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Endokomuna

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Endo-Communism
Endokomuna
Komunoendecja
LeaderMieczysław Moczar
Bolesław Piasecki
Jan Dobraczyński
Władysław Gomułka[2]
Founded1956; 69 years ago (1956)
Related partiesPolish United Workers' Party
National Party
National Party "Fatherland"
Samoobrona RP
IdeologyNational communism[3]
Marxism-Leninism[1]
Ultranationalism[4]
Catholic communism[5]
Social conservatism[6]
Neo-Stalinism[7]
Political positionLeft-wing to far-left[A]
Main representativesPAX Association
Partisans
Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth
Zjednoczenie Patriotyczne „Grunwald” [pl]

^ A: Despite the implication of being a mixture of the far-left Marxism-Leninism with the right-wing Endecja tradition, endokomuna is placed within the left-wing tradition in Poland, and was considered left-wing in the context of the Polish People's Republic.[8]

Endokomuna or komunoendecja, translated as Endo-Communism, is a term used to describe an ideology within the Polish United Workers' Party, the ruling party of the Polish People's Republic. Initially used to describe a faction, it is now also used to describe the period during which it became the de facto ruling ideology of Poland.[9] The term itself, endokomuna or komunoendecja, is a portmanteau of "endecja" (National Democracy) and "komuna" ("commune", in the meaning of communism). Described as a "peculiar marriage of authoritarian Communism and chauvinist nationalist tendencies",[10] endokomuna represented dogmatic Marxism–Leninism (i.e. opposed to De-Stalinization) combined with ultranationalism and social conservatism of the prewar Endecja movement. As an ideology, it was considered a Polish form of national communism that sought to augment real socialism with nationalism; it was also known for its embrace of Roman Catholicism, fervent anti-liberalism, and the term "banana left", used by Endo-Communists to describe socially liberal, privileged left-wing intellectuals. Similarly to the Endecja movement, it was aggressively anti-Western and Russophilic, arguing that the real danger to Polish sovereignty and national identity was not the Soviet Union, but the Western capitalist bloc.[11]

The origins of endokomuna date back to 1945, when captured Endecja activists agreed to collaborate with Polish communists; the collaborationist Endecja led by Bolesław Piasecki helped the government appeal to Catholic, nationalist and far-right circles.[12] After Polish October in 1956, communist authorities embraced national communism in a bid to maintain popular support, which led to the emergence of the "Partisans", a faction within the communist party led by the Minister of the Interior Mieczysław Moczar that consolidated Endo-Communism into the dominant ideology. The dominance of the Partisans culminated in the 1968 Polish political crisis, where they led an "Anti-Zionist" campaign against the Jewish diaspora.[13] By 1982, the ruling communist coalition was reforged into Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) that appropriated the Endo-Communist ideology and had Jan Dobraczyński, an Endecja activist, as its chairman.[14] Along with PRON, communist authorities also founded the Grunwald Patriotic Union, which organized National Bolsheviks and functioned between 1981 and 1995.[15] After the fall of Polish People's Republic in 1989, endokomuna tendency survived in some socialist and neo-Endecja parties, such as Samoobrona, Party X, National Party and the National Party "Fatherland".[15][16][17]

History

[edit]

Background

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Bolesław Piasecki, founder of PAX Association and one of the main representatives of Endokomuna.[18]

The nationalist Endecja movement, founded by Roman Dmowski in the interwar era, had undergone a radical transformation in the 1940s; during World War II, it was a part of the Polish resistance. At the end of the war, the movement's prominent leaders such as Bolesław Piasecki were captured by the Red Army. While in detention, Piasecki caught the attention of Soviet general Ivan Serov, who praised Piasecki as "genius boy" and held long conversations with him. While in captivity, Piasecki changed his political views, vowing to cooperate with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, endorsing the social and economic reforms of the Polish communists, and declaring his support for their struggle against the "reactionary current in Polish society".[12]

A pre-war Catholic activist, Piasecki proposed that Endecja could assist the communist regime by securing the support of Catholics for the government. After his release in 1945, Piasecki was received by Władysław Gomułka, and put forward his thesis of rapprochement between Polish Marxists and Catholics, which was to benefit both sides and stabilize the communist government. Piasecki discussed his idea of Catholic communism that would consider "God, mankind, nation, and family" its main values while at the same time supporting socialist economic reforms and loyalty towards the Soviet Union. Gomułka was pleased with the proposal, and gave Piasecki green light to founding a Dziś i jutro (Today and Tomorrow) newspaper, organized by numerous Endecja and Catholic writers.[19]

1940s

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Piasecki's defection prompted other important Endecja figures to approach the communist government. Stanisław Grabski, considered the "nestor of Endecja", became a member of the communist-controlled State National Council, and his enthusiastic appeals for "all patriots to enter the state apparatus and sociocultural organizations" mobilized other endeks (members of Endecja) to join the communist state structures and push for the legalization of the National Party. Despite this, the government never sanctioned legalization of the Endecja party; the fact that Endecja did not found its own party but rather infiltrated state structures directly made them avoid persecution as they were not seen to be contesting the communists in power, unlike the Polish People's Party led by Stanisław Mikołajczyk.[20]

According to Jan C. Behrends, the nationalist turn of Polish communism is rooted in Stalin's reconsiderations of nationalism from 1941; this was reflected in the diary of Georgi Dimitrov, the leader of the Communist International:

We will have to develop the idea of combining a healthy, properly understood nationalism with proletarian internationalism. Proletarian internationalism should be grounded in such a nationalism in the individual countries. Comrade Stalin made it clear that between nationalism properly understood and proletarian internationalism there can be no contradictions. Rootless cosmopolitanism that denies national feelings and the notion of a homeland has nothing in common with proletarian internationalism. Such cosmopolitanism paves the way for the recruitment of spies.[21]

Behrends writes that the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) laid the foundations for Endo-Communism in 1940s by using "the neo-Dmowskian nationalism" in order to both appeal to the Polish population and to justify the alliance with the Soviet Union.[21] The Manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation from 1944, is considered to have already started the Endo-Communist tradition in that it borrowed ideological slogans from the Polish nationalist extreme right wing in order to win over nationalist support.[22] Behrends argues that Polish communists introduced the traditional terms of Polish nationalism into communist vocabulary, and "the internationalists of the past had been remade into Polish patriots". PPR claimed to be the sole respresentative of Polish national liberation and tried to link other political factions in Polish politics, such as the peasant party and anti-Soviet socialist, to the occupier. Polish national communism was based on the idea that there was an extensive collaboration between German fascists and Polish reactionaries, and pan-Slavism was used to overcome anti-Russian sentiments in Poland. An important part of Polish national communist traditional was Władysław Gomułka who "had long fostered his image as a national communist", he advocated "a national road to socialism", ruled out forced collectivization of agriculture, and internally criticized the conduct of the Red Army in Poland.[21]

