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Battle of Subei
Part of Second Chinese Civil War
Suqian County Shandong Field Army
Date 1946 Location Jiangsu Province Suqian County
Belligerents
Shandong Field Army Central China Field Army	National Revolutionary Army National Revolutionary Army Reorganized 69th Division National Revolutionary Army 11th Reorganized Division
Commanders and leaders
Su Yu	Dai Zhiqi× Rao Shaowei Hu Lian
Strength
24 groups	6 half-brigades, 14 regiments
Casualties and losses
－8,000	21,000

The Battle of Subei refers to a major campaign launched in December 1946 following the merger of the command structures of the Shandong field army and the Central China field armies. It took place in the northern part of SuqianCounty, Jiangsu Province, where the weaker National Revolutionary Army Reorganized 69th Division was encircled and annihilated. The division commander, Dai Zhiqi, committed suicide, and the deputy commander, Rao Shaowei, was captured. A reinforcement attempt by the Reorganized 11th Division was repelled, with part of its forces destroyed.

Background

After the Communist forces lost both South and North Huai regions in 1946, they withdrew to Central and Northern Jiangsu, facing increasingly adverse strategic conditions. Leaders from the Shandong and Central China field armies realized that concentrating forces was necessary to reverse the situation. On September 17, 1946, Chen Yi telegraphed Central China leaders Zhang Dingcheng, Su Yu, Deng Zihui, and Tan Zhenlin, proposing to join forces and alter the unfavorable situation. On September 20, they responded, suggesting a joint operation of the Shandong and Central China field armies to capture Suqian and then expand westward. Chen Yi agreed and proposed merging the two command structures. The Central Committee replied on September 22 in favor of this unification and issued orders to launch operations in the Huaihai area. On September 23, it was decided that Chen Yi would be commander and political commissar, Su Yu as deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin as deputy political commissar.

On October 13, Mao Zedong telegraphed Chen Yi and others, supporting a major campaign in the Huaihai area by combining the Shandong and Central China armies. He also directed that the 8th Division remain in southern Shandong temporarily. Following discussions with the Central China Bureau, Chen Yi reported back on October 15 that Su Yu would lead the 1st and 6th Divisions north to Shuyang for potential engagements. He also mentioned that the Shandong army planned to initiate combat operations starting with one or two enemy regiments. The Central Committee approved, entrusting Su Yu with operational command.

On October 18, after the merger of the two commands, a joint telegram from Chen Yi, Su Yu, Tan Zhenlin, Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, Tang Liang, and Chen Shiju was sent out, assigning operational duties. It noted that enemy units advancing from the west were generally weaker—such as the 69th, 67th, 28th, 26th, 77th, and 39th Divisions—compared to stronger forces coming from the south like the 74th and 7th Divisions. The PLA decided to annihilate the eastern-advancing forces while pinning down the southern units, including using the 10th, 11th, and 9th Columns along with Pi Brigade.

The PLA expected the 74th Division to target Lianshui and the 7th Division to aim for Shuyang. To counter them, ten regiments from the 11th and 9th Columns and Pi Brigade were assigned to hold back five to six enemy regiments. The 9th Column was tasked with potentially crossing the canal for a strategic flanking move.

By October 21, the Central China field army’s 23 regiments advanced south to engage the 74th Division near Lianshui, while 15 regiments from the Shandong field army remained in Shuyang. Chiang Kai-shek expressed dissatisfaction with slow progress in northern Jiangsu and ordered more aggressive operations. On October 27, due to increased threats in southern Shandong, Chen Yi led the 8th Division back to the region to launch a counteroffensive in early November, disrupting enemy advances and stabilizing the railway north of Longhai. Central China forces conducted several battles to stabilize the southern flank of the Huaihai front. By mid-December, conditions were favorable for a joint operation in Shuyang.

The convening of the National Assembly in early December 1946 marked the breakdown of peace talks, allowing unrestricted military offensives. On December 7, the Xuzhou Pacification Headquarters issued Order No. 7 to destroy Chen Yi's forces south of the Longhai railway. From December 12, a multi-pronged offensive began.

