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'The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century' was written by Robert Marks and first published in 2002. He is currently a history professor at Whittier College and specializes in world and environmental history.[1]

Overview

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Purpose:

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The purpose of Marks’ work is to provide an alternative understanding as to why and how some parts of the world industrialised first. This timeline begins in the 15th century and ends in the 19th century to provide a broad overview of the historical developments of this time period. Additionally, his response is centered upon dismantling the notion of 'European Exceptionalism', that it is the intellectual and cultural superiority of Europeans facilitated the 'Great Divergence'.[2]

Methodology:

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To do so, Marks creates an alternative timeline that is premised upon the three concepts of contingency, accidents and conjuncture.[3] These are explained below:

  • Contingency:
    • Were western successes dependent upon developments elsewhere?
  • Accidents:
    • Were there any "historical accidents" that affected the development of countries?
  • Conjuncture:
    • Did intersecting historical developments create further success for some nations?

Although, it is not only the intersection between historical conjunctures, accidents and contingencies that enabled for the East and West diversion. Instead, accountability should be shifted to a nation's ability to break free from the constraints of the "biological old regime" to foster their development.[4]

Content:

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"The Material and Trading Worlds, circa 1400":

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In the first chapter, Marks introduces the environmental and material world of the 1400's.

"Starting with China":

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In the second chapter, Marks discusses the importance of the Indian Ocean as a global crossroad of trade.[5] In doing so, he challenges whether the voyages of Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama are as important as historians have claimed them to be; and therefore, seeks to reassess the role of Europe in this time period.[6] He chooses to examine the development and interconnectedness of India, Africa, Chinese and the Islamic empire as a point of analysis. Mark begins with China and examines how the Ming Dynasty was focused upon increasing their prestige through encouraging overseas trade.[7] This was necessary after the fall of the Mongol empire, where overland trade between Eurasia and Asia were severed; therefore, the Chinese turned their attention to the Indian Ocean for economic gain.[8]

In saying so, the voyages of Zheng He (1405-1433) enabled for access to new materials, emergence of major trading cities and ports (e.g. Melaka, Cambay and Kilwa) the development of three trade circuits linking Eurasia and Asia together as well as the establishment of diplomatic relations with other regions.[9] Although, from 1435 onwards China revoked their naval position in the Indian Ocean to refocus their efforts and resources towards the nomads in the north.[10] Marks then affirms that the Indian Ocean was indeed a self-regulated trade system that hardly required powers resorting to violence.[11] This changed when the Portuguese and later the rest of Europe gained access to the Indian Ocean with the aim to control and monopolise trade; however, they did not gain control until the 1800's.[12] Originally, Europeans had no access to trade routes of the Indian Ocean due to Islamic expansion. This changed after the Bartholomew Dias navigated around the 'Cape of Good Hope' and was able to gain access to the Indian Ocean from there. Marks then summarises the chapter by arguing that the world was polycentric, and that the "technological advantages", "climatic and geographical constraints" and "consumer tastes and social conventions" enabled for the Indian Ocean to be the global crossroad for trade.[13]

"Empires, States, and the New World, 1500-1775":

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In the third chapter, Marks acknowledge the changes occurring globally.[14] These are:

  1. The majority of the globe was connected and had ongoing contact with other nations.
  2. As wealth accumulated and economies expanded so too did empires.
  3. War and violence in Europe led to the establishment of sovereign states.
  4. The changes in the global climate affected the process of war, mortality rates and state order.

As these changes occurred, there emerged five new and greatly expanding empires of China, Russia, India, Iran and the Ottoman empire. Marks highlights the development of these empires, but most importantly, analyses how their mobilisation of resources and political control enabled for their rise. [15] Marks then shifts his focus to the Americas, where the Spanish conquest of America created the Columbian Exchange - the global trade of peoples, products and diseases. Besides this, Columbus' accidental discovery of the Americas enabled for the mass accumulation of gold and silver. The latter, however, would be most important due to Chinese demand for silver to serve as their currency and later for trade purposes.[16] At this point of time, Marks notes, Europe was a peripheral nation of which Asia was dominating the global market.[17] On the other hand, this began to change in the establishment of the New World economy which relied upon the trade of slaves, crops and goods to form the basis of their economic wealth.[18]

"The Industrial Revolution and Its Consequences, 1750-1850":