After the 1946 Polish people's referendum, Piasecki proposed in August 1946 "the replacement of the existing conditions by a new political configuration" to Gomułka which would include a Catholic party capable of "improving church-state relations, moderating the bishops’ anticommunist stance, securing Catholic support for the communists, and serving as coalition partner". This proposal was rejected, but the Polish president Bolesław Bierut tweaked the communist rhetoric on Catholicism, stating that he "acknowledged that the Catholic Church occupied a vital position in Polish history and argued that the government had no intention of altering this standing". In 1948 Poland had undergone "Stalinization" - Gomułka was accused of "right-wing nationalist deviation" and removed from the post of secretary-general in favor of Bierut, socialist parties were consolidated into the Polish United Workers' Party, and the opposition was clamped down on. Despite this, Endecja collaborationists endorsed the course and focused on promoting Catholic-Marxist dialogue.[23]

1950s

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With Piasecki's help, the government signed an accord with the Church in 1950 - the Church had to support the regime's economic policies, condemn anti-government activities and limit Vatican's authority to doctrinal and canonical domains in exchange for guaranteed freedom of religion, religious instruction in public schools, and allowed existence of Catholic institutions. In 1952, Piasecki registered the PAX Association, which would become the centre of Endecja-affiliated and Catholic supporters of the communist regime. In 1956, Poland was thrown into disarray by Nikita Khrushchev's denouncement of Stalinism, which divided the Polish communists into two camps - the Puławska group which favored rapid de-Stalinization, and the Natolin faction that urged caution. This event gave PAX a lot of influence, as both camps were willing to grant it concessions in exchange for support. Nevertheless, PAX found the de-Stalinization "traumatizing" and warned against "excessive democratization" which would undermine state authority and test Moscow's patience, thus siding with the Natolin faction.[24]

As the result of the Polish October, Władysław Gomułka was reinstated as the general-secretary and immediately announced his vision of the "Polish road to socialism", considered "a mishmash of ethnonationalism, populism, and communist orthodoxy". Gomułka's rule marked a "renaissance" for Endecja and gave rise to Endo-Communism - PAX was rapidly expanding its membership, and the government also dissolved the "Patriotic Priests" association and put it directly under PAX's tutelage.[25] Endokomuna as an organized movement then emerged in 1956 after Polish October, which put Władysław Gomułka in power. Gomułka's beliefs contributed to the emergence of Endo-Communism - he was accused of "right-nationalist deviation" in 1948 and spent over 3 years in prison, and after coming to power in 1956, he became a champion of a “Polish road to socialism”. Gomułka promised "a truly national communism" in Poland - his reforms included restoring the autonomy and granting concessions to the Catholic Church as well as dismissing Soviet advisers and military officers from Poland in favor of an exclusively Polish administration. His rhetoric stressed the importance of Polish national autonomy, and he sought to legitimatize the communist rule in Poland through Polish nationalism.[26]

Gomułka's policies

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Gomułka's direction of rehabilitating communist system of Poland by infusing it with nationalism was supported by a new generation of party functionaries, the so-called “new class”, that was primarily of peasant background and joined the Polish United Workers' Party after World War II. This direction included appropriating the rhetoric and ideological elements of the Polish pre-war National Democracy movement, referred to as Endecja, whose main ideologue was Roman Dmowski. National communism became increasingly important to Polish communists as they came to rely on it to maintain popular support and national legitimacy.[13] Gomułka actively promoted national communism, arguing that "thinking in the categories of the state and nation... are priceless values"; one of the main national communist thinkers promoted by Gomułka was Zbigniew Załuski, who would become a member of the Endo-Communist "Partisans". In 1957, Załuski gave a lecture named "Patriotic Traditions and the Contemporary Shape of Socialist Patriotism", where, with Gomułka's approval, he declared the Marxist slogan of "workers do not have a nation" to be no longer valid:

Comrades we know that since the times of the Manifesto the world has considerably changed, the international workers’ movement also changed… We ought to remember that we moved quite far away from treating this quote and these thoughts of Marx as they were treated 50 years ago, however, we have not moved away from Marx, but from grasping at half a sentence of his thoughts, and we have moved in the direction of understanding [that] the development of the world went in this direction and that is where our intellectual revisions come from. We have moved in the direction of understanding the second part of the Marxist sentence, because we have observed the process of the proletariat gaining their national fatherlands.[27]

Załuski argued that it was naïve to think that there is a possibility for a contemporary victory for the international proletariat in the form of a worldwide revolution. He affirmed that it was only possible through successive national revolutions. He noted the importance of the "patriotic tie, the tie that binds in some way people who have one language and one historical past, one culture and also one territory", adding that "this patriotic tie has one undeniable value: it exists." He stressed the needed for the party to avoid the mistakes of the rapid industrialization of late 1940s, arguing that it was done without the consideration for the national and local ties, and added that the USSR has likewise made a similar mistake that will from now on be avoided:

Nowa Huta came into being as a great camp of alienated people. And we realized that this process of breaking apart of hitherto small ties, these parish-villages ties, that this process is full of serious dangers, that this process deprives us of something, some order (positive), the order of these people feeling responsibility, who until then felt responsible for their village society. In a word, we came to realize that these small ties, broken apart by modern industry, that these small ties have a certain constructive value.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union, the socialist revolution in relation to its opponent, against an external enemy was the strongest twice in its history in 1920 and in 1942–1944. These were the moments when the socialist idea, the idea of a socialist state was in some way based upon the retrieving of the national tie, or, the very complicated Soviet tie, which is something more than the national tie, the state tie, a certain tradition of unity between nations, which could be found on the former tsarist territories [state]. On the other hand, in a certain sense, the attempts to build a non-national state led to the breaking apart of this tie, if one may say so, with the cutting off of the whole of the past, so the product of this period is the relatively large cutting off of people in Soviet society and making them into enemies during moments of crisis.[27]

Late 1950s

[edit]

Gomułka's policies resulted in the "nationalization" or "Polonization" of the communist party, merging communist and nationalist currents together. The 1960s marked the rapid rise in significance of the Partisans, an ultranationalist faction within the communist party led by Mieczysław Moczar which "represented an even more aggressive brand of red nationalism" than Gomułka. The Partisans came from the high-ranking security and military officers of the Polish People's Army during World War II and later took positions in the military and the police in the Polish People's Republic. Moczar's faction was formed in 1956 as he became the deputy minister of internal affairs, and worked to gather the support of former resistance fighters from both the People's Army and anti-communist Home Army; by the end of the 1960s, Moczar's paramilitary organization, Society of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (ZBOWiD), had 300,000 members, including 60,000 Home Army veterans. Commenting on the rise of the Partisans, Piasecki stated in 1965 that "the patriotic-socialist forces were on the offensive" and referred to Moczar as "my man".[28] Moczar and his Partisans were the main representatives of Endo-Communism - Robert S. Wistrich wrote that it was Gomułka's national communism that "would beget the phenomenon of General Mieczysław Moczar's "Endo-Communism".[29]

Endo-Communism is considered to have become the dominant ideology in the Polish United Workers' Party by the end of the 1950s. Luboš Veselý notes that the emerging dominance of Endo-Communism could be observed by the shift of the ruling authorities' towards nationalities such as Ukrainians - following a brief period of relaxation in the first years after 1956, Polish communists revived the tradition of Operation Vistula, glorifying it as "retribution" for the murder of Karol Świerczewski and an expression of "justified anger of the Polish nation". Polish historian Tadeusz Olszański wrote that this was the result of "the rise of a chauvinistic faction and ideology in the leadership of the PZPR, which over time earned the apt name 'endokomuna'".[30]

1960s

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Fragment of the exhibition devoted to the events of the 1968 Polish political crisis at the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw.