Combat Operations

The re‑organized 69th Division reached its attack positions near Suqian County on 12 December. On the 13th, the 41st Brigade seized Renhewei, the 60th Brigade took Zhangshan Town, and the Reserve 3rd Brigade advanced to Xiaodianzi. The Reserve 3rd Brigade, equipped with Japanese arms, contained the 7th and 9th Regiments and a mountain‑artillery battalion—approximately 6,000 troops. Deployment: Division HQ, 7th Regiment, and mountain artillery at Xiaodianzi; 9th Regiment at Zhangshan Town with an enhanced battalion and two mountain guns defending Fengshan. Division deputy commander Maj‑Gen Rao Shaowei recalled that on the 13th, “the 41st Brigade reached Miaozhuang, and the Reserve 3rd Brigade relieved the 60th in defending Fengshan and Xiaodianzi. Dai Zhiqi then ordered the 60th to advance northeast of Fengshan to link with HQ… leaving only the Reserve 3rd to hold Fengshan–Xiaodianzi. HQ and the 60th and 41st shifted into the plains.”

Major‑Gen Hu Lian’s re‑organized 11th Division assembled at Caojiajie. On the night of 13 December at Shunheji, on the east bank of the canal, regimental‑and‑above commanders decided to begin at 07:00 on 14 December:

• Cavalry battalion would scout toward Lailong’an–Shuyang.
• 18th Brigade (left column) would advance along the Suqian–Shuyang road.
• 118th Brigade (right column) would advance south of the Yi River toward Shuyang; upon contact, capture Lailong’an and link to the 69th Division’s left column.
• 11th Brigade would gather near Jingertou, on the north bank of Liutang River.
• Division HQ and direct units would follow the 18th Brigade toward Caojiajie.

On 14 December, under cover of eight aircraft, the 11th Division assaulted the Xiaopingfang and Lailong’an defenses held by the Communist 9th Column. 18th Brigade’s 53rd Regiment advanced from Gaowei, captured Shiliuwei and Qinzhuang, and launched multiple assaults on Xiaopingfang but was repelled. Meanwhile, 118th Brigade’s 33rd Regiment, launching from Caizhuang against Lailong’an, bombarded followed by infantry charges—also repelled. At 16:00, the 75th Regiment of the 9th Column counterattacked, seizing eight submachine guns, over ten rifles, and 3,000 rounds; Nationalist casualties numbered 60 killed and over 300 wounded. That evening, Hu Lian ordered: “At dawn tomorrow, the 118th will attack Lailong’an from west to east with divisional howitzer support; the 18th will attack from east to west to encircle it. The front line between them will be the Su–Shu Highway.”

Also on 14 December, Dai Zhiqi’s division HQ occupied Renhewei, the Reserve 3rd reached Fengshan–Zhangshan, the 60th Brigade secured Dongxi’anrenji, and the 41st occupied Shaodianzi. To support the 11th Division’s attack toward Shuyang, the 69th Division deployed reconnaissance forces near Yehai‑zi, Qiaobei Town, and Nanjianzi, while the main forces held key positions, secured against counterattack, and maintained an offensive on the right flank. Hu Lian’s troops remained in Lailong’an, Xiaopingfang, and Gaoweizi; Dai Zhiqi’s northern advance separated them by over 10 li.

On the night of 13 December, Chen Yi and Su Yu arrived at the field HQ in Yinping (Tongyang Town) and issued the first order under the name “East China Field Army”: “Concentrate main forces to annihilate the Suqian‑invading enemy in the Suqian‑Shuyang‑Xinan triangle to facilitate later operations.” They proposed two options:

1. Execute the enemy’s left column first, then defeat advancing forces along Su‑Shu Road.
2. If the enemy advances along that road while the Reserve 3rd lags, annihilate them west of Gengwei and south of Yanjix.

At 09:00 on 14 December, Chen Yi and Su Yu sent a telegram to Jiangxi-based Field Army commanders Chen Shuju and Tang Liang (formerly Chen Shiju) at the Shandong Field Army’s HQ near Chengjiajie, stating the situation near Lianshui was critical and to “first destroy the enemy’s left column—the Reserve 3rd and most of the 41st—before proceeding to the second phase in support of southern Shandong and Lianshui.” They ordered: “All units speed march tonight aiming to encircle the enemy northwest of Zhangshan by dawn on the 15th.” The 1st Column was to shift partly south to block Su–Shu retreat routes and strike from west‑northeast; the 8th Division to support 1st Column’s flank, coordinating with the 9th Column at Wuhuading.

