The Revolutionary Internationals (Stanford UP, 1966).
  • Drachewych, Oleksa. "The Comintern and the Communist Parties of South Africa, Canada, and Australia on Questions of Imperialism, Nationality and Race, 1919–1943" (PhD dissertation, McMaster University, 2017) online.
  • Dullin, Sabine, and Brigitte Studer. "Communism+ transnational: the rediscovered equation of internationalism in the Comintern years." Twentieth Century Communism 14.14 (2018): 66–95.
  • Gankin, Olga Hess and Harold Henry Fisher. The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origin of the Third International. (Stanford UP, 1940) online.
  • Gupta, Sobhanlal Datta. Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India: 1919–1943 (2006) online
  • Haithcox, John Patrick. Communism and nationalism in India: MN Roy and Comintern policy, 1920–1939 (1971). online
  • Hallas, Duncan. The Comintern: The History of the Third International. (London: Bookmarks, 1985).
  • Hopkirk, Peter. Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin's Dream of a Empire in Asia 1984 (1984).
  • Ikeda, Yoshiro. "Time and the Comintern: Rethinking the Cultural Impact of the Russian Revolution on Japanese Intellectuals." in Culture and Legacy of the Russian Revolution: Rhetoric and Performance–Religious Semantics–Impact on Asia (2020): 227+.
  • James, C. L. R., World Revolution 1917–1936: The Rise and Fall of the Communist International. (1937). online
  • Jeifets, Víctor, and Lazar Jeifets. "The Encounter between the Cuban Left and the Russian Revolution: The Communist Party and the Comintern." Historia Crítica 64 (2017): 81–100.
  • Kennan, George F. Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (1961) pp. 151–93. online
  • Lazitch, Branko and Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Biographical dictionary of the Comintern (2nd ed. 1986).
  • McDermott, Kevin. "Stalin and the Comintern during the 'Third Period', 1928–33." European history quarterly 25.3 (1995): 409–429.
  • McDermott, Kevin. "The History of the Comintern in Light of New Documents", in Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe (eds.), International Communism and the Communist International, 1919–43. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1998.
  • McDermott, Kevin, and J. Agnew. The Comintern: a History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin. (Basingstoke, 1996).
  • Melograni, Piero. Lenin and the Myth of World Revolution: Ideology and Reasons of State 1917–1920, (Humanities Press, 1990).
  • Priestland, David. The Red Flag: A History of Communism. (2010).
  • Riddell, John. "The Comintern in 1922: The Periphery Pushes Back." Historical Materialism 22.3–4 (2014): 52–103. online
  • Smith, S. A. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism (2014), ch 10: "The Comintern".
  • Studer, Brigitte. Travellers of the World Revolution: A Global History of the Communist International (Verso, 2023) online scholarly review of this book
  • Taber, Mike (ed.), The Communist Movement at a Crossroads: Plenums of the Communist International's Executive Committee, 1922–1923. John Riddell, trans. (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2019).
  • Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973. (2nd ed. Praeger Publishers, 1974). online
  • Valeva, Yelena. The CPSU, the Comintern, and the Bulgarians (Routledge, 2018).
  • Worley, Matthew et al. (eds.) Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern: Perspectives on Stalinization, 1917–53. (2008).
  • The Comintern and its Critics (Special issue of Revolutionary History Volume 8, no 1, Summer 2001).

Historiography

[edit]
  • Drachewych, Oleksa. "The Communist Transnational? Transnational studies and the history of the Comintern." History Compass 17.2 (2019): e12521.
  • McDermott, Kevin. "Rethinking the Comintern: Soviet Historiography, 1987–1991", Labour History Review, 57#3 (1992), pp. 37–58.
  • McIlroy, John, and Alan Campbell. "Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern: A historical controversy revisited." Labor History 60.3 (2019): 165–192. online Archived 2021-07-12 at the Wayback Machine
  • Redfern, Neil. "The Comintern and Imperialism: A Balance Sheet." Journal of Labor and Society 20.1 (2017): 43–60.

Primary sources

[edit]
  • Banac, I. ed. The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949, Yale University Press, 2003.
  • Davidson, Apollon, et al. (eds.) South Africa and the Communist International: A Documentary History. 2 volumes, 2003.
  • Degras, Jane T. The Communist International, 1919–43 3 volumes. 1956; documents; online vol 1 1919–22; vol 2 1923–28; vol 3 1929–43.
  • Firsov, Fridrikh I., Harvey Klehr, and John Earl Haynes, eds. Secret Cables of the Comintern, 1933–1943. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2014. online review
  • Gruber, Helmut. International Communism in the Era of Lenin: A Documentary History, Cornell University Press, 1967.
  • Kheng, Cheah Boon, ed. From PKI to the Comintern, 1924–1941, Cornell University Press, 2018.
  • Riddell, John (ed.):
    • The Communist International in Lenin's Time, Vol. 1: Lenin's Struggle for a Revolutionary International: Documents: 1907–1916: The Preparatory Years. New York: Monad Press, 1984.
    • The Communist International in Lenin's Time, Vol. 2: The German Revolution and the Debate on Soviet Power: Documents: 1918–1919: Preparing the Founding Congress. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1986.
    • The Communist International in Lenin's Time, Vol. 3: Founding the Communist International: Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress: March 1919. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1987.
    • The Communist International in Lenin's Time: Workers of the World and Oppressed Peoples Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress, 1920. In Two Volumes. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991.
    • The Communist International in Lenin's Time: To See the Dawn: Baku, 1920: First Congress of the Peoples of the East. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1993.
    • Toward the United Front: Proceedings of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, 1922. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
[edit]