The 1960s are considered to be a decade during which Endo-Communism became the de facto ruling ideology of the Polish People's Republic. Michael Steinlauf wrote that since "endokomuna" was no longer a faction but rather defined the character of the Polish communist rule, it can be used in reference to a specific period in the history of socialist Poland.[9] This could have been observed in contemporary texts - in 1967, S.L. Shneiderman wrote that "the influence in the party and government of erstwhile followers of Endecja has grown to such an extent that liberal Poles are calling the present regime "Endokomuna" (Communism dominated by the Endecja)".[31]

Already in 1960, the dominance of the Partisans became palpable and reported even by international media. In his memoirs, Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, the director of Radio Free Europe, wrote that in a conversation from 1960, Oskar R. Lange told him:

You have fallen into a simplistic pattern of dividing the party into Natolin and the Puławy group. You are operating according to an outdated model of two warring factions. You fail to see that for four years there has been a conspiracy of people with roots in the People's Army guerrilla movement. They have their base in the security services. Their goal is to gradually seize power and the benefits that come with it. The partisans are more dangerous than the Stalinists, because after Bierut's death, the latter had no leader, while the former found a charismatic leader in Mieczysław Moczar.[32]

Moczar was seen as the second most important person in People's Poland after Gomułka. The statements by Moczar and his Partisans appeared daily in the press and television, and their nationalist rhetoric was broadly discussed and analyzed. During state events such as army marches, anniversaries and celebrations, cameras often focused on Moczar. Polish historian Zygmunt Mańkowski wrote: "Moczar was a man of the people, i.e. he had excellent contact with his subordinates, the Partisans, whom he impressed with his enormous courage. He was extremely persuasive in his actions, tall, dark, decisive in his commands and in his entire manner of directing the partisan movements."[32]

In 1964, Moczar was promoted to Minister of Internal Affairs, and by 1965, several of his men had taken important posts in the military and the police. Moczar promoted a partisan mythology similar to Titoism in Yugoslavia, emphasizing the role of "home communists" in the liberation of Poland. The height of Moczar's influence were the years of 1968 and 1969 during the 1968 Polish political crisis. In the Six-Day War, Warsaw Pact sided with the Arab armies, who had been trained and equipped by the Soviets, and all Warsaw Pact countries broke off relations with Israel. Israeli victory was celebrated by Polish Jews and anti-communist activists - Mieczysław Rakowski noted: "The prevailing mood in our society is satisfaction that ‘our’ Jews are beating ‘Russian’ Arabs". Polish Jews "accused the Soviet Union of supporting fascist Nasser" and attacked Polish leadership as well. Gomułka reacted to the news with fury, comparing Israeli soldiers to SS men and declaring: "We will not ignore such events as drunken orgies that took place in some institutions to celebrate the victory of Israel." He spoke of the need to eliminate "Zionist circles among Polish citizens".[33]

Gomułka approved of Moczar's plan to carry out an "anti-Zionist" campaign where Jews suspected of Zionist sympathies were to be purged from public institutions. Initially, the purge was selective and affected mostly army structure and local party organizations. However, Mikołaj Stanisław Kunicki notes that the limited purge escalated tensions across the country: "The removal of Jews from public institutions, a state of ferment among liberal intellectuals and students, an aggressive mood in the party and security apparatus, and the impact of democratization in Czechoslovakia: all these factors produced a situation in which a little spark could set off a major political crisis. As often happens in history, the final eruption was caused by a seemingly marginal event."[34] This marginal event were student protests organized against the government's decision to ban Dziady by Adam Mickiewicz, a 19th-century Polish national epic which the authorities accused of inspiring "behavior hostile to Poland's 'eastern ally'". The protests soon became full-fledged political movement for political and cultural reform.[13]

The Partisans crushed the protests, forcibly dissolving related organizations and either imprisoning or exiling its leaders. The Partisans fought to win over popular support by emphasizing that they were the 'fighters and patriots' of the anti-Nazi resistance, contrasted with the protesting students which the Partisans condemned as "banana left" (implying privileged consumption of delicacies such as bananas). The protests also resulted in a massive escalation of the anti-Zionist purges - mass meetings were called at workplaces to denounce Zionism, and Jewish employes were often "unmasked" and fired. This extended the campaign to every workplaces, and as the result even factory workers or lower-level Jewish workers were fired. Unable to find work, dismissed Jews were permitted to leave Poland under condition of surrendering their Polish citizenship in exchange for an exit permit valid only for Israel. Over 25,000 Jews took this option, which the government showed as a "proof" of the Polish Jews' allegiance to Israel over Poland.[13]

Another struggle led by the Partisans was against the so-called Encyclopedists (Polish: Encyklopedyści), editors of the 8th volume of the prestigious Great Universal Encyclopedia (Polish: Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna). In its 8th volume, the encyclopedia discussed the Nazi occupation of Poland, and made a differentation between "concentration camps" where prisoners lived and worked under conditions designed to hasten death, and "annihilation camps", of which the only purpose was murder and of which nearly all victims were Jews. The Partisans led the wave of demonstrations which accused the editors of denying Polish martyrdom of World War II. Most of the encyclopedia's staff members (some of whom were Jewish) were dismissed, and the government released a "corrected" article which stated that all Nazi camps were intended to exterminate everyone who passed through their gates, Poles or Jews. The corrected article wrote that the German occupation was "the most tragic period in the history of the Polish nation" and added that "the extermination plans of the Nazi occupier assumed the physical annihilation of the Polish population—Poles as well as national minorities: Jews, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Gypsies". Starting in 1968, the government also issued pamphlets where it described the prewar Polish Jewish community as controlled by "bourgeois" and "Zionist" elements.[13]

1970s

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Mieczysław Moczar, the leader of the Endo-Communist "Partisans" faction in 1965, at the height of his political power.[29]

The anti-Zionist campaign was considered a part of a political struggle, as it was speculated that Moczar tried to replace Gomułka as the general-secretary.[13] According to Richard S. Levy, Moczar and his Endo-Communist Partisans tried to replace Gomułka by winning support from Kremlin which was "already unhappy with Gomu¬ka’s failing liberalism", but Gomułka managed to outmaneuver Moczar by sending forces to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and co-opting the anti-Zionist campaign.[35] However, Marcin Zaremba argues that both Moczar and Gomułka "both knew each other from the Communist resistance, which was not insignificant, because it created a bond of a specific character, extremely strong, based upon boundless trust, which is indispensable in a situation of constant threat". He added that both men faced accusations of "right-wing nationalist deviation" before, and the Gomułka's national communism was quite similar to Endo-Communism promoted by Moczar.[27] Nevertheless, after 1968, the influence of both Moczar and Gomułka waned, and Gomułka was dismissed by the party in 1970, and was replaced by Silesian Edward Gierek.[13]