General staff commander Chen Shiju issued orders at midnight on 14 December: “1st Column main forces tonight to north of Xindiantzi (north of Nuanfang and south of Qipanzi); by dawn on 15 December complete encirclement of Xindiantzi. Cut off enemy retreat to Zaohe or Suqian, link with 5th Brigade attacking Zhangshan, and annihilate reinforcements from Xiaodianzi. Full attack by dusk; after eliminating enemy at Xindiantzi, redirect main forces to surround Xiaodianzi.” The 8th Division’s task force assembled at Baicaotang, Majiachang, Xiaochongzi, Tianzhuang (6 li west of Xiaochongzi), poised to support the 1st Column.

That night, 2nd Column reached the battlefield. Due to shortening lines, the 9th Column was ordered by the field HQ to leave the 75th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion and regimental artillery defending Lailong’an under 2nd Column command; Zhangwei‑zi and Hanji positions were handed to 2nd Column. The 8th Division encamped north of Xindiantzi at Xiaochongzi and Baicaotang; the 1st Column, after six days marching, reached the Lingzigang–Qipanzi line and by dawn on 15 December took Xindiantzi. 2nd Brigade’s 6th Regiment pushed to Wu Village at the foot of Zhangshan Town; 3rd Brigade’s 8th Regiment reached Zhuchang in a 2½‑hour engagement and eliminated over 80 enemies from the Reserve 3rd. At 02:30, Su Yu instructed: "1st Column shift to Xiaodianzi, then southeast to capture Caojiajie." At 07:00, Tang Liang and Chen Ruiting, at forward HQ in Tangdianzi, relayed Deputy Commander Rao Zijian’s view: “Attacking from narrow fronts east-west will fail. The 1st Column should seize Xiaodianzi and Zhangshan to cut off enemy retreat.” At 08:00, Chen Yi & Su Yu telegraphed: “1st Column, 8th Division, and 5th Brigade – launch today regardless of aircraft; destroy Wuhuading front. If minimal resistance, main force of 1st Column should move north of Xiaodianzi toward northwest Caojiajie to link with 2nd Column and cut off 118th Brigade’s retreat, thus blocking 11th Brigade reinforcements. After clearing 8th Division’s front, occupy between Xiaodianzi and Caojiajie for Suqian reinforcements.”

At 08:00 on 15 December, the 53rd Regiment (18th Brigade) and 33rd Regiment (118th Brigade) of the 11th Division attacked Lailong’an. The 9th Column’s 75th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion held until 13:00 before withdrawing, suffering more than 300 casualties; deputy regiment commander Qu Shuyi and over 30 others were captured. The 9th Column later summarized: Day 1—incoming attack strong, but reinforcements arrived. Day 2—the main force shifted; 2nd Column replaced and support delayed, leaving them isolated and encircled, resulting in over 200 casualties during breakout. Commander Zhang Zhen wrote: “Our forces were split into three defensive points and lacked unity; a western flank regiment could have achieved a localized decisive victory.” The 11th Division’s history recounts: “By 16:00 on 15 December, the 33rd and 53rd Regiments entered and captured Lailong’an.”

On 15 December morning, the 8th Division’s commander He Yixiang and political commissar Ding Qiusheng returned to divisional HQ and held a battle conference. Their mission: eliminate the Reserve 3rd Brigade advancing through Xiaodianzi and north of Zhangshan. Their three‑step plan:

1. Capture Fengshan.
2. Annihilate enemy at Zhangshan Town.
3. Annihilate enemy at Xiaodianzi.

To seize Fengshan, they deployed 23rd and 24th Regiments as the first echelon:

• 23rd Regiment’s 1st Battalion attacked the southwest corner of Fengshan; 3rd Battalion seized Qiu Village and western approaches; 2nd Battalion blocked reinforcements from Xiaodianzi and prevented southern escape.
• 24th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion cut Zhangshan–Fengshan linkage from the west‑southwest; 1st & 2nd Battalions took Xiao Village north of Fengshan and supported its assault.

22nd Regiment and the divisional special‑ops battalion formed the second echelon, staging at Xiaoying.