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Marks opens the fourth chapter in assessing the biological regime which influenced the growth or decline of the population, but also economic development.[19] Once humans were able to harness the potential of coal, they were no longer restrained by this regime. Therefore, the “new productive powers” of emerging technologies enabled for the expansion of the human population and development.[20] To facilitate Britain's largely import based economy to that of an export economy, Britain's endorsement of mercantilist protectionism was necessary to expand its cotton industry and weaken Indian cotton dominance.[21] The success of this was contingent upon events such as the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1699 and the development of the Atlantic Slave Trade which established Britain's cotton market.[22] Although it was not only Britain's economic policies that allowed for the Industrial Revolution, but much rather, success is owed to the emergence of technologies that led Britain to break free of the old biological regime.[23]

Marks then examines China and questions why a Industrial Revolution occurred in Britain and not in China. He posits that China had good agricultural practices, great transportation and market policies that enabled for their growth to surpass that of Europe's. Despite this, the depletion of natural resources, labour sexual divisions and the lack of fertile land placed ecological limits upon China's growth.[24] These limits were reached by the 18th century and were not overcome.

"The Gap":

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"The Great Departure":

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Conclusions:

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In sum, Marks makes some observations in regards to the Great Divergence. These are explained below:

  • The West-East split was caused not because of the cultural advancements of a particular society, but much rather, arose due to the interactions between people.[25]
  • It should not be assumed that Western powers were superior for a large part of history. Instead, the Great Divergence occurred quite late in history and seemed accidental and unexpected.[26]
  • The ability of nations to tap into stored energy and no longer be restrained by the biological regime enabled for increased industrial output and production. As such, this economic edge facilitated further growth and development.[27]

Reception

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Marks' work has received fairly good but mixed reception from scholars. Take for example, Edmund N. Todd who argues that Marks' response is useful to dismantle European Exceptionalism, where the emphasis upon contingencies and conjunctures causes scholars to rethink the Great Divergence.[28] Additionally, scholars are urged to rethink the role of Asia, whom Marks establishes as the center of the world economy.[29]

Likewise Jacques Szaluta articulates that Marks' piece is highly informative and takes into account recent scholarship to make sense of how our global systems came to be.[30] Furthermore, Marks' integration of critical environmental issues today and the deviation from traditional Eurocentric approaches are of value to the academic community.

In contrast, David Ringrose pinpoints that at times Marks uses general historiographical stereotypes that he criticised greatly in his introduction. One of these stereotypes includes that Europe was not a singular, united empire due to tensions between the Spanish and other European nations.[31] Despite this weakness, Ringrose believes that Marks implicit reference to how Europe's lacking political authority made Europe vulnerable to "a form of free-swinging and armed merchant capitalism" is a valid claim.[32] Additionally, Ringrose disputes Mark's theory that Britain's Industrial Revolution was not only caused by "political manipulation" or Britain's conveniently placed coal deposits. Instead, some of the focus should be placed upon economic factors, such as Britain's successful market integration.[33] Regardless of this, Ringrose acknowledges that Marks' piece provides a good framework of global history from the 14th century onwards.

  1. ^ "Robert Marks | Whittier College". www.whittier.edu. Retrieved 2019-05-01.
  2. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 9-10.
  3. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 10-15.
  4. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 211-214.
  5. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 41.
  6. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 41.
  7. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 42-43.
  8. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 43.
  9. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 43-45.
  10. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 45.
  11. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 48.
  12. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 45.
  13. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 64-65.
  14. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 67-69.
  15. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 71.
  16. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 79-83.
  17. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 83.
  18. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 86.
  19. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 97.
  20. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 97-101.
  21. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 100.
  22. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 100-103.
  23. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 104.
  24. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 110.
  25. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 209.
  26. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 210.
  27. ^ Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 210-211.
  28. ^ Todd, Edmund N. Environmental History 9, no. 3 (2004): 532-33. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/stable/3985772.
  29. ^ Todd, Edmund N. Environmental History 9, no. 3 (2004): 532-33. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/stable/3985772.
  30. ^ Jacques Szaluta. "Marks, Robert B.: The origins of the modern world: a global and environmental narrative from the fifteenth to the twenty-first century." CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, Dec. 2015, p. 623. Academic OneFile, http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A437506061/AONE?u=usyd&sid=AONE&xid=c40ee5f8.
  31. ^ David R. Ringrose. "Global History: A Short Overview, and: The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative (review)." Journal of World History 15, no. 4 (2004): 519-522. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed June 3, 2019).
  32. ^ David R. Ringrose. "Global History: A Short Overview, and: The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative (review)." Journal of World History 15, no. 4 (2004): 519-522. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed June 3, 2019).
  33. ^ David R. Ringrose. "Global History: A Short Overview, and: The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative (review)." Journal of World History 15, no. 4 (2004): 519-522. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed June 3, 2019).
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