Under Gierek, while the influence of Endo-Communism itself waned, its rhetoric was utilized by the authorities more than before. In fact, Piasecki wrote in 1972: "This is the best leadership of the party and the state we have ever had in the history of People's Poland." Gierek was pragmatic and focused his efforts on improving the economy, seeing it as the basis of the communist party maintaining its rule in Poland. Gierek courted the Catholic Church and nationalist circles, but did so on pragmatic basis.[36] On the other hand, Gierek also pursued partial liberalization, opening Poland to trade with the West and Western influences - Poles would start travelling to other countries en masse, and products of Western mass culture became available in general circulation, along with Western movies and popular music.[27]

Gierek's rule was compared to goulash communism, given his reformist-leaning economic policies, humility and populism. He courted the Catholic Church, offering more building permits for churches and stating his openness to inviting the pope to visit Poland. In December 1977, Gierek traveled to Vatican and met the pope, becoming the first Polish communist leader to do so.[37] Karol Wojtyła, the Archbishop of Kraków who later became Pope John Paul II, praised Gierek as a wise leader, stating that Gierek would have received the help of the Polish episcopate, had he ever needed it. Wojtyła also argued that Gierek should be remembered as the communist leader of Poland "who started to pursue a reasonable policy towards the Church". Archbishop of Wrocław Bolesław Kominek expressed a similar view, stating that Gierek "spoke very reasonably" and that he was much more connected to the people than previous authorities of the Polish People's Republic. In the 1970s, Kominek described Gierek as follows: "He is surrounded by the people and the workers. He is more practical than Gomułka, he is more educated, he knows foreign languages, he spent years in France and Belgium; he has a broader horizon of thought; he was able to establish relations with the Church in Silesia."[38]

Rhetorically, Gierek turned away from communism and towards nationalism - in one of his speeches, he remarked: "Our steps stemmed from the concept of widening the social base of power, therefore in moving away from the dictatorship of the proletariat in the direction of a general national-state." Proletarian rhetoric was largely replaced by calls for national solidarity, but this did not mean abandonment of Marxism–Leninism; Gierek stated: "The historical process of identifying the new socialist Polish nation, a nation of working people, with the people's state was led by, inspired, and directed by our Marxist–Leninist party of the working class." He presented socialism as patriotic, arguing that "socialism ensured Poland's return to its ancient Piast lands on the Oder and the Baltic, once severed by violence, and made possible the rebuilding of a single, compact, Polish nation-state". Particular for Gierek was his usage of Polish pre-WWI history - he renovated the Warsaw Royal Castle and praised the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Polish kings. Marcin Zaremba remarks that "from the very start of the communist rule in Poland national history was never spoken of in this way". Historian Jan Kubik writes of Gierek period:

[Gierek] emphasized (...) the elements of the nation’s heritage that concurred with the vision of the Polish state as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous entity. (...) Thus, construction of the image of an ethnically homogeneous Poland was one of the priorities of the official propaganda and was guarded carefully by the censorship. One of the results of this policy was the almost total elimination of the Jews from official Polish history.[39]

1980s

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Gierek's rule became embroiled in an economic crisis in late 1970s, as the Western markets shrank after the 1973 Oil Crisis, which made Gierek's policy of liberalized trade backfire. After food prices rose rapidly beginning in 1976, his rule was marked by demonstrations, strikes and riots. Unable to contain the growing dissent, Gierek was ousted by his party in 1980. A year before, on 1 January 1979, Piasecki died.[13] After Gierek, Stanisław Kania became the general-secretary and focused exclusively on containing the growing Solidarity movement during his sixteen months of rule.[13] Kania labelled the protesters "revisionist-Zionist, social-Democrat, right-clerical, cosmopolitan, and liberal-bourgeois" and "Jews from the margins".[27] In October 1981, Kania was replaced by the general Wojciech Jaruzelski, who imposed martial law in Poland in December 1981. While the imposition of martial law was generally bloodless, many thousands of activists were taken into custody and kept in prison without trial for months.[13]

Jaruzelski's rule became famous for embracing Endo-Communism - the martial law was "justified almost exclusively through national and patriotic arguments", and the military council that Jaruzelski installed as the new governing body of communist Poland was called the Military Council of National Salvation (Polish: Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego, WRON). Jaruzelski strongly "supported forces that remained nostalgic for the days of General Moczar and Endo-Communism".[13] In 1982, Jaruzelski reorganized the communist-led ruling coalition into Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), and its chairman became Jan Dobraczyński, a long-time associate of Bolesław Piasecki, Catholic novelist and Endecja activist. Endecja was further embraced by the communist authorities in 1986, when Jaruzelski's Advisory Council came to include radical Endecja intellectuals such as Maciej Giertych. Rafał Pankowski stated that in the 1980s, Endo-Communists were "occupying seats in the government and parliament on a scale that surpassed the previous waves of such cooptation in Piasecki's lifetime".[39]

Mikołaj Stanisław Kunicki that by 1980s, Endo-Communists succeeded in "the nationalization of socialism", writing that "a nationalist-communist alliance preceded the official endorsement of nationalism and anti-Semitism by the communist leadership and paved the way for the recognition of a nationalist-communist kinship, which manifested itself in 1968 and came to full fruition under Wojciech Jaruzelski after 1981." Polish communists of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth "relied extensively on the rhetoric of nationalism, including old Piłsudskiite and Endek slogans". Kunicki argues that "Jaruzelski walked in Piasecki's footsteps", noting his patriotic and authoritarian-militarist, where to maintain the communist rule was regarded as a matter of "national interest" and "patriotic responsibility".[40] Zaremba notes that in the 1980s, Polish communists even went as far as directly referencing Roman Dmowski, the founder of Endecja. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Olszowski, stated in 1981:

I would like to remind you that even if Roman Dmowski understood that Poland, as a nation and state, on this scale and with this power can exist and function only on the basis of relying on one of its neighbors . . . And let no one be deluded: it is true that if the Soviet Union will not guarantee our independent existence, our borders, then nobody will guarantee them. A few years will pass, maybe a dozen, and these lasting borders might no longer exist. These aren’t empty threats, it is, unfortunately, the truth.[27]

The communist party approved of the creation of Patriotic Union Grunwald (Polish: Zjednoczenie Patriotyczne “Grunwald”, Grunwald Patriotic Union) which came to be led by Bogdan Poręba. Numbering over 250,000 members by October 1981, it was described as a nationalist-communist formation that took a hardline approach towards reformism and anti-communist opposition and referenced nostalgia towards the 1944-1956 period. Its main programmatic line was resistance against "further decay of the state" and opposing "toward activities that threaten Polish national existence."[27] Grunwald Patriotic Union was named after the site of a medieval battle in which Poles defeated the Teutonic Knights, and served as a medium of nationalist, anti-German and antisemitic agitation; it demanded a plaque to "honor patriots and Communists who had fallen victim to the Zionist terror" and undermined the opposition by spreading rumours about the Jewish origins of Solidarity leaders.[13] It was the main Endo-Communist organization in the 1980s apart from PRON, and was seen as the embodiment of "komunoendecja".[11]

Post-communist relevance

[edit]
Jan Dobraczyński, an associate of Piasecki and Endecja activists who became the chairman of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth.[39]