At 15 December morning, the 9th Column reported: “Enemy assaulting Bao’anwei has been handled by 2nd Column’s 4th Brigade (~1 regiment). Two enemy battalions from Shaodian are retreating southwest.” At Wuhuading on Su–Xin highway, Rao Zijian observed the enemy adjusting positions—possibly weakening—and reported that “enemy may have noticed our 1st and 8th Divisions advancing south and may change aims; forward command should watch carefully.” At 11:00, based on enemy collapse, Chen Yi & Su Yu ordered Chen Shiju: “1st Column and 8th Division should not linger at Xiaodianzi or Zhangshan. After partial annihilation, main force should advance southeast from between Xiaodianzi and Zhangshan to sever enemy retreat and destroy them piecemeal—no delays.” The 9th Column ordered one battalion of the 73rd Regiment to defend Wuhuading and Nainaimiao, one battalion of the 81st Regiment to defend Shenzhuang, Houzhuang and Daguan, while the remainder attacked Zhangshan Town.

That afternoon, Field Army leaders including Chen Shiju and Wang De came to the 3rd Brigade’s position to coordinate pursuit. At 19:00, Su Yu directed: “1st Brigade hold Xiaodianzi; another hold Fangquanzi; seize Suqian opportunistically; another advance to Caojiajie.”

At 16:00, 9th Column reached Qianwei, 3 li northwest of Zhangshan, engaged the enemy; the 73rd Regiment’s 3rd Battalion eliminated enemy there by 22:00, capturing Reserve 3rd Brigade’s 9th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion and its artillery platoon, 50+ capture. Main force then shifted to Shaodian, halting westward expansion. To address 9th Column’s overly frontal tactics, Su Yu ordered it to concentrate east of Shaodian to attack southwest in support of 5th Brigade; attacks should come from north of Xiao River westwards to link with 5th Brigade, not block from front. From 2nd Column, 5th Brigade attacked at noon and by evening 15th Regiment took Laohewei. At 16:00, 4th Brigade’s 10th Regiment seized Caiji, closed in on Liwei; 11th Regiment neared Yuanlaozhuang and Xujialin; 12th Regiment followed. 4th Brigade then agreed: 10th Regiment assault Xiaocaipwei, then Liwei. By midnight, under artillery support, 10th Regiment attacked Xiaocaipwei thrice without success; on 17 December dawn, it withdrew to Huangniwei. Xiaocaipwei battle caused ~600 casualties among defenders and the 11th Division withdrew farther. The 4th Brigade lost ~500 troops. Its after‑action blamed underestimation, dispersal of forces among four battalions against equal defenders, sequential use of troops, rigid command, failure to isolate defenders, slow artillery preparation, late reserve deployment, bayonet errors, and tight formations.

That afternoon, the re‑organized 18th Division advanced north toward Wangzhuang to relieve threats near their HQ. By nightfall, they reached positions threatening Communist forces besieging Xiaodianzi. At that point, the Communists had recalibrated and held firm. Nationalist defenders at Zhangshantun assessed too late in the day and fatigued, deciding not to advance further.

By 09:00 on 16 December, 8th Division’s 23rd & 24th Regiments occupied the Fengshan south–north line, repairing defenses for multi‑direction attacks. Forward HQ was in Wucun at the mountain’s base; 22nd Regiment’s 3rd Battalion in reserve. At 09:00, 69th Division’s 60th Brigade’s Tan Regiment and Reserve 3rd Brigade’s 7th Regiment, under artillery and air support, attacked Fengshan from east and south. 24th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion and part of 23rd Regiment’s 2nd Battalion held the mountain, repelling sustained Nationalist assaults from 10:00 until around 16:00. Assisted by 22nd Regiment’s 9th Battalion under staff Zhang Chaozhong, they resisted. Political Commissar Ding Qiusheng wrote: “Holding Fengshan is crucial; we must not retreat. Any unauthorized retreaters will be executed on the spot.” When asked by chief of staff Chen Shiju if forces were adequate, they replied: “We can hold; we still have the 22nd Regiment in reserve.” Nationalist reports state: “On 16 December dawn, Tan Regiment and parts of Wei Regiment attacked Fengshan. After hours of fierce fighting with heavy casualties and running out of ammunition, they retreated southeast.”