Shortly before 1989, Jaruzelski changed the course and instead pursued a strategy of reaching a "round table" agreement with Solidarity, mediated by the Catholic Church. This decision was strongly opposed by Grunwald, which took a hardline stance - Grunwald members were ones of the few delegates to vote against the Polish United Workers' Party self-dissolution at its last congress in January 1990. Rafał Pankowski argues that while Grunwald was unable to prevent the Polish Round Table Agreement and collapse of the communist regime, it was successful in terms of "educating a significant group of die-hard nationalist activists" who went on to found and participate in political parties of the 1990s and 2000s Poland, on both the far left and far right.[39]

Pankowski writes that Endo-Communism "survived the communist period as a cultural tradition, reasserted its presence and was re-establishing itself firmly in the country's political culture". While it survived the collapse of the communist regime, Grunwald disintegrated in the early 1990s because of an internal conflict between its leaders, Poręba and Ciesiołkiewicz-Zalewski. Grunwald was formally dissolved in 1995, but its members went on to play significant roles in other parties. The leader of Grunwald, Bogdan Poręba, became a member of several radical nationalist groups, and then became famous for producing a 2005 patriotic drama sponsored by the far-left Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona). Samoobrona, a far-left populist party that combined the traditions of the peasant movement, Catholic social teaching, nationalism, and ‘real socialism’ (Soviet-era socialism), was co-founded by the members of the nationalist wing of the Polish United Workers' Party. Numerous former Grunwald activists also joined Samoobrona, along with neo-endecja parties such as the National Party and the National Party "Fatherland"[41] Eventually, many Grunwald activists became high-ranking members of the neo-endecja party League of Polish Families, which adopted some Endo-Communist elements such as far-left economic policies and taking a harshly critical stance of the anti-communist Solidarity and Workers' Defence Committee, denouncing them as "the representatives of Western agencies".[42]

Jarosław Tomasiewicz wrote that after 1989, the nationalist camp in Poland was amorphous and included socialist overtones, adding that ironically, the post-1989 nationalist tradition in Poland is "not genetically linked to the traditions of the Polish national right", but rather with the national communist tradition of the Polish People's Republic. He noted that many parties, especially the League of Polish Families and the National Party, adopted "Grunwald lines" economically, while Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland adopted a kind of populism that "could be called ‘diluted national Bolshevism’, especially since many activists of this movement come from the Patriotic Union ‘Grunwald’."[15]

Ideology

[edit]

Michael C. Steinlauf defined endokomuna as a "peculiar marriage of authoritarian Communism and chauvinist nationalist tendencies",[10] while Łukasz Drozda described it as a "dogmatic trend of Marxism–Leninism [that is] nationalist, sometimes even Endecja-like, in spirit".[11] Richard S. Levy defined Endo-Communism as a form of national communism, "a mix of Endek (National Democrat) and Communist ideas".[43] Jennifer Stark-Blumenthal described it as a "particular Polish path to socialism" that was "marked by ethno-nationalism, authoritarian and anti-elitist ideals, and tinged by antisemitism".[44] Przemysław Gasztold-Seń wrote that Endo-Communists were "neither typical communists nor true nationalists, but combined elements of both attitudes", but that "its base formed not pre-war Endecja activists, but people close to the communist regime".[45] Łukasz Drozda argued that Endo-Communists were "Marxist–Leninist dogmatists sometimes associated with radical right-wing circles of a neo-Endecja orientation or Christian fundamentalism".[11] Endo-Communism was also described as "a nationalist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic branch of Stalinism" that was inspired not only by prewar Polish nationalism, but also Soviet actions such as the anti-cosmopolitan campaign.[46]

Marcin Zaremba, writing on the main representatives of Endo-Communism in communist Poland, the Partisans,[13] wrote that their ideology was "a unique variety of nationalism expressed with the language of communist doctrine" and was characterized by "aversion toward everything in cultural and scholarly life recognized as non-Polish, affection for the military tradition, and, finally, a revulsion toward even a relative liberalization of political life in the country."[27] Mikołaj Stanisław Kunicki considered Endo-Communist a Marxist–Leninist version of Piłsudski's colonels whose worldview "consisted of fanatical nationalism, anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, a military ethos, and overt opposition to liberalism of all kinds." Endo-Communists were also bound "by a strong sense of military camaraderie" and loyalty to the main leaders of the current, such as Mieczysław Moczar.[47] Jarosław Tomasiewicz described Endo-Communism as an extreme form of national communism, while Jacek Kuroń wrote of the Partisants' Endo-Communism:

Firstly, it was nationalist, military, veteran-oriented and officially opposed to so-called national nihilism. Secondly, it was a somewhat plebeian egalitarian ideology that attacked various privileges – wealth, position, birth. It is in this context that I would place the cult of physical labour, discipline and order, as well as a certain moral puritanism, preached by its heralds.[15]

Bartosz Korzeniewski described Endo-Communism as "military patriotism", stating that it was a combination of the official, state Marxist–Leninism with national ideology and military ethos, together with a strong anti-German and pro-Soviet attitudes. He wrote that this military patriotism served to "nationalise communist ideology", and that the state media actively participated in promoting this ideology, making it enter the national cinematography and popular culture.[48] Kunicki notes that Moczar and his Partisans particularly cultivated this myth, writing that Moczar glorified the communist partisans and projected an image of patriotic “boys from the forest."[49] This was also joined with the doctrine of PAX Association and Piasecki, who argued that "the whole history of People's Poland has demonstrated that the terms ‘people's’ and ‘national’ are fully compatible" and wrote that "patriotism was socialist and that socialism was patriotic". For Piasecki, anyone who opposed the incorporation of nationalism into communism was "guilty of antisocialist aberration".[50]

Nationalism

[edit]
Pins of main movements related to endokomuna - Endecja, PRON, and ZBoWiD.

Endo-Communists actively promoted the concept of national communism and sought to be seen as such. Considering the classic Marxist–Leninist doctrine too alien to the Polish society, Endo-Communists instead cultivated a "national-plebeian" tradition that portrayed Polish socialism as a continuity of pre-war and WW2-era Polish struggles for national liberation and a more egalitarian economic system.[32] Given its extreme nationalism, endokomuna was also described as 'chauvinist',[10] or ultranationalist.[4] The main belief behind the nationalism of Endo-Communism was that communism needs to attain a "national coloring" by embracing nationalist and patriotic tradition because "the strivings of the Polish worker movement were animated by the same patriotism as the national-liberationist struggle", noting that both socialist revolutions and nationalist insurrections were marked by sacrifice, courage and a far-reaching collective goals. Nationalism was regarded as "mistress and teacher of life", and Endo-Communism was critical of socialist movements that either denied the power of nationalism, or sough to "disarm the nation morally" by encouraging cosmopolitanism;[27] Western cultural influences, Zionism and liberalism were seen as particularly destructive to the "national organism" of People's Poland.[11]