At 20:00, the 8th Division launched coordinated assaults with 22nd Regiment and divisional special-ops battalion to take Zhangshan Town; accompanied by 5th Brigade’s 15th Regiment. However, defenders escaped east of Fengshan and fled south to Xiaodianzi. That night, 22nd Regiment advanced northwest of Xiaodianzi, preparing for attack. Based on aerial reconnaissance, Chen Yi ordered: “Send a squad to hold King Village, Zhang Village and South Wang Village east of Zhangshan; complete encirclement of Xiaodianzi; prepare to intercept Jinger‑tou reinforcements; after taking Xiaodianzi, advance to Santai Mountain to cut off escape. Resolve battle today. 1st Column’s 3rd Brigade’s 7th Regiment should secure south of Laohu Cave to protect our flank.” Reserve 3rd Brigade defenders in Xiaodianzi included their HQ, 7th Regiment’s three battalions covering east‑southeast, north, and west‑southwest; a mountain‑artillery battalion (seven guns, four defensive cannons) at the northwest; plus remnants of 9th Regiment, totaling four battalions worth of defense. On the night of 16 December, the 24th Regiment inserted east of Santai Mountain to dawn positions southeast of Xiaodianzi, blocking defender’s southern retreat and reinforcement routes. The 23rd Regiment supported from northeast, 22nd Regiment and special‑ops battalion attacked west; division HQ moved to He Village northwest of Xiaodianzi. Through 17 December daylight, they carried out reconnaissance and assault preparations.

On learning the 1st Column had withdrawn, Chen Yi ordered both the 1st Column and 8th Division to advance on Xiaodianzi; if defenders didn’t counterattack at Zhangshan or Fengshan, all forces—including 1st, 2nd Brigades, 8th Division, 5th Brigade, and 2nd Column—would unite that night to destroy the 69th Division. 1st Column would enter via Laohu Cave to Xu Gou Marsh, Caizhuang, Wangzhuang, Fuhua Lake, and attack Miaozhuang and Renhewei. 8th Division advance eastward from Fengshan to Xuzhuang, Songying, Miaozhuang, Caizhuang. 5th Brigade from Sunlijie and Xiaodaijia to Caizhuang. 2nd Column from northeast Caojiajie to attack Renhewei—initially focusing on 69th, while pinning the 11th with minimal forces. Chen Shiju issued three directives:

1. Strike eastward to amplify gains.
2. Link up with the 3rd Brigade for unified control.
3. Cut communication between 11th and 69th Divisions to secure flank support for 8th Division and others.

That night, 1st Column executed flank insertion: 1st Brigade led with 2nd Brigade behind, entering between Xiaodianzi and Fengshan through Laohu Cave toward Fuhua Lake. 3rd Brigade’s 7th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion captured Xu Village north of Xiaodianzi to secure rear; two other battalions ran south along Xiaodianzi’s eastern foothills seizing Santai Mountain and high ground eastward, including Zhanglin and Cailin lines. Column HQ moved to He Village in Xiaodianzi. By 03:20 on 17 December, 1st Column’s 2nd Brigade’s 6th Regiment and 1st Brigade’s 2nd Regiment attacked Laohu Cave, destroying one enemy battalion; 6th Regiment held the position; the 1st Regiment’s 1st Battalion captured Gaozhuang, and elements from both 1st and 2nd Battalions took Cailin, inflicting losses while advancing toward Fuhua Lake. Major forces occupied over a dozen villages across a 6–7 km by 1–2 km triangular area, securing three‑sided defenses—north, west, southeast—effectively dividing the 11th and 69th Divisions and isolating the Reserve 3rd, 60th, and 41st Brigades. However, 1st Column was surrounded: Xiaodianzi’s Reserve 3rd to the west; 60th and 41st Brigades to the north; 11th Division’s three brigades to the south. At 04:00, 3rd Brigade’s 7th Regiment under Chief of Staff Xie Zhongliang infiltrated southwest via Laohu Cave; its 3rd Battalion seized Xu Village north of Xiaodianzi; 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced to Shenzhuang; at dawn, using valleys and fog, 1st Battalion took Zhanglin, Cailin, and Santai Mountain, pushing defenders to Xiaodianzi; 2nd Battalion attacked Gaowazhen and by noon annihilated the 5th Engineering Regiment’s 1st Battalion. Securing Santai Mountain and Gaowazhen neutralised flank threats and allowed 3rd Brigade’s 7th Regiment to repel northern reinforcements from the 18th Division.