However, Endo-Communism did not reject internationalism, and instead embraced it. The Polish loyalty towards the Soviet Union was justified by arguing that the USSR is not just a Polish ally, but a part of the Polish nation and a collective Slavic nation. Moczar stated: "The Soviet Union is not only our ally, it is a saying for the nation. For us, partisans, the Soviet Union is our homeland, and I cannot define our borders today, today they are behind Berlin, and tomorrow in Gibraltar." The interest of Endo-Communism was also shown by its condemnation of Israel and strong support for Arab anti-imperalist movements, in particular Nasserism.[51] At the same time, Endo-Communism is credited with "nationalizing" Polish communism,[32] cultivating the myth of the insurrectionist tradition of Polish history. It harshly denounced those who questioned the meaningulness of Polish freedom uprising and insurrectionist uprisings, which partially motivated their anti-Zionism.[27] Endo-Communists became popular by successfully presenting themselves as "indigenous" communists - other Polish communists were accused of being distant from the Polish proletariat and labelled “shinels” (“overcoats”), as they "came to Poland with the Red Army", while the Endo-Communists spent the World War II in anti-fascist guerillas and conspiracies.[51]

A unique and controversial aspect of Endo-Communism was its rehabilitation of the Home Army, a Polish resistance group unaffiliated with the Soviet Union, of which many members would later form the "cursed soldiers" - anti-communist resistance. Endo-Communists argued that the role of anti-communist and non-communist partisans in fighting Nazi Germany has to be recognized and respected, while Moczar went as far as stating that non-communist Polish partisans were needlessly alienated and turned towards anti-communism because of misguided socialist practices. He pointed to the example of Antoni Heda (known as "Szary"), known for the Raid on Kielce Prison, speaking of him: "he held a good position against the Germans, and later, through our own fault, he would go breaking up [communist] prisons". Endo-Communists argued that "blood has one colour", and that anyone who fought for free Poland, regardless of his stance on communism, should be considered a hero and included in the new socialist Poland. Numerous actions were pursued by the "Partisans" to court non-communist war heroes, including providing them pensions, ensuring their release from prisons, and putting a halt on repression against them. This made Endo-Communism popular amongst non-communist nationalist circles.[32]

Anti-revisionism

[edit]

Endo-Communists were highly critical of anti-Stalinist forms of communism and socialism, including Trotskyism, Khrushchevism and other socialist movements supportive of De-Stalinization. Endo-Communists argued that these movements are "isolated from the working class, as well as from the vast majority of the Polish nation, unable even to empathise with its needs".[11] Such revisionist, anti-Stalinist or anti-nationalist movements were referred to by Endo-Communists as bananowcy ("bananists" or "banana left", implying privileged consumption of delicacies such as bananas),[13] and denounced as being nothing but "a frustrated section of high school and university students from the elite circles". They stated that the "vast majority" of both banana left and anti-communist activists were "people from well-off intellectual, petty bourgeois or even capitalist families". These movements were accusated of "subjective and individualistic interpretations of the global revolutionary process", "reducing revolutionary struggle to a physical confrontation between the forces of social progress and the coercive apparatus of the bourgeois state" and derailing the Marxist–Leninist state in favour of "their own particular conception of the revolutionisation".[11]

The Endo-Communist dogmatism towards Marxist–Leninism and legacy of Stalin was also justified from the nationalist perspective; Grunwald Patriotic Union argued that Stalinism is not a danger to the Polish nation, while Trotskyism "seeks to destroy all cultures based on faith in God" and that "the Trotskyists are primarily concerned with destroying everything that is Polish, historical, national, Christian, and even with our destruction, or at least our biological weakening, i.e. the extermination of the Polish people themselves." Drozda wrote that the main reason why the USSR was not alarmed by the ultranationalist rhetoric of Endocommunism was because of its extremely hostile attitude towards Trotskyism and all other forms of socialism that were critical of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact.[11]

Social conservatism

[edit]

Endo-Communism justified Marxism–Leninism in socially conservative terms, arguing that the Soviet domination protected Eastern Europe from the cultural revolutions and departure from traditional values and family values in the Western capitalist camp. Endo-Communists believed that "the Russian people are not our enemies, and Russian interests are not contrary to Polish interests", and noted that even non-communists should see that the Soviet Union, with its morally conservative values, is a better partner for Poland than the West, which would seek to erode Polish nationalism, Catholicism and moralism in favor of cosmopolitanism, atheism and hedonism.[11] Moczar, the leader of the Partisans faction, mocked introduction of foreign culture onto Polish soil, calling the Westernophile youth "pathetic youthful parrots".[27]

Given that the Endo-Communists controlled the security service of People's Poland, they played a decisive role in shaping the attitude of the state apparatus towards cultural issues. While People's Poland is credited with legalizing abortion and it never officially criminalised homosexuality, social conservatism prevailed. Officially, homosexuality was treated as a 'social pathology', and homosexual circles were invigilated and subjected to blackmail through Operation Hyacinth. There was no feminist wave in Poland, and until its very dissolution, the communist authorities treated youth movements with disdain and extreme suspicion, contrasting them with nationalist youth unions cultivated by circles such as Endo-Communism.[11] The Partisans saw women as mothers first and foremost, stressing that motherhood is the social obligation of every woman, and that women need to be taken care of and rewarded by men for their sacrifices.[32] Abortion was also opposed by Endo-Communists and cited as an example of Western moral degeneracy - Józef Kossecki, a member of the Grunwald Patriotic Union, wrote:

Currently, in major capitalist countries – primarily in the USA, Canada, England and Sweden – abortions are legally performed on a large scale, even in the seventh month of pregnancy. Advanced pregnancies are terminated by doctors there using caesarean sections, and the subsequent children, most of whom are alive and are in fact normal premature babies, are burned in crematoria or used in experiments during which they are killed. A highly profitable industry has developed in these countries around such practices.[52]

Endo-Communism also utilized social conservatism and nationalism in order to criticize the West and the anti-communist opposition; Endo-Communists spoke of the "anti-national function of the political underground in Poland", and argued that should capitalism be restored in Poland, it will lead to liberal and anti-clerical reforms "all the way to the regression of national culture". A PZPR declaration from 1984 argued: "The realities of today's world as such that anti-communism excludes patriotism and the fight against socialism excludes slogans about the good of the nation. One cannot separate concepts of patriotism from class interests and one cannot speak of just any kind of Poland, because it is socialist."[27] Endo-Communists argued that after decades of alliance with the USSR, it became clear that the Soviets did not seek to "destroy the biological fabric of the nation", while the Western-funded opposition did.[11]

Przemysław Gasztold-Seń defined Endo-Communism as left-authoritarian, writing that it took socially conservative positions, and was of "conservative and puritan" regarding cultural issues. Initially fighting jazz and rock-and-roll, Endo-Communists later also clamped down on metal music as a part of its plan to suppress Western cultural elements, which they regarded as 'imperialist infiltration'. Grunwald Patriotic Union called for protection of Polish culture and patriotism from the "flood of Western nihilism developed out of the vulgarized existentialist philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre." Endo-Communism stressed the needed to protect and develop "Marxist, Christian, and most importantly national values". Endo-Communists also founded youth and paramilitary organizations that would halt the "deideologization and demoralisation of the young generation of Poles", stating that Poles must be raised in nationalist values in order to become "immune from the cosmopolitan influences of Western ideology, culture, and consumptionist way of living".[53]

International matters

[edit]
Pins of Polish organizations related with Endo-Communism - the Grunwald Patriotic Union, Endecja, ZBOWiD, PZPR, PRON and Samoobrona.