By 08:00 on 17 December, re‑organized 11th Division’s 118th Brigade, supported by eight aircraft and heavy artillery, launched a counterattack on Santai Mountain, Cailin, and Anzhuang—positions held by the 3rd Brigade’s 7th Regiment. Reserve 3rd Brigade defenders at Xiaodianzi also struck northward and southward at the 7th Regiment. Despite the pincer attacks, the 7th Regiment repelled multiple assaults and held till near noon.

At 10:20, Su Yu ordered: “1st Column leave a battalion to observe the enemy; remaining forces attack reinforcements. Tonight, 5th Brigade, 8th Division, and 1st Column will come under Chief of Staff Chen [Shiju]; 2nd Column under the 9th Column. Objective: destroy the 60th Brigade. 2nd Column and 9th Column should concentrate fully on eliminating defenders at Renhewei.” Upon learning Santai Mountain had been taken, he instructed: “During daylight, allocate full force of 1st Column (except observing battalion) to defeat reinforcements at Jingertou; 2nd & 9th Columns should flank the 118th Brigade from north, if unsuitable from northwest of Gaoweizi.”

2nd Column commander Wei Guoqing immediately deployed the 9th Brigade alongside the 9th Column to besiege Renhewei: first clearing the area south of Renhewei to cut retreat, then attacking the main enclosure next day. The 4th Brigade secured Lailong’an, Gaoweizi, Zhuozhuang, Liuzhuang, moving westward to sever 69th–11th communications; also functioned to monitor the 11th and block its support. At 15:30, 2nd Column advanced: 4th Brigade progressed west through Gaoweizi, Zhuzhuang, Zhuozhuang, Liuzhuang, reaching south of Zhutaoyuan and near Zhaiwahufang; scouts advanced to Caotang Bridge to secure 9th Brigade’s flank and rear.

By 13:00, 118th Brigade of 11th Division, backed by aircraft and artillery, took Cailin and Anzhuang, then attacked Zhanglin and Gaowazhen. A battalion from the 18th Division also attacked Gaowazhen from Yezhuang and Shangjian Nuozhao. The 1st Column’s 2nd Brigade’s 6th Regiment dispatched Deputy Commander Chen Baofu and two companies to reinforce and hold the hill. The 7th Regiment’s 7th Company (named for the late Zhejiang Column’s Guan Jie) defended Zhanglin Village, enduring seven attacks and being reduced to a single squad. Deputy Chief of Staff Zhang Jilun organized communications, medical, and headquarters personnel into two emergency squads to hold the village interior.

That afternoon, at 17:00, Su Yu directed: “1st Column’s five regiments plus elements of the 8th Division will attack from Santai Mountain; a group from Xiaodianzi will come from east–south to annihilate the 18th Brigade.” At 16:10—one hour ahead—1st Column’s 1st Brigade’s 2nd Regiment with two battalions attacked from southeast of Fuhua Lake. The 6th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion took over defense from the 7th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion; 3rd Regiment deployed its 9th Company and ~20 special‑ops staff to counterattack—retaking southeast Zhanglin and outskirts near Cailin. The Zhanglin garrison, about 20 soldiers, engaged in close-quarters fights, repelling one company and capturing several enemy soldiers. The 6th Regiment’s 1st Battalion and 7th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion repelled enemy at Gaowazhen and regained Anzhuang. By 16:30, Nationalist forces advancing from Suqian had completely retreated. 1st Column used artillery to block the retreat of the 18th Division while supporting pursuit, capturing over 400 fleeing soldiers.

During 17 December, Nationalist commander Hu Lian opposed shifting the 69th Division to reinforce the 11th. Dai Zhiqi ordered all formations to fortify in place—but noted north of Suqian, soggy terrain and collapsing earthen houses made village defense weak.

At 18:00, the 8th Division initiated bombardment and sapping charges for the final assault on Xiaodianzi. By midnight, most of the Reserve 3rd Brigade defenders were destroyed; remnants attempting to flee south were captured by the 24th Regiment. Xiaodianzi fell. Reserve 3rd Brigade commander Wei Renjian handed over command to his chief of staff and escaped with a small group.

At 24:00 on the 17th, 2nd Column received a field HQ order: “The 9th Brigade must assist the 9th Column—by dawn 18 December decisively capture Renhewei. Any commander refusing will be executed.” Commander Zhang Zhen later recalled: “Su Yu was intensely monitoring progress at Renhewei—it’s the 69th Division HQ. If seized, battlefield advantage would shift; failure could reverse fortunes. Thus the harsh order.” Deputy Commander Rao Zijian recalled Su telling him: “Anyone not executing the forward HQ’s orders will be dealt with harshly. We must annihilate the enemy at Renhewei.”

2nd Column commander Wei Guoqing urgently arranged the final assault: 9th Column attacked from northeast and northwest corners; 9th Brigade’s 26th Regiment attacked southeast and south with one battalion; 25th Regiment attacked southwest; 27th Regiment held as backup. The 26th Regiment’s 1st Battalion, given insufficient intel, no artillery cover, and poor organization, assaulted exposed terrain with minimal access and heavy machine gun fire—suffering catastrophic losses. Battalion commander Liang Bangzhe and all assault company officers were killed; only wounded political instructor Ma Youli survived and commanded survivors—out of 472 men, 219 were casualties; 23 company-plus officers were casualties; 2nd Company lost 83 soldiers, only one squad leader and 11 men remained. The 26th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion likewise suffered near 200 casualties. The 2nd Column later concluded that hasty attack without preparation in flat terrain against strong defenses was ill‑advised; late orders, inadequate intel, unprepared weapons—these hampered success. Meanwhile, 9th Column’s 73rd Regiment attacked south, 77th as support, from 04:00 on 18 December, but made no breakthroughs and shifted to close-range operations.

Before dawn on 18 December, the 1st Column’s 2nd Brigade’s 4th Regiment attacked Luozhuang—site of 60th Brigade HQ—surrounding it from three sides.

That morning and at noon, under siege at Renhewei, 69th Division commander Dai Zhiqi twice radioed Hu Lian requesting 11th Division reinforcement. Hu replied support would arrive late 18 or dawn 19 December, urging Dai to hold. Hu then ceased responding; Deputy Commander Wang Yan managed communications. Wu Qiwei, deputy director of Suzhou Pacification Headquarters in Suqian, ordered the 11th Division to cross Liutang River to support Dai. At 11:00, Su Yu instructed: “69th Division HQ, and 41st and 60th Brigades should attempt breakout by 12:00; 11th Division must support from north—inform the 1st Column & 8th Division to prepare to annihilate the enemy. Do not let them escape.” At 14:00, Hu Lian dispatched only two regiments from the 18th Brigade toward Dai’s position—but they were repulsed by the 1st Brigade’s 1st Regiment, capturing over 200. Hu told Wu Qiwei: “General Dai is doomed!”

At 15:00, Dai Zhiqi summoned direct subordinate units including the 276th Regiment’s commander and decided to reinforce defense inside Renhewei enclosure. The 276th kept one battalion outside; regimental HQ with two battalions entered the compound. Deputy commander Rao raised concerns that daytime movement would invite confusion—but Dai insisted time was short. After 15:00, the 2nd Column’s 9th Brigade began bombardment: mountain artillery destroyed two towers on the southern wall with five rounds, and its radio mast with three. As the 276th moved into the enclosure by dusk, the 9th Brigade, mistaking the movement for breakout attempts, used two battalions from the 25th Regiment and the 27th Regiment to strike—crushing the 276th, with only a few escaping. 9th Column then dispatched the 75th Regiment, while 77th captured forward positions outside the perimeter.

At 16:00 on 18 December, the 3rd Brigade’s 8th Regiment seized Tongzhuang and Lizhuang, eliminating part of the 60th Brigade. The 60th collapsed. Its HQ and two battalions attempted breakout westward and were intercepted and decimated by 1st Column’s 1st, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 9th Regiments.