In regards to foreign policy, Endo-Communism called for acceptance of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, which it found both necessary and the only guarantee of establish Polish independence and sovereignty in the long-term. Endo-Communists warned against the threat posed by capitalist West Germany and its "Nazi revanchists", and strongly emphasized the Polish People's Republic founding myth of Polish anti-Hitler resistance. They noted that it was only thanks to the Soviet Union and Polish resistance that Poland was liberated from Nazi occupation, while the West often took a passive stance towards Nazi Germany and ultimately betrayed Poland (Western Betrayal). The circles of Endo-Communism wrote a particularly scathing critique of Solidarity, stating: "Apparently Solidarity is blind to the victory at Stalingrad, which was a turning point in the war in favour of the anti-Hitler coalition. However, this is hardly surprising. You will not find a single word in their speeches and articles, including those published in the Western press, about the retaliatory forces in West Germany or about the danger posed by those groups that have not renounced the idea of Drang nach Osten. As the saying goes, ‘Show me your friends and I will tell you who you are’."[11] Endo-Communists emphasized "the unity of the Eastern Bloc in the face of the American-Germanic threat and drew generously from old Pan-Slavic myths, whether about Slavic cultural brotherhood or about the role of Russia".[54]

Another prominent foreign policy view of Endo-Communists was Anti-Zionism. Moczar frequently spoke of the suffering of the Arab population 'under the yoke of Israel' and described Israel as a country "on whose territory, even before last June, there existed ghettos for Arabs, ghettos organized by the same people who once worked as policemen in the Hitlerite ghettos of our cities." Government-affiliated media presented cases of Jewish cooperation with Nazi Germany during World War II, including Jewish police forces, the Judenräte and the Jewish informers of Gestapo. One of the most controversial claims was that Jews who had collaborated with the Nazis during the war were now responsible for the persecution of Arabs under Israel.[55]

Economic issues

[edit]

Endo-Communists rarely commented on economic matters, but nevertheless presented a unique vision on the direction of Polish socialism. Their economic proposals for reform were variously described as "primitive populist" and "anti-elitist",[44] as well as "plebeian egalitarian".[15] The main assumption of the economic proposals of Endo-Communism was to establish national communism through safeguarding Polish economic sovereignty, promoting economic patriotism, and adopting socialism to the national pecularities and conditions of Poland. Endo-Communists also called for restoring the economic policies of Stalin, arguing that post-1956 reforms loosened necessary socioeconomic controls and thus gave rise to corruption, exploitation and black market.[56] As part of national communism, Endo-Communists proposed replacing Jewish and foreign-born workers and functionaries with ethnic Poles, arguing that Polish socialism had hitherto unfairly favoured ethnic minorities and prevented social advance of the Polish workers; after the 1968 purges, vacant position were decentralized into lower-level positions, which helped "thousands of ethnic Poles rise in the bureaucracy". There was also a redistributive factor in regards to housing, as the luxurious apartments of officials purged by Endo-Communists were then distributed to Polish families, which in effect "allowed many families to improve their living situation".[44]

Endo-Communists were critical of consumerism and policies that encouraged it.[57] They also defended central planning of the economy and opposed policies that served to increase economic competition or introduce various elements of capitalism. Similarly, Endo-Communists denounced anti-inflation policies as well as the concept of workers' self-government, which they saw as corruptible and easily exploited by political opposition. Instead, they encouraged increasing the role of computers in the economy, especially in terms of optimizing state planning.[58] Endo-Communism also opposed the reforms of Edward Gierek, arguing that the loans taken from the West would make Poland economically dependent on the West, eventually turning it into a semi-colony of USA and Western Europe in the process. Endo-Communists denounced what they called "parametric-market reformism", which they defined as increases of market dynamics and economic interactions with the capitalist West; in their view, these policies only served to enslave Poland and undermine Polish socialism. They also strongly opposed any presence of "non-Polish capital" in Poland, and opposed the presence of Polish companies abroad. According to Endo-Communists, establishing economic presence in other countries was "the gradual sell-off of our country" in that Polish companies benefited foreign capital rather than the Polish one, and undermined the need to establish economic self-reliance of Poland. Endo-Communists frequently warned that the West did not wish well to Poland, but instead had plans to turn it into a "neocolony". Given its emphasis on national conditions and the need for self-reliance, the economic proposals of Endo-Communism were compared to the 'national road to socialism' of Peronism as well as Juche.[59]

Views on religion

[edit]

One of the unique characteristics of Endo-Communism was its reconsideration of religion - Endo-Communists believed that both Marxism and Catholicism worked 'for the good of humanity', with Catholicism being a 'spiritual plane' for materialist Marxism. While recognizing nationalism as revolutionary, Endo-Communists connected Catholicism to it, recognizing the Catholic faith as the cornerstone of Polish national identity. Bolesław Piasecki, the leader of PAX, went as far as promoting a "Marxist-Catholic-nationalist trinity" - Polish communists were to legitimatize their rule and gain popular appeal by allowing Catholicism to "enrich Marxism spiritually", while embracing nationalism was to deny the opposition the claim to represent national interests of Poland.[60] The Endo-Communist circles included the "priest-patriot" movement, composed of left-wing nationalist Catholic priests who were supportive of the communist regime.[54] The ideas of PAX Association gained respect of some Catholic theologians, most notably French personalist philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, who considered the movement "genuine Christian revolutionaries". Mounier argued that Polish Catholics should establish a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union, adopt socialism "which in its Polish version was not anticlerical" and reconcile Catholicism with Marxism. This stance was shared by the Endo-Communists, who believed that Catholics should prove to communists that they are not "defenders of the bourgeoisie".[61]

Some Catholic priests who were critical of the anti-communist opposition were allied with the Endo-Communist movement. Endo-Communists regarded Catholicism very positively, and argued that that the Church must not allow itself to be instrumentalized by the pro-Western opposition; Endo-Communists argued that the accusations of communist persecution of religion were often fabricated, whereas the West was the true enemy of Christianity given its anti-clericalism, secularism, and disregard for Christian morality - abortion was frequently cited as an example of the Western disregard for Christianity. Endo-Communism also stressed that the logical conclusion of the Catholic social teaching is to "fight capitalism and install socialism compatible with the principles of Catholic morality". It was also argued that Catholics must struggle against a system that is "socialist in name only, in reality being devoid of any socialism in its content". Endo-Communists portrayed capitalism as a system that destroys Catholic values, and argued that the preservation of 'traditional values' is a "common duty of both communists as well as Catholics". Endo-Communist movements also often sermons critical of the opposition, and stated that Solidarity only wants to use the Church, speculating that it will sideline religion once coming to power.[62]

Comparison with other states

[edit]

Michael Shafir describes endokomuna as a form of national communism with "the assimilation of ideas with direct linkage to the prewar Endecja". He argues that endokomuna was a part of a wider trend towards national communism that started in the Soviet Union and then spread to the rest of the Warsaw Pact under Joseph Stalin. According to Shafir, there emerged national communist interpretatons of Stalin's socialism in one country doctrine, and chauvinist tendencies were furrther inflamed by the "highly anti-Semitic campaign against cosmopolitanism in the late 1940s and early 1950s" in the Soviet Union; afterwards, in Soviet countries "nationalism took the form of National Bolshevism".[63]

Shafir wrote that endokomuna was "hardly peculiar", as with the exception of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, all Warsaw Pact countries embraced similar forms of national communism. He points to Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania, whose communist ideology adapted "the world outlook of the interwar Fascist Iron Guard encoded in all but official acknowledgment in party documents", as well as Enver Hoxha in Albania and Todor Zhivkov's "xenophobic communism" in Bulgaria. Shafir concludes that "national communism, though it may seem to be a political oxymoron, became increasingly the norm by the 1970s and certainly by the 1980s as the Marxist–Leninist regimes sought to hold on to power in face of collapsing political legitimacy", and that a "large part of the post-Communist East Central European political spectrum is occupied by parties of 'radical continuity' and – to a lesser, but not inconsiderable – extent by parties of 'radical return' to the values embraced by the interwar radical right".[63]

See also

[edit]

References

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  1. ^ a b Drozda, Łukasz (2015). Lewactwo. Historia dyskursu o polskiej lewicy radykalnej (in Polish). Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa. p. 93. ISBN 978-83-62744-83-1. „Grunwald" był najbardziej znaną organizacją komunoendecką, ale do tego samego nurtu zaliczano i inne instytucje i organizacje bliskie partyjnemu betonowi. Taką rolę spełniał zwłaszcza w pierwszym okresie swojego istnienia (do stanu wojennego) tygodnik „Rzeczywistość", często mylnie łączony z „Grunwaldem" jako jego rzekomy organ prasowy. [...] Wszystkie te organizacje można traktować jako marksistowsko-leninowskich wrogów polskiego „lewactwa". [Grunwald was the most well-known Endo-Communist organisation, but other institutions and organisations close to the party leadership were also considered part of the same movement. All these organisations can be regarded as Marxist-Leninist enemies of the Polish ‘lewactwo’.]
  2. ^ Banas, Josef (1979). Lionel Kochan (ed.). The scapegoats: the exodus of the remnants of Polish Jewry. Translated by Tadeusz Szafar. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. p. 201. Fourteen years of Gomulka's second period of rule (October 1956 to December 1970) might be considered an exercise in moderate Endo-Communism.
  3. ^ Levy, Richard S.; Paulsson, Steven (2005). Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution. Vol. 2: L-Z. ABC-CLIO, Inc. p. 468. ISBN 1-85109-444-X. Moczar had already displayed antisemitic views while holding his post in Lodz: he expressed the opinion that the number of Jews in the security apparatus was excessive and was undermining the party's credibility. Later, as head of the partisans, he advocated "national Communism" or "Endo-Communism"—a mix of Endek (National Democrat) and Communist ideas—as a way of enhancing the party's popularity.
  4. ^ a b Kunicki, Mikołaj Stanisław (2012). Between the Brown and the Red: Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in 20th-Century Poland — The Politics of Bolesław Piasecki. Ohio University Press. p. 141. ISBN 978-0-8214-4420-7. Did he mean the Partisans of Mieczysław Moczar—the ultranationalist faction within the party and the security apparatus—or the broad antireformist front that united Moczar's men and Gomułka's entourage? In fact, he may have been referring to both.
  5. ^ Kunicki, Mikołaj Stanisław (2012). Between the Brown and the Red: Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in 20th-Century Poland — The Politics of Bolesław Piasecki. Ohio University Press. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-8214-4420-7. He pledged to build a Catholic-Marxist alliance and to mobilize the nationalist Right in the establishment of a socialist Poland. Piasecki proposed the creation of a dual political system embodied by a communist-Catholic ruling coalition. He believed that under the ideological guidance of PAX, Catholics, communists, and nationalists would be united in the service of God, socialism, and nation. Piasecki's concept was socialist in its form and nationalist in its content, since he always viewed Catholicism as central to Polish national identity.
  6. ^ Drozda, Łukasz (2015). Lewactwo. Historia dyskursu o polskiej lewicy radykalnej (in Polish). Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Książka i Prasa. p. 93. ISBN 978-83-62744-83-1. W Polsce pod postacią biurokratycznego, konserwatywnego obyczajowo realnego socjalizmu... [In Poland, this took the form of bureaucratic, socially conservative real socialism...]
  7. ^ Miguel, Alcebíades Diniz. "Visões do inferno histórico: a "trilogia de guerra" de Andrzej Wajda" [Visions of the historic hell: the "war trilogy" by Andrzej Wajda]. Arquivo Maaravi: Revista Digital de Estudos Judaicos da UFMG (in Portuguese). 1 (1). Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais: 5. doi:10.17851/1982-3053.1.1.3-15. ISSN 1982-3053. Com Gomulka, as bases do "endocomunismo", uma variante nacionalista, xenófoba e anti-semita do regime stalinista que seria adotada com adaptações, até pela URSS a partir dos anos 1960 para combater as minorias nacionalistas – eram lançadas. [With Gomulka, the foundations of ‘endocommunism’ were laid, a nationalist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic variant of the Stalinist regime that would be adopted with adaptations, even by the USSR from the 1960s onwards to combat nationalist minorities.]
  8. ^ Gasztold-Seń, Przemysław (2012). Jerzy Eisler; Kazimierz Przybysz (eds.). Koncesjonowany nacjonalizm. Zjednoczenie Patriotyczne Grunwald 1980-1990. Monografie (in Polish). Vol. 77. Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej - Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. p. 49. ISBN 978-83-7629-335-6. Na określenie środowiska ludzi tworzących Zjednoczenie Patriotyczne „Grunwald" oraz pokrewnych organizacji wymiennie stosowane są zwroty: lewica partyjna, polska lewica partyjna, lewica patriotyczna, lewica narodowa, lewacy, narodowi komuniści, komunofaszyści, konserwatyści, twardogłowi, prawidziwi komuniści, dogmatycy, beton partyjny. W taki sposób (w większości) przedstawiali się sami zwolennicy tych grup [...] Liberałami, reformatorami, pragmatykami, rewizjonistami czy prawicowym odchyleniem nazywani są zwolennicy szerokich reform w łonie PZPR, zwolennicy dialogu z „Solidarnością", w tym przedstawiciele tzw. porozumień poziomych. [The following terms are used interchangeably to describe the people who make up the Grunwald Patriotic Union and related organisations: the party left, the Polish party left, the patriotic left, the national left, leftists, national communists, communist fascists, conservatives, hardliners, true communists, dogmatists, party hardliners. This is how (most) supporters of these groups presented themselves [...] Supporters of broad reforms within the PZPR, supporters of dialogue with Solidarity, including representatives of the so-called horizontal agreements, are called liberals, reformers, pragmatists, revisionists or right-wing deviants.]
  9. ^ a b Engelhardt, Arndt; Fiedler, Lutz; Gallas, Elisabeth; Gordinsky, Natasha; Graf, Philipp (2016). Ein Paradigma der Moderne Jüdische Geschichte in Schlüsselbegriffen: Festschrift für Dan Diner zum 70. Geburtstag (in German). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. p. 174. ISBN 978-3-647-30084-9.
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