2nd Column’s 9th Brigade then assigned the 27th Regiment as main assault unit from south and southeast; 25th Regiment continued southwest attacks. At 22:30, the 9th Brigade launched the final assault; at midnight Captain Rao Zijian reported: “Dawei‑zi taken by five battalions; expected victory by dawn.” At 00:40, 9th Column commander Wei Guoqing reported two regiments had entered and would soon take full control. 73rd Regiment’s 1st Battalion first breached the northwest corner; 3rd Battalion entered; the 77th attacked from northeast, encountered stubborn resistance, but with 73rd support quickly overcame it. By 02:00 on 19 December, 9th Column reported four battalions captured, seven mountain guns, ten vehicles, over 1,000 prisoners—battle not fully over. At 02:40, they said “battle nearly finished; tallying results.”

On 19 December, East China Field Army and Shandong Field Army annihilated Dai Zhiqi’s re‑organized forces around Zhangshan, Renhewei, and Xiaodianzi north of Suqian. Dai Zhiqi issued his final order: “No chance to break out. I was betrayed. Every unit find way to break through.” Then he shouted “Long live the Kuomintang!” and committed suicide. Political cadre Hu Qikun of the 2nd Column found a dead soldier wearing cotton shoes frozen in ice—he removed them to wear.

According to the post‑battle 69th Division report: “By the 17th rear routes were severed and ammo gone. HQ sent repeated requests to 11th Division commander and Wu Qiwei—‘We will die here, have destroyed over 40,000 enemies; if resupplied for even one more day we can finish. Enemy knows our ammo is gone and is intensifying siege. Nine enemy regiments surround our small HQ; send immediate ammo.’ 11th Division commander replied sincerely: ‘They are comrade‑brothers; by dawn we will dispatch two regiments, arriving by nine.’ With that we awaited relief—but nine came and passed, then twelve, then night with neither troops nor ammo.” Again they radioed Wu Qiwei—he barked: “Commander Dai, you know my temper; I will not say more. You must fight to the end.” Despite days without sleep or food, the division had achieved success; yet Xi Qiwei and Wu tried no relief, causing ammunition exhaustion and collapse. The division perished. People’s Daily later reported him as “incompetent, responsible for the tragedy of the 69th Division at Renhewei.”

Aftermath

The campaign lasted four days and nights. The East China Field Army attacked six and a half Nationalist brigades—14 regiments—using 24 regiments, with a force ratio of 1.7:1. They completely annihilated the re‑organized 69th Division’s 3½ brigades including Engineering 5th Regiment, totaling 21,534 men (8,174 killed or wounded; 11,360 captured). Captured materiel: 35 mountain guns; 82 mortars; 12 infantry/defensive artillery; 2 rocket launchers; 160 rifle grenades and grenade tubes; 5,704 rifles; 3,180 shells; 790,000 rounds of small arms ammo; 21 radios; 294 horses. PLA casualties: 8,766 (2,191 killed; 6,350 wounded; 225 missing). Ammunition used: 9,913 artillery shells, 807,000 small arms rounds.

Casualties by unit:

• 1st Column: 2,470 (740 KIA; 1,730 wounded)
• 2nd Column: 1,372 (264 KIA; 1,108 wounded)
• 8th Division: 1,270 (204 KIA; 1,066 wounded)
• 5th Brigade: 2,182 (323 KIA; 1,859 wounded)
• 9th Column: 1,387 (428 KIA; 959 wounded)

Total: 8,681 casualties (1,959 KIA; 6,722 wounded).

The 5th Brigade sustained one-quarter strength casualty rate across its three regiments despite limited combat, failing to secure a single village—due to being pinned during breakout. Significantly, the campaign strengthened unified command between East China and Shandong Field Armies, generated large-scale annihilation experience, and bolstered morale. Su Yu remarked: “This campaign determined whether we could seize strategic initiative through active will…it was the first turning point in East China Theater…a victory marking that turn.” Chen Yi, writing to the Party Central Committee, noted lessons: focus force density and free principal forces once urban strongholds fall.

On 6 June 1947, Chiang Kai‑shek commented to the Military Cadre Training Corps (third class): “Last winter, the 11th Division was moved near Xuzhou…we believed it was to assault Xin’an—but Suqian was the actual objective. With only two divisions, advancing on two fronts dispersed our strength, exposing weakness and opportunity for the enemy. That was strategic error not rectifiable by tactics.” The Defense Ministry formally blamed the re‑organized 11th Division’s retreat without notification, causing the 69th Division’s disaster.

External links

• zh:宿北战役
• zh:陈毅军事文选